PIETY AND PUBLIC OPINION

Understanding Indonesian Islam

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JAKARTA – INDONESIA

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To Eli and Anisa
To Emma, David, Claire, Eva, and Anna
To Baikuniyah

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Piety and Public Opinion

PETA NEGARA KESATUAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

SAMUDRA PASIFIK UTARA
LAUT SULAWESI
LAUT HALMAHERA
LAUT SERAM
LAUT BANDA
LAUT ARU
LAUT ARAFURA
LAUT TIMOR
LAUT JAWA
LAUT NATUNA UTARA
LAUT NATUNA
LAUT CHINA SELATAN
LAUT SULU
LAUT FILIPINA
SAMUDRA PASIFIK SELATAN
SAMUDRA HINDIA
SAMUDERA INDONESIA
SELAT MALAKA
SELAT KARIMATA
SELAT MAKASSAR
SELAT LOMBOK
SELAT SUNDA
SELAT BANGKA
SELAT GASPAR
SELAT BERHALA
SELAT DURIAN
SELAT PHILLIP
SELAT SINGAPURA
SELAT MALUKU
SELAT TIMOR
SELAT LEUWEUNG
SELAT SELAYAR
SELAT BALI
SELAT ALAS

1

Introduction

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

John Esposito and John Voll's signature book *Islam and Democracy* opens with a stark observation: "Religious resurgence and democratization are two of the most important developments of the final decades of the twentieth century" (Esposito and Voll 1996: 3). More than twenty years later the same observation holds true. Across the Muslim world, religion plays an increasingly prominent role in both the private and the public lives of over a billion people. Observers of these changes, in turn, struggle to understand the consequences of an Islamic resurgence in a democratizing world. Will democratic political participation by an increasingly religious population lead to victories by Islamists at the ballot box? Will more conspicuously pious Muslims participate in politics and markets in a fundamentally different way than they had previously? Will a renewed attention to Islam lead Muslim democracies to re-evaluate their place in the global

community of states, turning away from alignments with the West or the global South and toward an Islamic civilizational identity?

The answers to these questions depend, at least in part, on what ordinary Muslims think and do. For example, do Muslims actually care about the religious platforms of political parties, and is this concern more pronounced among more pious Muslims? Are more pious Muslims less tolerant of democracy, more tolerant of Islamic law, more likely to demand that their market transactions comply with Islamic legal principles? Do they actually identify with the Muslim world more than they do with the West? Pitched at the individual level, none of the answers to these questions are themselves dispositive, for it could be the case that the views of ordinary Muslims do not much matter for the trajectories of Islam and democracy as world historical forces. But the simple fact that the actions and choices of mass publics constitute the essence of democratic politics means that understanding the contours of public opinion is important for making sense of these changes. Focusing on what individuals actually believe is also a corrective to the sensationalist, sometimes even hysterical characterizations of Muslim beliefs that in the West so often drive public discourse about the future of Islam and democracy.

Not surprisingly, scholars and analysts alike have looked primarily to the Middle East to make sense of the resurgence of Islam and its prospects for democracy. Given the Arabian origins of Islam as a world religion and the centrality of Muslim holy sites located in the Middle East, it makes sense to consider trends in the Arab Middle East as particularly important for the Muslim world as a whole. But for most of its postcolonial history, the Arab Middle East has fared poorly in electoral or liberal democratic terms: between 1972 and 2012, counting seventeen countries in the Arab Middle East, Freedom House ranks only three country-years out of 692, or 0.4%, as "Free."[1] The non-Arab Middle Eastern states of Turkey and Iran

1. See Freedom House (2013), calculated from Teorell et al. (2013). The seventeen countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The three country-years rated "Free" are Lebanon, 1972–74. Of country-years in this period, 36.7% are rated "Partially Free," and a full 62.9% are rated "Not Free."

have slightly more extensive democratic experiences, but only Turkey ever achieved the ranking of "Free," and that only in the 1970s. This means that linking the beliefs and preferences of Muslims to the question of Islam and democracy requires a difficult counterfactual: *if* Middle Eastern Muslims lived in democratic societies, how would their religion shape politics and political economy there?

In this book, we argue that Indonesia—the world's largest Muslim country and one of the world's only consolidated Muslim democracies—is the place to look for evidence of the consequences of Islamic religious resurgence. Like Hefner (2000), Bowen (2003), Rudnyckyj (2010), Buehler (2016), and Menchik (2016), among others in a tradition stretching back to Geertz (1968), we show how the Indonesian experience informs questions of the relationship between piety and politics that span the Muslim world and beyond. Like Fealy and White (2008), Mietzner (2009a), Azra, van Dijk, and Kaptein (2010), and others, we show how a more nuanced understanding of Islam helps shed light on just what the implications of political Islam are for Indonesian democracy and society. But our approach differs from existing approaches in Indonesian studies, which have concentrated on the interpretation of important events, historical trends, and texts; or the opinions expressed by elites or collected in spatially focused field sites. Without rejecting the contributions of earlier scholars employing such methodologies in the study of Islam in Indonesia and elsewhere, we characterize the religious orientations of Indonesian Muslims in a different way, by collecting as much data as possible from as broad and representative a sample of Indonesians as can be gathered. With these data, we are able to describe, in a way that has never before been possible, Indonesian Islam as practiced across the country by everyday people.

More significantly, we are also able to use the variation that we uncover to explore in detail how religiosity and religious belief translate into political and economic behavior at the individual level. The core finding that we uncover is, in fact, a null finding. Across various issue areas—support for democracy or Islamic law, partisan politics, Islamic finance, foreign relations—there is no evidence that the religious orientations of Indonesian Muslims have any systematic relationships with their political

preferences or economic behavior. We establish these facts in three steps. We begin conceptually, outlining just what individual piety means for Indonesian Muslims, and establishing a coherent measurement approach that allows us to describe how piety varies across individuals. We then turn to a series of substantive issue areas, drawing on a wide range of theoretical insights to generate clear expectations as to why religion *might* affect beliefs or behavior as well as theoretically motivated reasons why it might not. We then carefully construct a series of empirical models of the relationship between beliefs, preferences, and behavior that emerge directly from the preceding conceptual and theoretical steps. Each of these models is a novel contribution to the study of religion and political and economic behavior in the Muslim world, and each remains in close dialogue with the specifics of the Indonesian case.

The general result is that, if we look across Indonesian Muslims, evidence that more religious Indonesian Muslims think or behave differently than their less religious counterparts simply does not exist.

PIETY, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND IDENTITY: QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Establishing that religiosity among Muslims has only a limited and highly conditional relationship to political preferences and economic behavior is not straightforward. This task requires a clear conceptualization of piety at the individual level, rigorous measurement, and careful research design. It also requires theoretical nuance in order to capture the subtleties of how beliefs, preferences, and behaviors are interrelated. To be useful for comparative insight—outside of Indonesia, and beyond Islam—it also requires us to be explicit about what is and is not particular about Islam as a religion, and about Indonesia as the country under investigation.

Attuned to these challenges, we divide our task in this book into four parts. The first of these—chapter 2—is where we present our conceptualization and measurement of piety. We argue that the rapidly growing public opinion literature on religion and political behavior in the Muslim

world has articulated neither a conceptual foundation for what it means for a Muslim to be pious or religious, on one hand, nor a credible strategy through which to capture that conceptualization of piety in public opinion data, on the other. We provide a theoretically grounded yet contextually flexible conceptualization of piety, which we base on a series of basic assumptions about the individual foundations of piety as well as a close reading of Islam as a religion. We then show how to operationalize that conceptualization of piety using survey data that we collected directly for this purpose. Throughout this chapter we maintain a critical perspective on both conceptualization and measurement of piety, raising explicitly what we consider to be plausible substantive objections to our assumptions and (where possible) using our data to allay concerns that these assumptions adversely affect the conclusions we draw.

The three remaining chapters of the book apply the concept of piety to three broad topical areas that have long animated scholars of Islam, politics, and political economy, both in Indonesia and beyond. The first of these is the relationship between piety and support for Islamist political parties. Indonesians have gone to the polls four times since democratization in 1998 to vote for a national legislature, and since 2004 they have had three chances to vote directly for their president. Uniquely in the Muslim world, Indonesian Islamists compete freely and openly with non-Islamist political parties, the overwhelming majority of which self-identify with the multifaith political ideology known as Pancasila. Two questions naturally emerge. Do Islamist parties receive more votes than they otherwise would because of their Islamist platforms? And are more religious Muslims more likely to vote for such parties than others who are less religious?

The simplicity of these two questions belies the challenges in providing credible answers for them. The reason is that it is nearly impossible to separate the effect of Islam—what we term "Islam's political advantage"—from the effects of other platforms that Islamist parties espouse. Islamist parties have long campaigned on both secular reformist and Islamist messages, and focus in particular on material prosperity and social development, two platforms that naturally may be attractive to many Indonesian voters,

both pious and not. The basic issue we face is that support for Islamic parties may reflect the attractiveness of Islam or the attractiveness of something else that that party espouses. Indeed, even though Indonesia's Islamist parties have not won more than approximately a quarter of all votes in any national election since 1998, it could be that they would be even more popular if they were *not* Islamist.

In chapter 3 we set our sights on answering these questions. Drawing on the emerging literature on Islam and public opinion, historical research on the background social and economic conditions that shaped the evolution of Islamic parties throughout the Muslim world, and formal political theories of valence and attribution, we propose a series of theoretical interpretations of what Islam's political advantage might mean. We then outline an experimental approach that draws on recent advances in experimental political science to generate the exact counterfactual comparisons needed both to isolate the extent of Islam's political advantage and to interpret what it means. We show that Islam does have a small political advantage, but that it is highly circumscribed by voters' own knowledge of parties' *nonreligious* economic platforms. And, moreover, this advantage exists only among the most pious members of our sample of Indonesians. This finding is a powerful corrective to long-standing interpretations of a vote for Islamist parties as merely an expressive choice among religious individuals who "naturally" vote for like-minded parties; it also qualifies reductionist perspectives that downplay the role of religion in shaping individual vote choice.

A similar set of questions motivates our analysis of individual piety and ways of participating in the modern market economy. As in the rest of the Muslim world, the growth of political Islam in post-Soeharto Indonesia parallels a rise of conspicuously Islamic modes of social and economic behavior. And much as Islamist political movements propose that Islam provides an alternative to secular or "Western" models of politics, Islamic economics promises an alternative foundation for economic organization, one rooted in scriptural principles on the permissibility of certain types of economic exchange (see El-Gamal 2006; Kuran 2004 for critical overviews). In practical terms, this means that Indonesians can choose to

participate in the modern market economy in ways that are more or less consistent with what is perceived to be an Islamic model of behavior. This may mean patronizing establishments that adhere more or less closely to Islamic teachings, or participating in credit cooperatives run by Islamic mass organizations, or choosing financial products that eschew interest (forbidden as *riba*) in favor of alternatives that have been synthesized by Islamic financial experts to offer similar returns in a scripturally compliant manner.

The last of these—the market for consumer financial products—is perhaps the most salient to contemporary debates about Islam and the economy. Much as Indonesians have a choice to vote for Islamist or non-Islamist parties, Indonesians may also choose Islamic or non-Islamic financial products that offer comparable benefits and services. In chapter 4 we investigate both opinions about Islamic financial products and the actual use of these products by Indonesian Muslims. We find limited evidence that more pious Muslims are more likely to use Islamic financial products than less pious Muslims. But this finding is fragile: when we account for either the socioeconomic position of Muslims or their degree of perceived attachment to other Muslim countries, the relationship between piety and economic behavior disappears. We interpret this as further evidence that there is no clear relationship between individual religiosity and the ways that contemporary Muslims in Indonesia participate in the modern market economy. It also signals that scholars must understand religious life and individual piety as part of a larger and more complex set of social transformations that include both modernization and globalization.

The third substantive topic that we address is the ways in which Indonesian Muslims relate to the rest of the world. Islam is a world religion, and one particularly attuned to its global community of adherents, or ummah. As Islam becomes a more conspicuous component of Indonesian Muslims' everyday lives and identities, it is widely suspected to correspond to a shift from a more nationalist or postcolonial identity to one more aligned with the Muslim world. This potential transformation has profound implications for how Indonesians situate themselves in the global community of nations and peoples. Yet actual data on how

Indonesians actually conceptualize their relationship to the rest of the world are almost nonexistent. More problematically, we argue, there are some nagging problems in how most scholars of Islam and civilizational identity—in Indonesia and elsewhere—approach this question, assuming that a more conspicuous or assertive identification with the Muslim world necessarily entails a corresponding decrease in one's identification with other groups, peoples, or civilizations.

Chapter 5 takes up the task of remedying these problems. Drawing inspiration from the emerging literatures on anti-Americanism in world politics (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007), we first explain why Muslims, and particularly more pious Muslims, might prefer less engagement between Indonesia and Western countries. But departing substantially from the state of the art in this literature, we then argue that that finding—if true—would be consistent with at least two different underlying orientations among Muslims. One is an anti-Western orientation, but another is an "isolationist" or "anticosmopolitan" orientation. Distinguishing between those two perspectives requires knowing more than just an individual's orientation toward the West; it also requires knowing his or her orientations toward *other* countries or civilizations as well. The theoretical reason for this is that preferences for global engagement, like other forms of identity, are multidimensional (individuals may hold multiple identities) and nonexclusive (strong identification with one part of the world need not entail weak identification with other parts of the world). Capitalizing on our rich data on preferences for global engagement, we investigate how Indonesians relate not only to the West, but also to the Muslim world and to East and Southeast Asia. To do so, we introduce a new methodological procedure that allows us to estimate the relationship between individual characteristics and a "portfolio" of identities or orientations while respecting both the multidimensionality and the nonexclusivity of global engagement, something that is not possible with existing statistical techniques. Our findings paint a rich and nuanced picture of individual religiosity and global engagement: more pious Indonesian Muslims are indeed drawn to favor closer relations with Muslim countries, but this is because they are cosmopolitans, not

because they favor engagement with the Muslim world at the expense of engagement elsewhere.

The main contributions that emerge from these four chapters are empirical. In showing that, for example, pious Muslims favor engagement with East and Southeast Asia as well as with the Muslim world, and that there is more variation in individual piety within "streams" or *aliran* in Indonesian Islam (Geertz 1960) than there is between them, we provide new evidence about how piety relates to preferences, identities, and economic behavior that has not yet been available. The contributions complement one another, such that, taken together, they amount to a broad rejection of the view that a distinctly Islamic form of politics or identity follows from being a pious Muslim in Indonesia.

However, we also consider our conceptual and theoretical contributions to be just as important, for these are what ensure that this book is not simply a descriptive characterization of patterns in Indonesian public opinion data. Put otherwise, the function of the book is not only to provide answers to existing questions about piety, Islam, and public opinion, but to show how to ask proper questions in the first place. These questions are relevant far beyond the contemporary Indonesian context. We cannot study what piety causes without first conceptualizing what piety is. As a corollary, to avoid tautology or circularity, we must specify piety among Muslims in a way that distinguishes the essence of being a pious Muslim from engaging in behaviors or holding beliefs that are associated with Islam. We cannot ask whether Islam has a political advantage without a theory of why and how Islam could have a political advantage, and in turn, how public opinion data might be used to uncover that advantage. We cannot study the use of Islamic finance as a form of "commodified piety" (Hasan 2009) without a theory of what predictions about the relationship between beliefs and behavior would follow from that perspective. Indeed, our ability to characterize patterns of Indonesian public opinion depends on a series of conceptual choices, theoretical arguments, and methodological commitments: these tell us what data need to be collected and how to interpret the relationships we find. Detailing these choices, arguments, and commitments amounts to a general contribution for scholars working in allied fields on related topics.

Finally, while we emphasize that our empirical and conceptual contributions are relevant to scholars of Islam, politics, and political economy the world over, this is a book about Muslims in Indonesia. As such, it is a contribution to Indonesian studies as well. Some of our contributions speak directly to enduring questions in the scholarly literature on Indonesian Islam, such as our analysis of the broad *similarities* in religious belief and behavior across *aliran*, or "streams," in Javanese Islam (Geertz 1960). Others stand at the forefront of new, contemporary topics in Indonesian Islam such as "commodified religion" and "aspirational piety" among Indonesian Muslims (Fealy 2008). And although we are not the first to have used public opinion surveys to study Indonesian politics—see Mujani (2007) and Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi (2012) for earlier works—this book presents a fresh and distinctive take on substantive topics that these works have not addressed. In contrast to the panoramic overview of voting behavior contained in earlier studies of Indonesian public opinion, we use our data to make sharp, incisive contributions to the study of Indonesia, Islam, and politics.

METHOD AND CONTEXT

The essence of our research strategy is to collect as much data as possible from as many Indonesians as possible in order to describe—with nuance and care—how beliefs, preferences, and behaviors are interrelated. This "quantitative case study" (Pepinsky 2014a) joins a recent trend in the social sciences to privilege close understanding of a particular national context in order to identify research opportunities that are feasible, that are sensitive to local particularities, and that provide valid descriptions and credible inferences about causal effects.

The Quantitative Case Study Approach

The main strength of our quantitative case study approach is that it combines detail and comprehensiveness with close attention to the unique aspects of the Indonesian case. That our methods are quantitative is

unimportant; what is key to this approach is that we collect data that are as broadly representative as possible of all Indonesians, Muslim and non-Muslim, from across the archipelago and from all walks of life. The benefits of comprehensiveness are that we can describe broad trends in beliefs and behaviors across all of Indonesia, confident that they are no more likely to neglect any particular voice or perspective than any other (on the construction of the survey itself and how we ensure representativeness in a statistical sense, see the appendix at the end of this book). At the same time, though, we maintain the rich detail necessary to capture differences across groups of individuals, defined in geographic, ethnic, religious, educational, or other terms.

Yet our quantitative case study is also a case study: it is an "intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units" (Gerring 2004: 342). The "unit" here is Indonesia itself, and the similar units, depending on the question, are other Muslim countries, other democracies, or other countries in the global South. We study the Indonesian case intensively in this book because doing so provides us with the depth of understanding of the constitutive features of one particular Muslim-majority democracy in the global South. With attention to the "unit context" (Pepinsky 2014a)—the features of the case that give it meaning—we have greater confidence that the questions that we ask in our survey make sense, that we identify relevant ways of being Muslim in this national context, that we have a representative sample, and so on. We also are able to interpret our findings in light of recent developments in Indonesian politics and society, in a way that we could not do if asked to compare across multiple different national contexts.

The trade-off in any case study, quantitative or otherwise, is generalizability. Our quantitative case study approach gives us a special perspective on major questions about Islam, piety, and politics in contemporary Indonesia, but as we have stressed, our aim is to contribute beyond the narrow confines of this particular case. By design, a single country study cannot do this. We can generalize only by making assumptions about the comparability of the social, historical, and political context of Indonesia and other countries to which it might be compared.

In the context of Indonesia as a case study of broader issues of Islam and politics, moreover, the problem of generalizability carries particular weight. One immediate response to our analysis of Indonesia is to claim that Indonesia is a peripheral or otherwise peculiar unit from the perspective of any of the broader collections of units to which it might be compared. This objection comes in two versions. The first is that Islam in Indonesia is fundamentally different from Islam elsewhere: more syncretic, more tolerant, more liberal, more pluralist, even "gentler." The second version of the objection to Indonesia is that whatever the essential differences between Indonesian Islam and Islam elsewhere, Indonesian politics and society more generally just differ too starkly from other countries for comparison to be proper. Put concretely, the claim is Indonesia is an unusual Muslim country, an unusual democracy, and an unusual part of the global South. These peculiarities, in fact, reinforce one another: Indonesia is an unusual Muslim country because it is a democracy, it is an unusual democracy because it is majority Muslim, and it is an unusual country in the global South because it is a Muslim democracy.

We acknowledge that the generalizability of our analysis of Islam, beliefs, and behavior may be limited by the particularities of the Indonesian context. But we nevertheless proceed under the maintained assumption that the Indonesian case *does* generate broadly relevant insights, for three reasons.

First, and most significantly, our concepts and methods can travel even if our findings do not. Problems of spiritual versus economic or sociological motivations for market behavior, economic versus noneconomic ideologies in multiparty electoral competition, and varieties of cosmopolitan identity are general problems in the social sciences. We confronted these problems in the context of our study of Indonesia, but our contributions will help to understand problems of these types in other contexts even if the findings that we uncover are not themselves generalizable. Conceptualizing piety, measuring the effects of party ideology, estimating statistical models for multidimensional nonexclusive ordered choices,

and other tasks that we pursue in this book are of interest even to scholars who are skeptical that what we conclude from the Indonesian case applies elsewhere.

Second, we reject the claim that Indonesian Islam is fundamentally incomparable to Islam elsewhere, such that the Indonesian case has no relevance for other Muslim countries. We naturally accept that there are specific features of the Indonesian Islamic experience, but that is true of Islamic belief and practice in any national context. Consider the astounding diversity in the rest of the Muslim world, from Dakar to Dhaka, from Istanbul to Tashkent, from Baghdad to Dar es Salaam. Indonesian Islam is no more or less unusual than Islam in any of these contexts.[2] We note further that patterns of Islamic belief and practice need not be *identical* to be *comparable*, and that the common mistake of equating Arab or Middle Eastern Islam to "real" Islam does not withstand careful scrutiny. All Islam is vernacular Islam.

Third, the most noticeable differences between Indonesia and many other Muslim-majority countries are demonstrably not enduring or essential features of Islam and politics around the world. As we will note below, at the time when we collected our survey data—2008—Indonesia was the sole country context in which to study Islam and politics. But had we written eleven years previously, Indonesia would not have been a democracy either, while Turkey and Senegal would have been. Had we collected our data in 2012, Tunisia would be another emerging Muslim democracy, and Pakistan and Bangladesh would have been plausible cases as well. There have been other Muslim democracies in the global South before, and there will be more in the future. When there are, then we will have more examples of Muslim democracies, and Indonesia will no longer appear as exceptional as it presently does.

2. Indeed, precisely the opposite: the fact that more Muslims live in Indonesia than in any other country in the world means that Indonesian Muslims are actually the *most typical* Muslims.

Indonesia: Muslim Democracy in Comparative Perspective

Yet it is true that Indonesia is the rare case of a majority Muslim democracy in the contemporary world. Not only is Indonesia more democratic than the Arab Middle Eastern cases addressed above, it was one of the only Muslim-majority democracies with free political competition in the world in the late 2000s, even though many Muslim-majority countries have prior histories of democratic political competition and several others have joined the ranks of new democracies since. In large Muslim-majority countries such as Bangladesh, elections have historically been contested among both Islamist and non-Islamist parties, but in 2007 a series of corruption scandals led the military to intervene in electoral politics, postponing elections until December 2008 and raising questions about the consolidation of democracy in that country. Likewise, Pakistan returned to democratic rule only in late 2007. In Turkey, by contrast, the secular military establishment long exerted a powerful check on the ability of Islamist parties to campaign as such, for doing so would contradict the secular Kemalist ideology upon which the modern Turkish state was built. Even today, with the Justice and Development Party firmly in control of Turkish politics, an openly Islamist party politics is still not possible.

This discussion indicates that what makes Indonesia distinctive is not merely the existence of competitive elections with regular alternation of executive power—which qualifies Indonesia as a democracy in minimalist or Schumpeterian terms (Przeworski 1999)—but also the competitive ideological environment that allows Indonesian political parties to campaign on a wide range of issues, including explicitly Islamist platforms. This free competition between Islamist and non-Islamist parties, in fact, dates to the era of liberal democracy in Indonesia (from independence to 1957), when the Islamist political parties Masjumi and Nahdlatul Ulama competed effectively with nationalist, communist, and other non-Islamic political parties. Islamists were forbidden from free electoral competition during the Guided Democracy (1957–1965) and New Order (1965–1998) periods. However, since democratization in 1999, Indonesia has enjoyed four democratic elections in which Islamist political parties and parties rooted in Muslim mass



Figure 1.1 Seat Shares by Party Type, 1955–2014
Each bar contains the number of seats in Indonesia's national legislature won by parties of different types. See text for definitions of "Islamist" and "Mass Islam."

organizations have competed with parties that explicitly retain a commitment to Pancasila (we discuss these distinctions across party types in more detail in section "The Method" in chapter 3). And while Islamists have never won Indonesia's presidency, they have always occupied approximately one-quarter of the seats in the legislature (see figure 1.1), and until 2014 had always been a minor party in the president's coalition.

Of course, there are limits to partisan ideological competition in Indonesia, as there are in many consolidated democracies. Indonesian political parties may not advocate secessionism or treason, for example. For the purposes of our argument, the key observation is that contemporary Indonesian democracy places no restriction on the ability of Islamists to campaign on Islamist principles.[3] The coexistence of popular elections with alternation in power at multiple

3. This principle, while true in the late 2000s, has been tested more recently. The 2013 law on mass organizations forbids all Indonesian mass organizations from contradicting the state ideology of Pancasila. Under the authoritarian New Order regime, such

levels of government and a competitive ideological environment puts Indonesia in the class of regimes that Dahl (1971) denotes as polyarchies. Of course, Indonesia differs from other polyarchies in the precise levels of contestation and participation, the two dimensions along which Dahl conceptualizes polyarchy. But it does remind us that the existence of multiple parties that compete in elections is more common than is a truly competitive ideological environment, one in which parties may espouse whatever ideological platform they wish and voters are free to vote for or against candidates following those platforms without fear of official reprisal.

How, then, does Indonesia compare to other Muslim-majority countries? We look synchronically at the state of democracy in the Muslim world in the late 2000s. To measure free political competition along with procedural democracy, we rely primarily on Freedom House's (2009) rankings from 2009, which describe the year 2008, when we fielded our survey.[4] Nearly every Muslim-majority country is scored as "Not Free" or "Partly Free." In table 1.1 we summarize contemporary political conditions in Muslim-majority or Muslim-plurality[5] countries based on Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey.

The two exceptions to the overall trend of nondemocratic or illiberal politics in the Muslim world in 2009 were Indonesia and Mali. Both were

restrictions carried the implication of forbidding Islamist mobilization. In the first decade of the post–New Order democratic period such an interpretation no longer held. At the time of writing, there is no evidence that Islamists in party politics face any legal or practical restrictions on mobilizing voters or campaigning on explicitly Islamist principles. The limiting exceptions are extremist Islamist groups such as the Islamic State, banned by the Indonesian government in 2014 (Yuliasri Perdani and Ina Parlina, "Govt bans support, Endorsement of ISIL," *Jakarta Post*, August 5, 2014).

4. Both the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) and the Cheibub et al. (2010) regime coding yield qualitatively identical results on political regimes, but yield limited insight about civil and political liberties.

5. Several countries in West Africa report highly variable figures for religious adherence. These include Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. A substantial number of Ethiopians are Muslims, but they are a minority if compared to Christians, Jews, and animists together. Eritrea and Nigeria are each approximately 50% Muslim.

Table 1.1 Political Regimes and Freedom in the Muslim World (2008)

		Electoral democracy	
		No	**Yes**
Freedom Status	Not Free	Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Brunei, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan	n/a
	Partly Free	Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Gambia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Togo, Yemen	Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Turkey
	Free	n/a	Indonesia, Mali

predominantly Muslim democracies with relatively high levels of political freedom. But in Mali, *laïcité* was enshrined in the constitution, which explicitly forbids political parties from appealing to religious principles. At the time our survey was administered, Islam in Mali appeared to be playing a growing role in public life, but no political parties espoused Islamist ideologies (Soares 2006). Since then, the 2012 coup in Mali has interrupted electoral democracy, and a period of harsh Islamist rule in the northern part of the country followed, although a fragile constitutional order has been restored.

By focusing on Indonesia, then, we have a unique opportunity to tackle central questions in the study of Islam and democracy in the one contemporary context where we can observe it. In the comparative perspective, Indonesia's democracy sets it apart from other Muslim countries, but this is precisely why Indonesia is such an important case. Yet the fact that Indonesian democracy is distinctive might also be interpreted

as supporting the argument that Indonesian Islam is not comparable to Islam elsewhere. We can draw on cross-national survey evidence as a basic way to investigate differences between Indonesia and the rest of the Muslim world in terms of religion and religiosity. In figure 1.2 we show country-level averages of four coarse indicators of religiosity, tolerance, and trust from nineteen Muslim-majority or Muslim-plurality countries included in the World Values Survey (Teorell et al. 2013; World Values Survey 2008).



Figure 1.2 Indonesia's Religion and Religiosity in Comparison to Other Muslim Countries

Religiousness is the answer to "How important is God in your life?" on 1–10 scale. *Religiosity Scale* is an additive index of six questions about orientations toward religion, on a 0–100 scale. *Tolerance* is the answer to "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" with "People who have AIDS" and "homosexuals" as answers. *Trust* is the answer to "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Country bars correspond to country means, averaged across survey waves for countries surveyed more than once. Indonesia's score is in black.

These comparisons are encouraging, for we see that Indonesia is not an outlier in terms of average levels of religiousness, religiosity, or tolerance. Indonesia is more of an outlier relative to other Muslim countries when it comes to trust, but it is, perhaps surprisingly, closer to Arab Middle Eastern countries than it is to Asian or African Muslim countries. While we do not believe that these existing measures of religiosity or religiousness are proper measures of piety—our dissatisfaction with these measures is an important motivation for this book—it is encouraging that Indonesia appears to be a typical Muslim country when using them as comparative benchmarks.

We can also look more broadly across *all* national characteristics, not just democracy, or average levels of religion or tolerance, which might set Indonesia apart from other Muslim countries. To do this, we employ data from the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al. 2013). These data include hundreds of variables, capturing everything from national gross domestic product per capita to ethnolinguistic fractionalization to civil liberties to violence. We begin with their time-series cross-section data set, and create a country average for each variable. Then, for each country, we calculate what decile it falls in for each variable from among all fifty-two Muslim-majority and Muslim-plurality countries. So, for example, if country A scores in the 95th percentile of all Muslim countries for variable X, it gets a score of 10, corresponding to the tenth decile. If country B scores at the 45th percentile, in the fifth decile, it gets a score of 5. We repeat this procedure for every ordinal, continuous, or dummy variable in the data set, creating decile scores for each Muslim country for hundreds of variables.

A Muslim country that is "abnormal" or "unusual" relative to other Muslim countries will tend to score on the extremes—first or second, ninth or tenth deciles—across large numbers of variables. "Usual" countries will tend to score in the middle. We plot the empirical distribution of decile scores for each country in figure 1.3, highlighting Indonesia to show how it compares to other countries.

The results here are reassuring for the use of Indonesia as a comparison case. Across most dimensions that we are able to measure, Indonesia is



Figure 1.3 Comparing Indonesia: A Comprehensive Approach
Each line represents a kernel density plot for one Muslim country's decile scores (see text for details). Plots for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Afghanistan are highlighted for emphasis.

not an extreme case; it is a typical case, scoring close to the median of all Muslim countries. Once again, these findings do not entail that Indonesian *Islam* is typical as well. But they do suggest that if Indonesian Islam is atypical, such differences have not translated into broad differences in economy, society, and politics relative to the rest of the Muslim world.[6]

Why Public Opinion?

As we noted above, we are not the first to have drawn on individual-level public opinion surveys to study Indonesian politics or Indonesian Islam.

6. This procedure also allows us to highlight countries that do tend to score at the extremes. We have highlighted two, Afghanistan and Malaysia, which stand out in particular. Based on their scores relative to other countries, we would consider it inadvisable to use an intensive case study of either Afghanistan or Malaysia as a way to develop insights that are broadly applicable across the Muslim world.

Nevertheless, adopting this individual-level focus puts our findings about Indonesia into conversation with a wealth of recent cross-national survey research on Islam and politics (see, e.g., Blaydes and Linzer 2008, 2012; Fish 2011; Jamal 2006; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012). As we will show throughout this book, our study of the Indonesian case provides new concepts, new methods, and new findings that build on established work by public opinion scholars working on these and related issues.

However, our decision to focus on public opinion in the study of Indonesian Islam does not merely reflect a desire to contribute to an existing literature that itself relies on public opinion. This decision also reflects the nature of the questions that we seek to answer. Many claims about how political Islam works in Indonesia are, at root, claims about what Muslims think or believe. We can attempt to describe individual thoughts and beliefs using any number of different research strategies, from participant observation to ethnography to focus groups, and each of these has its own strengths. The strengths of the survey-based approach are standardization, comprehensiveness, and representativeness, each of which is of paramount importance if we are to describe how Indonesians think and believe, or to compare thoughts and beliefs across different groups of Indonesians. One simple measure of the value of standardization, comprehensiveness, and representativeness in the Indonesian context is the observation that Indonesian politicians themselves care deeply about public opinion research such as this, using polls and opinion research to shape candidate and party strategy (for better or for worse; see Mietzner 2009b).[7]

None of the preceding denies the obvious limits on what can be learned from survey research. Public opinion alone can tell us little about how elites shape politics, about social movements or mobilizational power, or about history and social structure. The focus is only on mass opinion, which is probably more relevant in the context of an electoral democracy such as contemporary Indonesia than in nondemocratic settings,

7. Indeed, some party elites in Indonesia have responded with interest to the findings in this book, in particular those in chapter 3.

but not necessarily a driver of national politics outside of election time. Public opinion, in fact, may have no causal impact on policy outcomes at all, as Gilens and Page (2014) have recently argued in the US context. Additionally, even though surveys exploit variation at the individual level, they actually erase the distinct voice of any one individual, and leave no room for playfulness, irony, or even basic dialogue between researcher and respondent. And, even when characterizing aggregate mass public opinion—the very task to which public opinion research should be best suited—interpreting public opinion results requires attention to the social context in which surveys are fielded, to issues of translation and question wording, and to subtleties of meaning and pragmatics. All of this depends on researchers' understanding of the social context in which the survey data is generated.

We also emphasize that our defense of surveys based on considerations of standardization, comprehensiveness, and representativeness does not invalidate the use of alternative methodologies to study politics, political economy, or Islam, either in Indonesia or anywhere else. Indeed, we believe that there are many complementary ways to study these topics. We ourselves have learned from and are inspired by ethnographers, historians, and others who are attentive to issues of meaning, context, history, and structure in the study of Indonesian Islam. We learn too from our own qualitative interviews, and from our own participant observation.

However, even recognizing the limitations of what we can learn from public opinion, none of these complementary strategies for studying Islam in Indonesia can replace the insights that we derive from our analysis. Public opinion is not the entire story in Indonesian Islam, but it is an essential part. It is our goal in this book to tell that part of the story.

CONCLUSION

The resurgence of Islam in private and public life, in Indonesia and elsewhere, is one of the most important phenomena of our time. As

we show in this book, its implications for politics and society are also widely misunderstood. Piety among Indonesian Muslims is essentially unrelated to most of the basic problems of political and economic life that analysts of religion and public life have addressed. We find, instead, that the social and economic transformations that are co-occurring alongside the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia are the best predictors of how Muslims think and behave. On a purely descriptive level, these findings should give pause to those who believe that the resurgence of Islam will transform politics and society in the Muslim world. Where our claims are causal—as they are in the case of the highly conditional effects of Islam as a party platform—they show why it is so important to take into account the power of reform and social change in the study of political Islam.

We also emphasize that our findings in this book directly contradict the more sensationalist or even hysterical interpretations of Islamic revivalism in contemporary world politics. These interpretations are found in works such as Oriana Fallaci's *The Rage and the Pride* (2002), Robert Spencer's *The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades)* (2005), and Ayaan Hirsi Ali's *Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now* (2015) that portray contemporary revivalist Islam—either implicitly or explicitly—as medieval, barbarous, illiberal, or at least fundamentally antidemocratic. These works elide the notions of piety and radicalism or extremism, and disembed Islam and religiosity from its social context. Writing about Islam in Indonesia, Fealy and White (2008: 3) describe the problem well:

> Governments and the media have tended to portray Muslims according to the threat that they perceive them to pose. Thus, Muslim leaders, groups and even entire societies have been classified as either friendly or hostile using binary categories such as "moderate" or "mainstream" versus "radical" or "extremist." Accompanying this has been the rise in the media of commentators on Islamic issues whose main field of expertise is not Islam or Muslim society and politics, but rather security issues and particularly terrorism. Their research

> and analysis are driven primarily by security preoccupations, and they tend to show little interest in other aspects of Islamic life, such as cultural and economic developments, non-Islamist political trends, intellectual activity and social discourse, except in so far as these can be interpreted as decreasing or increasing the "Islamic threat." Thus, much of the recent literature and commentary on Islam has been reductionist and underpinned by assumptions that reflect Western concerns rather than understanding of Muslim communities on their own terms.

In such interpretations, piety would naturally inhibit any tendencies toward modernity, democracy, or cosmopolitanism. We show that in one critically important Muslim majority country, there is no evidence that this is true.

The following chapters develop our argument in full. Chapter 2 is about conceptualizing and measuring piety among Muslims. Chapter 3 is about Islam and politics. Chapter 4 is about Islam and the market. Chapter 5 is about Islam and global engagement. Each of these four substantive chapters can be read alone, but the full weight of their contribution comes into sharper focus when considered as a whole.

Chapter 6, the conclusion to this book, is where we draw out the full implications of our argument. Theoretically and conceptually, we argue for a re-evaluation of how scholars of religion and politics approach piety, both in the Muslim world and beyond. We emphasize the complex, multifaceted transformations underway in Muslim societies: globalization, modernization, democratization, and other forms of social change that mediate any simple relationship between beliefs, preferences, and behaviors. Finally, targeting the growing literature on Islam, politics, and society in Indonesia, we draw parallels between our findings based on public opinion-based research and existing work that relies on more historical and contextual insights.

TERMINOLOGICAL NOTES

Any study of Islam and politics risks terminological confusion. Two conceptual and therefore terminological distinctions are particularly important throughout this book: between "Islamic" and "Islamist," and between "sharia" and "sharia law."

We use "Islamic" as the generic adjective that modifies other concepts that we discuss throughout the book: Islamic banking, Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic revivalism, and so forth. We reserve the term "Islamist" to describe movements, ideologies, and actors that apply Islamic principles to politics and for which Islam is the foundational principle for political and social life. This is a particularly important distinction in chapter 3, in which we study Islam, piety, and party politics. A party like Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) that draws organizational and individual support from a Muslim mass organization like Nahdlatul Ulama is an *Islamic party*. A party like Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) that holds that its sole foundation is Islam and has sought in the past to implement sharia law throughout Indonesia is an *Islamist party*. Likewise, pious Muslims are not Islamists simply because they are pious (see section "Piety and Political Islam" in chapter 2). The relationship between piety and Islamism is an empirical matter and depends on Muslims' beliefs about the relationship between Islam and politics.

Our distinction between sharia and sharia law is similar. We use the term "sharia" in general terms to refer to what Kamali (1999: 109) terms "the totality of guidance that God has revealed to the Prophet Muhammad relating to the dogma of Islam: its moral values and its practical legal rules." Sharia law refers to a particular legal system that is seen to be based on sharia or on sharia-based reasoning. Sharia exists independently of its implementation as a legal system, and indeed, as Kamali continues, "*Sharia* is generally flexible with regard to most civil transactions, such as criminal law . . . government policy and constitution, fiscal

policy, taxation, and economic and international affairs" (110). "Sharia law" therefore entails a series of political commitments on the relationship between sharia and the legal system. We of course take no position on what specific commitments are required under sharia law, as this is a continuing subject of debate across the Muslim world. The conceptual distinction we wish to highlight is between sharia and the social objects (law, but also banking, finance, politics, among others) to which this reasoning might be applied.

2

Conceptualizing and Measuring Piety

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an overview of piety among Indonesian Muslims, beginning with a conceptual discussion of what piety means and then describing how we operationalize piety in our survey. Our conceptual treatment of piety as an individual-level phenomenon is a unique contribution to a growing literature on comparative public opinion in the Muslim world that has produced a range of useful empirical findings (Blaydes and Linzer 2008, 2012; Fish 2011; Furia and Lucas 2008; Jamal 2006; Pepinsky and Welborne 2011; Tessler 2002, 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012), but which is nevertheless marked by a lack of attention to the conceptual foundations of what it means to be pious and how piety might be captured in public opinion data. We then use the original measure of piety that we develop out of this conceptual discussion to provide a fresh perspective on questions that have long animated scholars of religion in Indonesia,

from the relationship between piety and *aliran* (Geertz 1960) to support for democracy and sharia law among Indonesian Muslims.

Some portions of our discussion in this chapter are technical in nature. Although we have endeavored to minimize these discussions, we view devoting attention to the statistical assumptions that underlie our measure of piety as simply unavoidable given our task of relating a contested concept to a quantitative measurement. We confront explicitly the substantive criticisms that our measurement strategy inevitably will raise by acknowledging exactly how they relate to the statistical procedures that we use to create our measure of individual piety. In doing so, we clarify the substantive conceptual foundations for what some might interpret as a superficial or mechanical approach to religion among Muslims in Indonesia.

WHAT DOES PIETY MEAN IN ISLAM?

Measuring piety among Muslims requires a conceptualization of piety in Islam. This puts us into contested territory.

In principle, one could argue that there are as many conceptualizations of Islamic piety as there are sects and schisms in Islam. Authoritative statements of what Islamic piety means also carry political weight: witness the difference in interpretation of piety between Salafis in Egypt and Shia authorities in Iran. Moreover, scholars who are not themselves Muslims struggle to conceptualize the religiosity of those who follow a faith tradition that is foreign to them (see, e.g., Fish 2002: 21). Piety and religiosity are also subject to severe problems in terms of individual self-reporting. Asking people to rate their own piety recreates the problem of how they themselves define piety, which surely varies widely even among individuals who are members of the same faith community. It is also subject to social desirability bias, long understood to be a major problem in the study of individual religious behavior and participation (Brenner 2014; Hadaway, Marler, and Chaves 1993; Presser and Stinson 1998). Even if individuals agreed on what piety means, they may overstate their own adherence to their faith.

Perhaps because of these challenges in conceptualizing piety among Muslims, most social science research on this subject has ignored conceptual issues entirely. Particularly worrying for our approach, existing public opinion research on piety or "religiosity" among Muslims glosses over the conceptual foundations of these variables and moves straight to measurement. The most thorough discussion of the conceptual foundations of religiosity of which we are aware is from Steven Fish, who attempts to compare religiosity between Muslims and non-Muslims, notes that "defining religiosity is so difficult," and then proceeds anyway using data from the World Values Survey (Fish 2011: 20, 3–45). Proceeding in this fashion ignores Sartori's dictum that "concept formation stands prior to quantification" (1970: 1038). We provide some examples of how this generates narrow and, we think, inappropriate measures of piety in the section "Piety and Political Islam" below. Here, we outline how we conceptualize piety among Muslims in general terms.

We begin with four key assumptions about piety. Although we do not explore piety among non-Muslims in Indonesia or anywhere else in this book, we do hold that these are general assumptions that should be equally relevant to the conceptualization of piety across faith traditions. Our assumptions are as follows.

1. Piety is a property of individuals.
2. Piety is unobservable.
3. Piety is multifaceted.
4. Piety is apolitical.

Assumption (1) may appear trivial but it is not. To be meaningful as a concept that predicts individual beliefs and behaviors, it must be the case that piety is something located in the individual. We may of course speak of the collective properties of religious publics in terms of mass public opinion, but these are ultimately rooted in the beliefs of individuals. Assumption (2), on the unobservability of individual piety, reflects a particular conceptualization of piety that holds that at the individual level, piety is an internal mental state. Piety thus differs

from demographic characteristics such as biological gender, height, or employment status that can be observed by both analyst and the research subject.

The importance of our assumption of the unobservability of piety becomes evident when we turn to assumption (3). This assumption holds that *even if we could* observe piety, there is no single belief or behavior that would capture it. As part of our assumption that piety is multifaceted, we also reject *by assumption* the view that religious observance, practice, or behavior is the sole essence of piety among Muslims. While we hold this assumption to be true of all religious traditions, this is a particularly important assumption in the context of Islam due to the perception among some scholars of Islam (both Muslim and non-Muslim) that Islamic piety is in essence a statement about practice. The term orthopraxy describes a Muslim's adherence to normative ideals of religious *practice*, which may be contrasted to a focus on normative ideals about individual beliefs or orientations (see Cornell 1999: 88–9 for a discussion). Note, however, that assuming that piety is *multifaceted* is not the same as assuming that piety is *multidimensional*. We view the dimensionality of individual piety as an empirical question. In fact, in our discussion of the dimensionality of piety below, we will test empirically the hypothesis that we can characterize piety among Indonesian Muslims as varying along a single dimension. Likewise, our rejection of orthopraxy as the core determinant of piety among Muslims does not preclude us from finding that ritual practice, on the one hand, and self-professed beliefs, on the other, are distinct dimensions along which individuals vary. Again, this is a hypothesis to be tested.

Assumption (4) is probably the most controversial of our four assumptions. Some Muslims, for example, hold that Islam itself entails a conceptualization of an ideal form of government (see Esposito and Piscatori 1991: 434–8; Esposito and Voll 1996: 33–51). If true, then one might interpret the belief that sharia law is inappropriate as a basis for national government as an unpious belief. However, the theological basis for the claim that Islam is, say, inherently democratic, or that a sharia-based legal system is obligatory for Muslims, is highly contested among Muslims and

scholars of Islam as well.[1] Accordingly, our denial of Islamic piety as having a political component may—and probably should—be interpreted as itself a political statement (see Pepinsky 2014b). We are unable to resolve the ultimate theological question of the relationship between Islam, law, and political order. Yet we proceed with our assumption that individual piety is apolitical because it renders coherent the question about the empirical relationship between individual piety and political beliefs. Consider the alternative. If we were to conceptualize piety as entailing a belief about the appropriateness of sharia or democracy for Muslims, then we could not ask whether more pious Muslims are more or less likely to hold those views. Fortunately, as we show below, we can probe the consequences of this assumption for our empirical analysis by exploring what would happen if we were to expand our conceptualization of piety to include beliefs about the relationship between Islam, politics, and sharia law.

With these four assumptions in hand, we are now prepared to define piety in Islam. This naturally requires attention to the theology of Islam itself. We hold, along with every other scholar of Islam, that as a purely theological matter, Islamic piety requires belief in and practice of the five pillars of Islam: belief in Allah and Muhammad as his prophet (Arabic *shahadah*, Indonesian *syahadat*), required daily prayers (Arabic and Indonesian *salat*), obligatory tithing (Arabic *zakah,* Indonesian *zakat*), fasting during the holy month of Ramadhan (Arabic *sawm*, Indonesian *puasa*), and intent to make the pilgrimage to Mecca if feasible (Arabic *hajj*, Indonesian *haji*). These are examples of practice and ritual, the adherence to which distinguishes pious from nonpious Muslims.

However, because we assume that piety is an unobservable interior mental state that is not reducible to ritual, we also believe that it is likely to be manifest in other beliefs or actions. These include individuals' feelings about their own faith, their self-professed religious devotion, and their

1. We note here that Islamic political thought is divided among at least four positions: Islam is inherently compatible with democracy, Islam is inherently opposed to democracy, Islam makes no claim on the propriety of democracy, and Islam provides an alternative foundation for understanding democracy.

nonobligatory behaviors that are also inherently (if not exclusively) religious in orientation. We will turn to the specifics of these nonobligatory behaviors below in our discussion of measurement, but we argue here that as a theoretical matter, individuals who act in ways consistent with valuing their faith, or claim to feel closer to their faith, are more pious than individuals who do not. Recognizing this point does raise a tension, though. Because Islam is a global religion, any conceptualization of piety must be broad enough to transcend national boundaries. This is why the five pillars of Islam are so important for our conceptualization of piety. But we recognize that a conceptualization of piety must also be specific enough to reflect local or regional understandings of piety. In our case, then, our conceptualization must be sensitive enough to the way that religion is practiced in Indonesia to capture forms of religious belief or practice that have meaning to Indonesian Muslims, even if those beliefs or practices are not equivalently meaningful for Muslims elsewhere.

Our conceptualization of Islamic piety, in sum, encompasses ritual, orientation, and behavior. Ritual captures adherence to the pillars of Islam. Orientation captures individual beliefs about one's relationship with faith. Behavior captures practices that carry no specific theological weight but which can reflect religious beliefs. This tripartite conceptualization, in turn, entails certain claims about our ability to compare piety across individuals. For example, an individual who regularly attends Friday prayers and professes that religion is very important in his life is more pious than an individual who regularly attends Friday prayers but professes that religion is not important in his life. An individual who regularly reads the Qur'an but does not fast during Ramadhan is less pious than an individual who regularly reads the Qur'an and does fast during Ramadhan. Note that our definition does not tell us *how much more* pious these individuals are—we treat that as an empirical matter to be addressed below. And to reiterate, we do *not* assume that all of these facets of piety are of equivalent importance, or that they cluster along a single dimension of piety—those too are empirical matters to be addressed below. Our conceptualization of piety simply holds that ritual, orientation, and behavior all contribute to our understanding of an individual's piety.

Just as important are the factors that our conceptualization of piety excludes. We deliberately exclude both social and demographic characteristics and beliefs and behaviors that are logically consequent to piety from our conceptualization of piety. For example, despite the belief among Indonesians that certain ethnic groups are more pious than others, we do not include one's membership in a particular ethnic group as a component of piety. We also do not include self-identification into *aliran* as a component of piety (we discuss *aliran* and piety in greater detail in section "*Aliran*, Ethnicity, and Piety"). In terms of the many possible logical consequents of piety, we also exclude from our conceptualization any positions on the relationship between religion and politics (see our discussion above) as well as behaviors and beliefs such as using Islamic financial products, encouraging the wearing of the Muslim headscarf by women, membership in one or more Muslim organizations, or support for various positions on socially acceptable behavior by Muslims or proper punishments for violation of Islamic law. In doing so, we allow ourselves to ask whether individuals who are more pious are more likely to do or support these things.

FROM CONCEPTUALIZATION TO MEASUREMENT

Our conceptualization of piety as a broad, multifaceted property of individuals requires us to develop a measure that fits those characteristics. Accordingly, to measure piety, we collected data on various aspects of respondents' religious beliefs and religious behavior. Consistent with our conceptualization of piety described above, some of these include conventional understandings of piety in Islam as orthopraxy, narrowly defined in scriptural terms. These include praying at the obligatory daily times and fasting during the holy month of Ramadhan. Others include behaviors that are not strictly understood as required of all Muslims but which may help to reveal further distinctions in piety among respondents, including performing nonobligatory prayers (*salat sunnah*), studying the Qur'an (*mengaji*), or attending community religious meetings (*pengajian*). Still others include self-professed piety and the importance of religion. A list of

these items, and the distribution of their responses as percentage of total (Muslim) respondents, appears in table 2.1.

Our main takeaway point from table 2.1 is that there is substantial variation across most indicators. While 80% of respondents always fast during Ramadhan, only 66% report that they always pray at the required times daily, and even fewer report that they are "very pious" (*sangat taat beragama Islam*) or that they attend Friday prayers. Taken together, these results give us confidence that we can distinguish different levels of piety across our survey respondents.

It could still be the case that some form of social desirability bias leads respondents to overreport the extent to which they adhere to Islamic orthopraxy in their daily lives. But this is not a central concern for us, as our main goal is to develop a conceptually grounded measure of piety

Table 2.1 Indicators of Piety

	Not at all	**Not very**	**Fairly**	**Very**	***N***
Religion is important to R	0.0	0.3	20.7	79.0	2,233
R is pious	0.1	5.9	58.4	35.7	2,216
	Never	**Seldom**	**Often**	**Always**	***N***
R thinks about religion	2.7	6.6	43.0	47.7	2,223
R prays at obligatory daily times	0.6	11.7	21.3	66.4	2,246
R fasts during Ramadhan	0.4	3.7	14.2	81.6	2,247
R studies or reads the Qur'an	7.2	36.8	29.9	26.2	2,238
R attends Friday prayers	3.9	39.4	33.8	22.9	2,237
R performs additional (nonobligatory) rituals (*salat sunnah*)	6.7	44.0	31.7	17.6	2,221
R attends communal religious meetings	7.9	34.0	32.4	25.8	2,238
R participates in ritual prayers for the deceased (*tahlilan*)	13.4	28.1	31.3	27.2	2,236
R pays zakat after Ramadhan	0.9	3.2	12.2	83.7	2,239

NOTE: Cells indicate the percentage of total respondents responding in each category.

that allows us to compare across individuals, not to estimate the "true" level of compliance with Islamic teachings among Indonesian Muslims. For such comparisons of piety across individuals to be useful in the presence of social desirability bias, we must assume that social desirability bias is uniform (every respondent overstates his or her religiosity by the same amount), that it is distributed randomly across respondents (every respondent is equally likely to overstate his or her religiosity), or that it is a strict monotonic function of individuals' true levels of piety (the least pious overstate the most and the most pious overstate the least, in which our comparisons across individuals still preserve their correct ordinal rankings in expectation). The first of these two conditions almost certainly does not hold. The second and third are more plausible. What would overturn either of those latter two conditions is if certain categories of respondents were more likely to report pious behavior independent of their true level of piety, for example, if urban respondents are more likely to report being pious than are rural respondents. We suspect that this indeed may be possible. In chapters 3–5, we employ our rich information on respondents' social and demographic characteristics in order to ameliorate this concern, if only partially.

These items also clearly reflect the Indonesian context. Items such as participation in ritual prayers for the deceased (*tahlilan*) would have no particular meaning in the Arab Middle East or in Central Asia. In other parts of the Muslim world, moreover, items such as communal religious meetings might not be meaningful for women, who are frequently excluded as a matter of social practice from communal religious practices and rituals. We will return to this observation in the conclusion of this book, but we highlight it here to emphasize that in the step from conceptualization to measurement we are forced to confront the specific national context in which Islam is practiced in order to produce a valid measurement of individual piety within that context.

As we suggested above in our conceptual overview of piety, no single indicator should be taken as the true or proper measure of piety. This follows from our assumption that respondents' "true" piety is not observable to us. But the eleven indicators *are* all highly intercorrelated

(Cronbach's α = .778) across respondents, suggesting that when analyzed together they will identify a common—yet unobserved—trait that corresponds to our conceptualization of piety. Accordingly, we use principal component analysis to reduce these indicators to an index that reflects the diversity of the survey responses while capturing the commonalities among them (Jolliffe 2005, 2002). All indicators load strongly onto the first principal component, with an eigenvalue of slightly above 3.5, and explaining 32% of the variance in the eleven indicators. We define a single new variable, *PIETY INDEX*, as the first principal component of these indicators. *PIETY INDEX* is the main measure of individual religiosity that we use throughout this book.[2]

Dimensionality

As we have emphasized throughout this chapter, the task of measuring piety cannot be separated from the task of conceptualizing piety. We have taken a broad view of what piety means, and this inevitably has consequences for the measures that we produce, and in turn, the conclusions that we will draw from them. We have also made statistical choices that might have consequences for the index that we construct. In this subsection we subject one of those statistical decisions to greater scrutiny: the decision to ignore the "additional" principal components that could in principle capture additional dimensions of piety. In the following sections we ask whether our measure of piety is excessively broad, including aspects of religious experience and behavior that are not properly related to piety, or is excessively narrow, excluding religious experiences and behavior that should be related to piety.

2. Principal components analysis assumes that each component is a continuous variable, which is not true in our case. Fortunately, we find substantively identical results when we use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), analogous to PCA but more suitable for categorical data (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). The rank correlation coefficient between *PIETY INDEX* and the individual scores from the first dimension of the MCA analysis is .985.

Recall that we have defined *PIETY INDEX* as the first principal component of the eleven indicators in table 2.1. Implicit in this choice is a conceptualization of piety as a single variable that varies along a single dimension. It need not be this way. We might define piety as two interrelated concepts, perhaps "practice" and "belief," as might be more suitable in the study of Christianity. However, as we show here, our data do not give us much reason to think that there is meaningful variation in the data beyond that which we capture with the first component of our eleven indicators. In other words, even if we were to impose a multidimensional conceptualization of piety on our data, those further dimensions would not describe the responses to our survey well.

One way to think about the statistical task of extracting information about the structure of piety among our respondents is to ask, "How much information about piety do we wish to retain?" If we wanted to retain 100% of the information contained in our eleven indicators, we would keep all eleven components, which together explain 100% of the variation. However, our concern is not to do this, but, as is the case in any data reduction procedure, to extract the underlying structure of piety from our survey responses. From that perspective, our question might be reformulated as "How many dimensions do we need to capture the underlying information that exists in the data?" This formulation highlights the inherent subjectivity in deciding the optimal or "correct" number of dimensions of piety *based on the data itself* rather than a theory.

Jolliffe (2002: 111–8) discusses the statistical issues associated with choosing proper subsets of components. One rule of thumb, "Kaiser's rule," is to retain any components whose eigenvalues are greater than 1. The second and third principal components of our eleven piety indicators have eigenvalues of slightly larger than 1, indicating that they may capture additional dimensions of piety as revealed in the data. But a scree plot (figure 2.1) shows that even though the second and third components cross the boundary suggested by Kaiser, the first component explains the majority of the variation among the indicators.



Figure 2.1 Scree Plot for *PIETY INDEX*
This plot shows the eigenvalues obtained from a principal components analysis of the eleven piety indicators in table 2.1.

This is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a single underlying dimension of piety that our measure *PIETY INDEX* captures from the data.

Another way to visualize the unidimensionality of our measure is to simply average all of the eleven indicators of piety that we used to construct *PIETY INDEX*. If there is really only a single underlying dimension of piety in our responses, then that average (an index that weights each indicator equally) should tightly match the index constructed from the first principal component. Figure 2.2 shows a scatterplot of the simple average of those eleven indicators—a new variable that we denote as *PIETY MEAN*—against *PIETY INDEX*.

There is little doubt that *PIETY INDEX* captures extraordinarily well the variation that exists in the data. Scatterplots (not shown) of *PIETY MEAN* versus the second and third principal components of the eleven piety indicators reveal that the correlations between the two are far weaker.



Figure 2.2 Scatterplot of *PIETY INDEX* and *PIETY MEAN*
This figure compares the simple mean of the eleven indicators used to construct *PIETY INDEX* with the index itself. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient = .995 ($p < .0001$).

Our conclusion from this discussion is that our data contain within them little evidence that there are meaningful dimensions of piety beyond that which is captured by the first principal component of our indicators. This is reassuring given our conceptualization of piety, but it does not rule out the possibility that there might be meaningful variation among Muslims that is captured by the other dimensions in our data. We leave it to future research to propose a conceptualization of piety that captures such additional aspects of Muslims' religious lives.

Breadth

Our choice to include a wide range of indicators of piety also might engender a separate criticism, that we are including features of Muslims' religious life that are not proper indicators of piety. A narrow interpretation of Islamic orthopraxy might hold that attending communal Qur'anic

study sessions—while a laudable activity that reflects an individual's commitment to his or her faith—is not itself an indicator of how pious one is. Particularly in the Indonesian context, ritual prayers for the deceased (*tahlilan*) fall into a class of activities termed *wasilah*, understood by modernist Muslims in Indonesia as activities that do not strictly follow from the core of Islamic teachings as embodied in the Qur'an and the Hadith (Inayah and Woodward 2012: 124). Some modernists[3] believe that *tahlilan* are in fact *not* Islamic, and might consider routine participation in *tahlilan* to be a measure of an individual's *lack* of piety. By conceptualizing piety as broadly as we have and defining our index accordingly, we thus risk polluting our measure of piety with other facets of Indonesians' religious lives that are either not measures of piety at all, or that reflect particular (and contested) understandings of piety that are particular to the Indonesian context.

We are unable to settle any debates about the true nature of piety, although as noted above, we reject the position that there is a single universal conception of true Islam that exhaustively defines the features of a pious Muslim. Accepting that position amounts to imposing an external value judgment on the very things that people believe are elements of their own religious expression. To the extent that people believe that participating in *tahlilan* is an expression of their religious identity as Muslims, we wish to capture that in our measure, not exclude it.

We can, however, examine how our measure of piety would change if we were to include within our measure only those indicators that match a narrow, scripturalist interpretation of piety as orthopraxy. We do that by restricting the indicators of piety to four: prays at obligatory daily times, fasts during Ramadhan, attends Friday prayers, and pays zakat. We then follow the same procedure as that used to create *PIETY INDEX*, extracting the first principal component of the four indicators and defining it as *NARROW PIETY INDEX*. In figure 2.3 we use a scatterplot to compare the values of *PIETY INDEX* and *NARROW PIETY INDEX*.

3. We describe modernist and other groupings of Indonesian Muslims in the next section.



Figure 2.3 Scatterplot of *PIETY INDEX* and *NARROW PIETY INDEX*
This figure compares the *PIETY INDEX* with *NARROW PIETY INDEX*, a variable that is defined identically to *PIETY INDEX* except that it draws only on a limited subset of indicators (see text for discussion). Spearman's rank correlation coefficient = .826 ($p < .0001$).

As figure 2.3 shows, the two measures are very highly correlated. There is, naturally, greater nuance in the broader *PIETY INDEX*, which is particularly visible at higher values of *NARROW PIETY INDEX* and which allows the broader measure to capture gradations of piety that the narrower measure cannot. But with a rank correlation coefficient of .826 between the two indices, any individual ranking of piety across our survey respondents does not much depend on which index we use. We therefore conclude that even allowing for objections to the breadth of our index of piety, at least within our large and representative sample of Indonesians, the inclusive conceptualization of piety is not polluting our index with irrelevant facets of Muslims' religious life that affect the content of our measure.

A separate critique is that in excluding political attitudes from our conceptualization of what makes an individual pious, we have created an excessively *narrow* measure of piety. We maintain that for conceptual purposes it

is essential to distinguish conceptually between what piety *is* and what piety might *cause*. However, we need not depend solely on our assumptions; we can also explore how our index would change if we were to include data on individuals' beliefs about politics. In section "Piety and Political Islam" we describe a series of survey items about individuals' beliefs about the relationship between Islam and politics. Here we focus on three questions about sharia in Indonesia and the proper role of Islam in Indonesian politics (see table 2.3 and subsequent discussion for full question wordings).

To explore whether or not excluding politics from a conceptualization of piety is consequential for our measurement, we follow the same procedure we used to create *PIETY INDEX*, but this time we also include the three political variables. The first thing to note is that unlike the case of *PIETY INDEX*, we now find evidence that these fourteen indicators load onto two components. This can be seen by comparing the top two graphs in figure 2.4.

What does this second component capture? Almost exclusively, it picks up the three new political variables, which load heavily onto the second component and only lightly on the first component. We can see this clearly when we plot how each variable loads onto each of the two first principal components of *BROAD PIETY INDEX* (see the bottom-left graph in figure 2.4). When we plot the first component of *BROAD PIETY INDEX* against *PIETY INDEX*, we also see that the two indices are very tightly correlated (see the bottom-right graph in figure 2.4). As might be expected, the second component of *BROAD PIETY INDEX* is only loosely correlated with *PIETY INDEX* (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient = –.010).

These results from an exploration of a broader conceptualization of piety that encompasses political beliefs do not allow us to conclude that our assumption that piety is apolitical is appropriate. They do, however, reassure us that—at least in the Indonesian context—it does not much matter whether we assume this or not. If we were to assume that piety entails an orientation toward politics, then the data tell us that whatever notion of piety this is picking up is completely separate from that which we capture with our focus on ritual, orientation, and behavior. We return to this discussion in more detail in section "Piety and Political Islam."



Figure 2.4 ***PIETY INDEX* with Political Variables**
This figure compares *PIETY INDEX* with a broader version (*BROAD PIETY INDEX*) that includes three variables that capture an individual's beliefs about the role of Islam in politics. The top two panels are scree plots of the two indicators. The bottom-left plot compares the loadings on the first two components across the fourteen components of *BROAD PIETY INDEX*. The bottom-right plot compares the first principal component of *BROAD PIETY INDEX* with that of *PIETY INDEX* (Spearman rank correlation coefficient = .998, $p < 0.0001$).

ALIRAN, ETHNICITY, AND PIETY

Scholars of Indonesian Islam since Geertz (1959, 1960) and Jay (1963) have remarked on the heterogeneity of religious life among Muslims in Java, and proposed a broad classification scheme to capture major groupings of Muslims. These groupings are denoted as *aliran*, or streams, in Indonesian Islam. *Aliran* are not themselves descriptions of religiosity, but rather of the organizational forms associated with specific groups. In Geertz's (1959: 37) classic formulation, "An *aliran* consists of a political party surrounded by a set of voluntary social organizations formally or informally linked to it." In this section we ask whether there are, in fact,

differences across *aliran* and other identity groups in individual piety. Our close examination allows us to make nuanced conclusions about variation both between and within groups.

We begin by reviewing the differences among the three Muslim *aliran* identified in the literature: *abangan, santri*, and *priyayi*. The source of their heterogeneity is the syncretic character of Javanese Islam, which mixes animistic, Hindu/Buddhist, and orthodox Islamic beliefs and practices. In this context, the *abangan* (in Javanese literally the "red ones")[4] are understood as the most animistic, that is, strongly marked by the local spiritualist beliefs and practices that long predate the arrival of Hinduism, Buddhism, or Islam in the archipelago. Other labels for the *abangan* are "nominal" or "statistical" Muslims.[5] By our operational definition of Islamic piety, *abangan* respondents should be highly impious.

To be sure, there is debate about the lineage of *abangan* as a distinct social category. Ricklefs, for example, argues that the emergence of *abangan* as a social category is a relatively recent phenomenon.

> By the early nineteenth century a synthesis of 1. firm Islamic identity, 2. observation of Islam's five pillars, and 3. acceptance of indigenous spiritual forces, all within the capacious boundaries of what Javanese understood Sufism to be, was found not only among the elite but also . . . among Javanese commoners. (Ricklefs 2006: 37)

4. The *santri* were originally known as *putihan* ("whites"), and it is from here that the term *abangan* emerges, as "reds," denoting those Muslims whose religious beliefs and practices were at variance with the pure (white) Islam of the orthodox (Ricklefs 2006).

5. Jones (1980: 312) provides one typical formulation, although she does not employ the term *abangan*: "For the majority of Indonesians who profess Islam, being Muslim entails no strict adherence to or particular knowledge of Islamic doctrine as laid down in the Qur'an, the *hadith* or traditions of the Prophet, and the *syariah* or body of law derived principally from the other two sources. For these nominal or 'statistical' Muslims, Islam is little more than a thin veneer of Arabic phrases over a Hindu-Buddhist-animist base. Its adherents are Muslims, to be sure, because they identify themselves as such, but the religion they practice is a syncretic, Javanese variant that bears little relation to its West Asian prototype. Rather than the religion providing an all-embracing framework for their daily life, it is their life with all its attendant rituals and beliefs built up over centuries that provides the framework for the religion."

The Javanese Muslims described by Ricklefs would not have considered themselves to be *abangan*. It was only over the course of the nineteenth century that the category of *abangan* came to be understood as a reflection of the emergence of another group, the *santri*. As van Bruinessen (1999) convincingly argues, moreover, the very distinction between "Islamic" and "pre-Islamic" or "un-Islamic" practices—both in the minds of foreign observers and among Indonesians themselves—is often historically inaccurate, rooted in a scripturalist view of Islam that neglects the diversity of the varieties of Islamic practices that have influenced Indonesian Islam.

There is also debate about the continuing strength of *abangan* culture today, more than a half-century after the research on which *aliran* analysis was based. In the late 1980s, the anthropologist Robert Hefner reported a strong trend toward Islamization of the *abangan* in Pasuruan, east Java. He concluded more broadly that "the social forces unleashed under the New Order [the Suharto dictatorship that began in 1965] may contribute to the partial realization of one of the Muslim community's primary religious goals, the Islamization of Java" (Hefner 1987: 551). Since that time, many observers have commented on the public signs of growing piety among Indonesian Muslims, such as increased mosque construction, wearing of Islamic clothing by Muslim women, and attendance at Friday prayers. Given the findings of historians such as Ricklefs and anthropologists such as Hefner, it may turn out to be the case that the existence of a large number of self-conscious *abangan* was characteristic of only a brief period in modern Javanese/Indonesian history.

Members of the group known as *santri* espouse an orthodox Sunni version of Islam (there are few Shia or other Muslim sects in Indonesia). In its narrowest meaning, in Javanese, a *santri* is a student in a *pesantren* or traditional boarding school, but the term has long been applied to pious and/or orthodox Muslims in general. These are the people who are reputed to pray five times daily, fast during Ramadhan, pay zakat, and to study the Qur'an both individually and collectively. They should therefore score very high on our indicators of piety.

Today's *santri* are divided between traditionalists and modernists. The traditionalists, perhaps two-thirds of the total, are adherents to the Syafii

"school" (Arabic *madhhab*, Indonesian *mazhab*) of Islamic jurisprudence. This is one of four major schools of interpretation within Sunni Islam worldwide and the only prominent one in Indonesia. Over the centuries since Islam first came to Indonesia, the traditionalists have also adopted practices that many Muslims consider heterodox accretions from local culture. *Tahlilan*, ritual prayer for the deceased, is one of those practices.

Islamic modernism came to Indonesia as a part of the late nineteenth-century reform movement in the Middle East associated with the Egyptian cleric Mohammad Abduh. Its goals were purificational in two senses: advocating return to the Qur'an and Hadith as the unmediated word of God (which meant challenging the Syafii clerics' legitimacy as interpreters of the holy book and traditions of the Prophet); and rejecting the many pre-Islamic Indonesian beliefs and practices common among the *santri* of the day.

Importantly, Ricklefs also documents the emergence of the concept of the *abangan* as a reaction against *santri* modernism, in which the *abangan* were understood not simply as those who retain non-Islamic elements in their religious lives, but also as those who actually fail to adhere to the tenets of Islam. Many of those to be termed *abangan* in the nineteenth century "began to abandon Islamic prayer and only observed other Islamic rituals in the name of community solidarity" (Ricklefs 2006: 53). This is a description of *santri* and *abangan* as differing in their piety as Muslims: relative to *santri, abangan* are actually less Muslim, and *santri* are not just purer, but more pious.

The third group of Muslims is known as *priyayi*, denoting a small bureaucratic class whose members held formal governmental office in precolonial and colonial Java. Their religious beliefs and practices still retain the strong Hindu and Buddhist influences of precolonial Javanese court Islam. Like the *abangan*, the *priyayi* should be highly impious by our operational definition of Islamic piety.

The position of the *priyayi* relative to *abangan* and *santri* is perhaps the most contested aspect of *aliran* as an organizing framework for understanding Indonesian Islam, with *priyayi* referring to a distinction in social class rather than in religious belief or behavior (Koentjaraningrat 1963),

and with evidence of both orthodox Islam and traditional Javanese mysticism as having important influences on *priyayi* cultural and religious beliefs (Sutherland 1975). Although we recognize this long-standing critique, we retain the discussion of *priyayi* as a separate stream in order to remain as true as possible to the classificatory scheme of Geertz and others.

One further caveat before we proceed to presentation of our findings. We are well aware that the categories *abangan, santri*, and *priyayi* were developed specifically for the analysis of Javanese culture and may not be meaningful to other Indonesians. Indeed, the terms *abangan* and *priyayi* in particular are from the Javanese language. We nonetheless asked non-Javanese to self-identify as *abangan, santri*, or *priyayi*. In doing so we hoped to learn which if any of the categories do cross ethnic lines and to explore the reasons why they do so. The answers might reveal much about contemporary Indonesian Islamic culture and politics.

We might hypothesize, for example, that the concept of *santri* travels best. Some non-Javanese cultures are reputed to be strongly Islamic, and the term *santri* is common in the Indonesian language and many regional languages in addition to Javanese. We might also hypothesize that, over the last fifty years, the term *abangan* has become increasingly commonly used in the Indonesian national political discourse to characterize weak or nonobservant Muslims. In other words, non-Javanese Muslims who self-identify as weak or nonobservant might recognize this term and apply it to themselves.

Finally, we might hypothesize that the term *priyayi* travels least well. Its strongest meaning refers to the Javanese court officials whose offices were abolished after the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945. For many Javanese, therefore, the term has only historical significance. A second meaning, hereditary aristocracy, has never been relevant to the many non-Javanese societies in which there is no comparable social group. Further, in no non-Javanese society which did have a hereditary aristocracy was that group called *priyayi*.

Now to the findings. Our survey data allow us to examine variation in piety across *aliran* by showing the distribution of *PIETY INDEX* across



Figure 2.5 The Distribution of Piety by *Aliran*
This figure shows three violin plots of *PIETY INDEX* for subgroups of Indonesian Muslims defined by respondents' *aliran*. The shaded region is a density plot showing the full distribution of *PIETY INDEX* across each group, while the box and whisker plots within the shaded regions show medians, interquartile ranges, and adjacent values.

abangan, santri, and *priyayi*. We do this using violin plots (Hintze and Nelson 1998), which allow us to display information about the full distribution of values across subsets of respondents rather than focusing solely on average values. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of *PIETY INDEX* across respondents who self-identify as each of the three groups, as well as among those who do not identify with any of the three (we address this group in greater detail below).

Two notable features of figure 2.5 stand out. First, the white circle in the middle of each plot, corresponding to the median value of piety for each group, shows that *santri* as a group score higher on our index of piety than do either *priyayi* or *abangan*. This is consistent with descriptions of *santri* as not just "purer," but "more pious" than *abangan*. It also helps to reassure us that our measure of *aliran* is valid. However, just as important

is the spread around that median, and here we see a wide range of variation among *santri* as well as *abangan* and *priyayi*. Our data reveal that there are many individuals who describe themselves as *abangan* who are as pious as most *santri*, and there are also substantial numbers of *santri* whose level of piety is comparable to that of the average *abangan*. Having derived a measure of piety that is conceptually distinct from *aliran*, we see that differences across *aliran* are picking up something other than differences in piety alone. The description of *abangan* as Muslims less religious than *santri* is a statement of averages only,[6] and therefore, identifying as *santri* is not itself an indicator of a respondent's piety.

Could this finding be a function of our decision to code all Indonesians as falling into an *aliran* framework, rather than Javanese only? The classic works on *aliran* in Indonesian Islam focused on Islam in Java and among the Javanese, rather than Islam more broadly, and it is not immediately clear what it means for a non-Javanese to identify as *abangan* or *priyayi*, even if—as we discussed above—the term *santri* is understood more broadly. In table 2.2 we show how different ethnic groups identify by *aliran*.

These figures confirm that most *priyayi* in our sample are indeed Javanese, but also that substantial numbers of non-Javanese identify as *abangan* and that a substantial number of Javanese identify as *santri*. Even if the *aliran* framework was originally applied to ethnic Javanese, it appears to have spread to many of Indonesia's most populous ethnic groups as well. Likewise, even if *santri* were originally the minority among Javanese Muslims, today they form a substantial majority.

We can also compare piety for Javanese and non-Javanese according to each *aliran* group. We do this in figure 2.6, using density plots to compare the shapes of the distribution for each subgroup.

Consistent with the results in figure 2.5 above, figure 2.6 shows that *abangan* of any ethnicity score lower on our index of piety than do *santri*

6. A formal *t*-test of the difference in means of *PIETY INDEX* for *santri* versus *priyayi-abangan* finds that *santri* are on average more pious than *priyayi-abangan* ($t = -14.54$, $p < .0001$). A rank-sum test similarly finds that the distribution of values of *PIETY INDEX* is higher among *santri* than *priyayi-abangan* ($z = -13.77$, $p < .0001$).

Table 2.2 Aliran by Ethnic Group

Ethnic group	*Aliran*					
	Abangan	*Priyayi*	*Santri*	Other	Don't Know	Total
Javanese	231	28	577	68	91	995
Sundanese	184	3	172	17	48	424
Malay	54	6	26	3	41	130
Madurese	18	1	59	2	21	101
Bugis	22	1	40	1	6	70
Betawi	21	2	31	5	7	66
Batak	2	0	5	3	3	13
Minang	15	1	14	5	32	67
Bantenese	0	0	1	10	1	12
Other	107	6	91	13	153	370
Total	654	48	1,016	127	530	2,248

NOTE: This table shows the distribution of *aliran* across ethnic groups.



Figure 2.6 Piety by *Aliran*, Javanese versus Non-Javanese
This figure shows the density plots of *PIETY INDEX* for Javanese and non-Javanese ethnic groups for different *aliran*. The dotted vertical line denotes the average of *PIETY INDEX* across all Muslims, confirming that *santri* on average score higher than *abangan*.

of any ethnicity. However, Javanese *abangan* are less pious on average than non-Javanese *abangan*, while there is no general difference for Javanese and non-Javanese who identify as *santri*. Together, it is unlikely that the great variation in piety among both *santri* and *abangan* is a simple consequence of ethnicity.

PIETY AND POLITICAL ISLAM

Our discussion so far has focused on what piety is and how we can measure it. Having developed a measure of piety that allows us to characterize how religiosity varies across Indonesian Muslims, we now explore the relationship between piety and political beliefs related to Islam. Our focus in this section is deliberately broad, examining different beliefs about the relationship between Islam and politics across all Muslims in Indonesia before turning to examine how piety varies across those respondents with differing beliefs about that relationship. We will turn to a more nuanced and precise discussion of how Islam might affect individual vote choice in chapter 3.

At the outset we emphasize that our index of piety differs strikingly from most commonly used measures of religiosity in existing work on public opinion and democracy in the Muslim world. Most existing research, in fact, relies on a single indicator to capture piety.[7] Jamal (2006: 55), for example, uses "one question [in] gauging the effect of Islamic religiosity on support for democracy and Islamism. This measure examined levels of attendance of religious services." This is consistent with Tessler (2002: 237), which uses "personal religiosity, or mosque involvement," to measure individual piety. Benstead (2014: 10) uses "support for Shari'a law," which she equates with "support for an Islamic state." Tessler does include an index of religious beliefs, but only one that captures the beliefs about the compatibility of religion and public office. Our approach would consider each of these measurement strategies to be inadequate for the task

7. The closest parallel to our index is Blaydes and Linzer (2012), which focuses on anti-Americanism rather than public support for democracy. We revisit this work in chapter 5.

of measuring individual piety. Single indicators such as mosque attendance are simply too narrow to capture the diversity of individual religious behaviors. Indicators such as "support for Shari'a law," or opinions about the proper level of religiosity for politicians in public office, on the other hand, are measures of what piety might cause, not what it is. Whatever the strengths of these other approaches,[8] our argument so far in this chapter has demonstrated that they are not suited to our task of characterizing the consequences of individual piety for political attitudes.

Our main political beliefs of interest concern the appropriateness of sharia law (*hukum syariah*) in Indonesian politics, the importance of Islam in general for Indonesian politics, and the propriety of democracy for Indonesian politics. The precise wordings of four basic questions are included in table 2.3, in English and in Indonesian. For each, the possible answers included "Strongly Disagree," "Disagree," "Agree," "Strongly Agree," and "Don't Know."

Two questions capture sharia law in ways that reflect the context in which it is discussed in contemporary Indonesia. One, which we denote with the variable *SHARIA*, reflects the basic issue of Indonesia's constitutional architecture and its relationship to sharia. This debate, which has oriented Indonesian political Islam at least since independence with the proposed inclusion of the so-called Jakarta Charter (Elson 2009) in the 1945 constitution,[9] re-emerged as an open political question in 1998 (Fealy 2004). Another, *LOCAL SHARIA*, focuses on regional sharia legislation. This issue, too, is not new in Indonesian politics, but unlike the unsuccessful efforts of Islamists after 1998 to amend Indonesia's constitution to

8. For example, it is entirely reasonable to ask if individuals who support sharia law also support democracy. Our critique is simply that this is not a test of the relationship between piety and opinions about democracy.

9. The key phrase in the Jakarta Charter is "kewadjiban mendjalankan sjari'at Islam bagi pemeloek2-nja," which translates as "with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents." As Fealy (2004: 119 n. 7) notes, there is some degree of semantic ambiguity in this phrase about whether this requirement holds that Muslims must themselves comply with sharia, or alternatively, that Muslims implement sharia law that applies to all Indonesians. Most Indonesian Islamists follow the latter interpretation, although a system based on the former could in principle be implemented, perhaps following the Malaysian model.

Table 2.3 Four Questions about Islam and Politics

Variable	English	Indonesian
Sharia	Some people believe that Indonesian law must be consistent with Islamic law, or sharia. To what extent do you agree with that belief?	Ada yang berpendapat bahwa hukum yang berlaku di Indonesia harus sesuai dengan hukum Islam/syariah. Seberapa setuju atau tidak setuju Ibu/Bapak dengan pendapat tersebut?
Local Sharia	To what extent do you agree with the belief that local governments are allowed to implement sharia law in their own regions?	Seberapa setuju Ibu/Bapak dengan pendapat bahwa pemerintah daerah diperbolehkan menerapkan syariah di daerah mereka masing-masing?
Pro-Islam	Separately from the view that Islam or sharia should or should not be the basis of [Indonesian] law, some people believe that Islam should play a larger role in political life than it currently does. To what extent do you agree with that belief?	Terlepas dari pendapat yang menyatakan bahwa Islam/syariah harus menjadi asas hukum negara atau tidak, ada yang berpendapat bahwa Islam harus lebih banyak berperan dalam kehidupan politik dibandingkan sekarang. Seberapa setuju Ibu/Bapak dengan pendapat tersebut?
Pro-Democracy	Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree that compared to other forms of government, democracy is the form of government that is best for a country such as ours?	Apakah Ibu/Bapak sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, setuju atau sangat setuju dengan pendapat bahwa dibandingkan dengan bentuk pemerintahan lainnya, demokrasi adalah bentuk pemerintahan terbaik untuk sebuah negara seperti negara kita?

include explicit mention of sharia, several local jurisdictions have successfully passed "*sharia* ordinances" (Buehler 2013).

Two other questions turn away from sharia in particular to focus on Islam and democracy more generally. *PRO-ISLAM* captures respondents' general outlook toward the role of Islam in Indonesian political life. This is an important complement to the question about sharia law, for it is possible that some respondents may disagree that Indonesian law must be made consistent with sharia but nevertheless wish that Islam were more important in Indonesian politics. Finally, *PRO-DEMOCRACY* simply asks whether democracy is the best form of government for a country like Indonesia, which helps to determine the baseline level of support for democracy in an abstract sense.

In figure 2.7 we show the basic breakdown of responses to each question among Muslim respondents. The results for *SHARIA* and *LOCAL*



Figure 2.7 Political Beliefs among Indonesian Muslims
This figure shows the distribution of responses to four questions about political beliefs (see table 2.3 for definitions). Sample includes only Muslims, $N = 2{,}241$.

SHARIA show that most Indonesian Muslims do indeed favor making Indonesian law consistent with sharia. They also believe, however, that democracy is the most appropriate form of government for Indonesia.

More revealing than the beliefs of Muslims overall is the relationship between piety and these beliefs. In figure 2.8 we use violin plots (as in figure 2.5) to compare piety across respondents giving each response to each of the four questions.

The plots in figure 2.8 show that piety has remarkably little purchase in explaining beliefs about sharia law, the importance of Islam in politics, or beliefs about democracy in general. Some of Indonesia's most pious Muslims agree with implementing sharia law, but many pious Muslims disagree strongly as well. The same is true for democracy. These results



Figure 2.8 Piety and Political Beliefs
This figure shows violin plots of *PIETY INDEX* for subgroups of Muslims defined by their responses to the questions described in table 2.3 and figure 2.7. The shaded region is a density plot showing the full distribution of *PIETY INDEX* across each group, while the box and whisker plots within the shaded regions show medians, interquartile ranges, and adjacent values. The dotted vertical line denotes the average of *PIETY INDEX* across all Muslims.

amount to a convincing rejection of any simple story linking piety to political beliefs among Indonesian Muslims.

Of course, the wide variation in piety across all levels of responses to all questions does not preclude the possibility that there are differences "on average." Recall first that the vast majority of respondents to each question provided moderate responses, meaning that they neither strongly agree nor strongly disagree with these beliefs. Among these moderates, those who favor sharia law are slightly more pious than those who do not, but the difference between the two is not highly statistically significant (for *SHARIA,* $p = .046$; for *LOCAL SHARIA,* $p = .070$).[10] There is no significant difference whatsoever between the level of piety for *PRO-ISLAM* ($p = .322$). Relative to those few Muslims who disagree that democracy is the most suitable form of government for a country like Indonesia, those who agree that it is are on average *more* pious ($p = .011$). But among those relatively few Muslims who hold more extreme views, those who strongly disagree with implementing sharia law in Indonesia are actually more pious than those who simply disagree (for *SHARIA,* $p = .014$; for *LOCAL SHARIA,* $p = .045$).

Taken together, these results are weakly supportive of a basic claim that individual piety is related to political beliefs about sharia law, the importance of Islam in politics, and democracy. But by inspecting the full distribution of piety across respondents, we also learn that much as in the case of the relationship between piety and ethnicity and *aliran*, these differences "on average" can obscure the wide variation in piety that exists in our data across respondents espousing each of these beliefs.

COMPARING DIFFERENT MEASURES OF PIETY

It is useful to ask how the conclusions reached with our new measure of piety would compare to those reached in conventional analyses that

10. *P*-values here and throughout this paragraph are from *t*-tests comparing the average levels of *PIETY INDEX* for responses that are either "Agree" or "Disagree." Results are qualitatively similar for rank-sum tests, but *p*-values rise in each case.

either measure piety more coarsely or associate it directly with support for sharia. To do so, we compare the results from four otherwise identical statistical analyses of the determinants of individual support for the United States (we discuss this variable in greater detail in chapter 5). In our preferred analysis, we use *PIETY INDEX* to measure piety. In another, we use a variable called *PIOUS*, which is self-reported piety, described in table 2.1. In the third, we use self-reported mosque attendance for Friday prayers (*MOSQUE*), also described in table 2.1. Finally, in the fourth, we use *SHARIA*, our indicator of respondents' support for sharia law in Indonesia. This procedure explicitly compares the approaches in Tessler (2002), Jamal (2006), and Benstead (2014) to our own.

Our results appear in table 2.4. Each model reports the coefficient for a measure of piety in a regression that predicts support for the United States as a function of piety and a set of demographic control variables. Panel

Table 2.4 Comparing Measures of Piety

	PIETY INDEX	*PIOUS*	*MOSQUE*	*Sharia*
Panel A: Ordered Logistic Regressions				
Measure of piety	–.015	–.198**	–.111*	–.361***
	(0.025)	(0.075)	(0.055)	(0.067)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,903	2,165	1,977	2,055
Pseudo-R^2	.044	.067	.046	.074
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares				
Measure of piety	–.005	–.082**	–.042^{+}	–.137***
	(0.010)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,903	2,165	1,977	2,055
Adjusted R^2	.038	.092	.043	.103

NOTE: The dependent variable is favorable feelings toward the United States. Controls include gender, urban, and a full set of dummies for age, ethnicity, and province.

$^{+}$ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

A estimates ordered logistic regressions, and Panel B uses ordinary least squares (OLS).

These results are illuminating. When we use *PIETY INDEX* as our measure of piety, we find no statistically significant association between piety and feelings toward the United States. Substantive effect sizes are small and imprecisely estimated. On the other hand, when we use any of the other three measures of piety, we uncover a statistically significant and substantively much larger negative relationship between piety and individual support for the United States. This is evidence that our conceptualization and measurement of piety matters: substantive conclusions about individual religiosity and political attitudes in the Muslim world will depend on how we measure piety itself.

It is also useful to examine the pseudo-R^2 and adjusted R^2 statistics reported in table 2.4. These statistics summarize the total amount of variation in the individual support for the United States that is explained by the full set of explanatory variables. Because the regression models are otherwise identical, we can conclude from these figures that *PIETY INDEX* explains less variation in support for the United States than do each of the other indicators of piety. Yet we cannot infer that these other indicators of piety are superior *measures of piety*, because our purpose is not to maximize predictive power from among many possible measures of piety. Instead, it is to ground measurement in a rigorous conceptualization of piety, and from there to see what predictive conclusions follow. Following this strategy has allowed us to see just how much existing conclusions may depend on coarse measurements.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a panoramic overview of piety among Indonesian Muslims. Its contributions are both conceptual and empirical. Conceptually, we have advanced a distinctive argument on what it means to be pious in Islam, one that focuses not just on orthopraxy but also on beliefs and other varieties of religious behavior. Our empirical contribution, in turn,

is to apply this conceptualization to a large survey population in order to characterize piety across Indonesian Muslims. Explicating how we conceptualize piety, and then translating that directly into our measurement procedures, allows us to address some of the most important critiques of survey-based measures of Muslim piety: that it implies a unidimensional and therefore reductionist perspective on what piety means; that it is excessively broad, encompassing aspects of religious life that do not fall within the "core" of Islamic orthopraxy; and that it confuses indicators of piety itself with other beliefs about what Islam may require.

Armed with our novel measure of piety, we also make two important contributions to the study of Indonesian Islam. We have shown that there is much wider variation in individual piety *within* various *aliran* than across *aliran*. This should lead scholars of Indonesian Islam to rethink the common characterization of Indonesian Muslims as "statistical" or "nominal" Muslims simply because they self-identify as *abangan* or *priyayi* rather than *santri*, hopefully laying to rest enduring preconceptions of syncretic religious traditions as diminished or degenerate forms of Islam. We have likewise shown that individual piety is not a strong predictor of Muslims' beliefs about the proper relationship between faith and politics in Indonesia, a country in which the majority of Muslims support democracy as well as a greater role for Islam in public life. This finding complements others drawn from public opinion data in the Arab world that religiosity does not predict support for or opposition to democracy (Benstead 2014; Jamal 2006; Tessler 2002), but rests on a more conceptually appropriate understanding of piety than does existing work. Accordingly, it should help scholars of Islam and politics the world over to derive more appropriate empirical methods for testing the relationship between religiosity and support for democracy. We have also shown that our measure yields substantively different conclusions about the relationship between individual piety and attitudes toward the United States, which reinforces just how important measurement choices are.

These are primarily descriptive contributions. In the following three chapters, we investigate additional questions about Indonesian Islam in greater depth.

3

Islam and Party Politics

INTRODUCTION

In chapter 2, we showed that there is a relatively weak relationship between individual piety and beliefs about the importance of Islam in Indonesian politics, either in terms of Islam playing a greater role in politics or in terms of implementing sharia law on a regional or national scale. But these individual-level insights about how piety correlates with political beliefs only scratch the surface of a broader analysis of Islam and democracy. In this chapter, we ask if political parties that espouse Islamist party ideologies enjoy an electoral advantage over non-Islamist parties when they compete in free and open democratic elections.

This question has a long pedigree in the scholarship on Islam and democracy, motivated by a common belief among many observers of Islamist opposition movements in authoritarian states that Islamists would win any election in which they were able to compete. While the causal logic for

such a belief is rarely articulated, presumably the reason that Islamist parties are held to have an inherent advantage over other parties in attracting Muslim voters is Islam's scriptural focus on economic justice, or alternatively because of Muslim voters' association of Islam with other normatively good outcomes. As Evans and Phillips (2007: 131) write on Algerian politics in *Anger of the Dispossessed*, "In the face of unending economic hardship, this vision of Islam offered a powerful pull because, in providing an all-embracing credo, it gave people a sense of new-found purpose and dignity." Likewise, popular portrayals of disaffected youths and the urban poor hold that economic hardship in Muslim societies provides a critical impetus that drives voters toward Islamist parties and social movements (see, e.g., *International Herald Tribune*, February 17, 2008). In such writings, Islamists have an inherent power to attract voters under conditions of economic hardship that non-Islamist parties and movements do not have. We term this view "Islam's political advantage."

Yet substantial inferential and conceptual problems exist in this line of reasoning. Existing approaches cannot discern whether Islam's political advantage is inherent to populist Islam, or is merely a consequence of Islamic organizations' persistence under unpopular and unresponsive popular regimes. Conceptual problems, by contrast, lie in the failure of existing research to articulate precisely how Islamist platforms attract popular support. Are Islamist parties more able to win over constituents with populist economic programs than are non-Islamist parties *with identical platforms*? Do nonreligious party platforms shape Islam's political advantage?

Our analysis in this chapter makes three contributions to political economy and mass public opinion in the Muslim world. First, we propose a different theory of how religion interacts with material interests to shape mass support for Islamist parties, drawing on literature on cueing, heuristics, and informational shortcuts in comparative political behavior. Islamist party ideologies, we claim, function as informational shortcuts to Muslim voters—much as heuristics such as party, ideology, and elite endorsements shape political behavior among voters in American elections (see, e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Rahn 1993; Sniderman, Brody, and

Tetlock 1991). Second, we distinguish our theory from various alternative conceptions of Islam's political advantage that are implied in existing research, and show the difficulties of using observational data to distinguish among them. Finally, we use experimental methods to test our theory in democratic Indonesia.

If voters view Islamist party ideologies as cues about expected future behavior, then they should only confer a political advantage when voters are uncertain about parties' other policies. Accordingly, policy uncertainty will play a central role in shaping the electoral fortunes of Islamist parties. We show that when citizens rate parties' economic policies as either *favorable* or *unfavorable*, Islamist parties have no advantage over non-Islamist parties. However, when citizens are *unsure* about parties' economic policy platforms, Islamist parties do have a distinct political advantage. In demonstrating this point, we show that even among those respondents who are most sympathetic to political Islam, Islamist party ideologies only give parties an advantage over non-Islamist parties when voters are uncertain about parties' economy policy platforms. Moreover, individual-level piety plays only a very limited role in conditioning these effects: among the least pious Muslims in our sample of Indonesians, we find that even this small and highly conditional political advantage for Islamist parties disappears. Together, findings indicate that Islam's political advantage is real, but is critically circumscribed by voters' instrumental motives and their beliefs and knowledge about party platforms.

Our approach overcomes the main conceptual and inferential problems in the research on Islam's political advantage. Our theory provides more conceptual nuance than either an essentialist conception of Islam as universally attractive to voters or a reductionist perspective of Islam as an ideological cover for material interests. As we argued in chapter 1, the choice of Indonesia, where Islamist parties campaign freely alongside non-Islamist parties, removes the inferential problems that arise when Islamist parties (or any other parties) are forbidden from participating in elections or restricted in the ideological appeals they may make. Our experimental strategy allows us to pose directly the precise counterfactuals necessary to evaluate just how Islam—rather than other components of a party's platform—is attractive to voters. By randomizing ideology and

economic evaluations across respondents, we ensure that respondents' baseline ideological orientations cannot systematically influence the average level of support that we elicit for a particular party type.

Beyond applying the insights of the literatures on cueing and information in comparative political behavior to a novel empirical domain, our findings from Indonesia contribute to larger debates about religion and politics. The idea that confessional parties might hold unique appeal among the faithful is an old and sensible one (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). More recent research has examined the links between religious belief and vote choice (e.g., Kotler-Berkowitz 2001; Layman 1997; Manza and Brooks 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2004). We turn this research around, asking not how an *individual's* religious belief affects *his or her* vote choice, but instead how a *party's* ideology affects its *aggregate* political support. Our answer—that religion matters, but in a subtle way that existing research has ignored—suggests important new directions for understanding how religious messages affect popular support for confessional parties.

ISLAMIST PARTIES AND ECONOMIC APPEALS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Islamist parties tap into economic grievances to win popular support across the world. In Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) campaigns on issues of economic and social justice (Mujani and Liddle 2009), but it is far from alone in this regard. In Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamist Party (PAS) has built a platform around progressive economic policies and anticorruption (Noor 2003). Pakistan's former Islamist opposition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), derived its support from its opposition to the war on terror and to liberal capitalism (Misra 2003). The Islamic Republic of Iran consistently implemented redistributive policies throughout the 1980s, and presidents such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad use economic appeals to secure political support (Amuzegar 2007). Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) campaigns on its record in economic management (Öniş 2006). In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood grew by stressing

poverty eradication and economic empowerment (Lia 1998: 85–6). Algeria's Islamist Salvation Front (FIS) united disgruntled urban poor with middle-class groups under a platform of social reform and economic development (Miller 1993). These examples all share a common theme: an Islamist party or politician capitalizing on economic grievances to gain political power.

Economic appeals figure in Islamist political activism in nonelectoral contexts as well. During Iran's Islamic revolution, *bazaaris* (urban traders and small merchants) created a "bazaar-mosque alliance" that combined frustration with the shah's economic policies with disgust with the regime's perceived anti-Islamist stance (Ashraf 1988). Palestinian Hamas draws its support not merely from its strict opposition to Israel, but also from service provision (Mishal and Sela 2000). Islamist social institutions in the Middle East, which appeal to broad constituencies frustrated with the state's failure to provide adequate social services, represent Islam's "challenge to the secular state itself" (Clark 2004: 5–6).

The fact that popular Islamist political movements so frequently emerge in response to economic grievances suggests that Islam is inherently attractive to the economically disadvantaged. Yet scholars often treat Islam's appeal under such conditions as given and unproblematic. A key early critic of this literature, Wickham (2002) notes that the Muslim Brotherhood's growth in Egypt arose from the sustained mobilizational efforts of movement elites. Her critical insights suggest a broader problem. In the Muslim world, conspicuously Islamist parties occupy only a portion of the political landscape. Their political competitors seek Muslim votes but campaign on liberal, nationalist, socialist, and other ideological platforms. These parties confront the same economic circumstances as Islamist parties. Most, in fact, face fewer legal hurdles than do Islamist parties and movements. Why, then, should grievances drive Muslims to support *Islamist* parties (see also Masoud 2013)?

To be sure, there is no agreement that Islamist parties have any advantage over other parties. Smith (2003) argues that many *bazaaris* grew to oppose Iran's Islamist government due to its economic policies. Brumberg (2006) rejects any sort of monolithic Islamist identity that shapes political behavior. Ottaway and Hamzawy (2007) stress that Islamist parties

invariably couple their religious messages with redistribution and patronage. Masoud argues that organizations and linkage opportunities explain why Islamists in Egypt perform better than leftists among an electorate that demands redistribution: "Islamists possess multiple opportunities to communicate with voters and convince them of their fealty to their interests, whereas leftists—who may actually be truer to those interests—simply lack equivalent opportunities" (7). But all of these observations still beg the question of why Islamist parties appear more successful at deriving political support from such platforms than their secular counterparts. Accordingly, some scholars assert explicitly that Islamist parties are uniquely able to link their Islamist platforms to popular economic discontent, for example, Vergès (1997), Miller (1993), and Demiralp (2009).

How might Islam resonate with economic grievances? Davis and Robinson (2006: 169) argue that a worldview called "theological communitarianism" "inclines the orthodox to economic communitarianism or egalitarianism." Muslims, in this view, might be predisposed toward favoring Islamist political movements over non-Islamist ones under conditions of economic hardship simply because Islam favors redistribution. Yet even if this is true, it implies that Islam's appeal is not only universal, but unconditional on other factors such as the policy platforms of other parties that surely affect the ways in which parties compete to attract Muslim voters.

Uncertainty and Party Choice: Islam as a Cue

In contrast to these views, we argue that Islam resonates with voters precisely because they are uncertain about parties and the policies that they intend to adopt. Voters face at least three kinds of uncertainty. The first is uncertainty over policies: voters may not actually know parties' economic policies, perhaps because they are "cognitive misers" (Lau and Sears 1986), or alternatively as a consequence of parties' inability to communicate their policy platforms (Banks 1990). A second kind of uncertainty is uncertainty over outcomes: voters may not know how policies that the parties plan to adopt will affect them (Fernandez and Rodrik 2001). A third kind of uncertainty

is uncertainty over implementation: voters may be uncertain about a party's commitment ex ante to adopt costly policies ex post (Besley and Coate 1998). These three forms of uncertainty are present in all elections, but they are hallmarks of elections in young democracies (such as Indonesia or Pakistan), where there is high party turnover (Turkey), or where electoral authoritarianism prevents some or all parties from campaigning (Egypt before 2011).

Under all forms of uncertainty, we argue that the value of Islamist party ideology in majority Muslim countries is that it serves as an informational shortcut that communicates something positive about a party's policy intentions. Linking Islam to a party's platform will do this if voters are predisposed to associating religious piety with other normatively good outcomes (as per Davis and Robinson 2006), and hence voters—who face a problem of uncertainty about policies adopted ex post—believe that Islamist parties are more likely to adopt good policies than are non-Islamist parties. Islam's political advantage operates not when voters evaluate party platforms as good or bad, but specifically when voters are uncertain about how to evaluate party platforms. This means that voters *cue on Islamist ideology* under conditions of policy uncertainty. Critically, if we are correct, then we should be able to show that when individuals are provided with information about parties' policies, Islam's political advantage disappears entirely.

To distinguish this perspective on Islam's political advantage from competing views, we outline below these alternative conceptions of "advantage" based on how voters respond to the policies proposed by Islamist and non-Islamist parties. Throughout, our discussion is not whether pious individuals vote for Islamist parties, but rather whether a party is better able to sway a mass of voters by appealing to Islam than it would otherwise be. "Advantage" here is a statement about aggregate support, not about an individual's beliefs and vote choice.

Absolute Advantage

The first alternative is that voters always prefer an Islamist party to a non-Islamist one. To make this idea concrete, imagine two kinds of policies and

two kinds of parties. The first policy is to increase fuel subsidies for the disadvantaged in a country where such subsidies are deeply popular. The second policy is the opposite, a cut in fuel subsidies, which is just as unpopular as subsidies are popular. The "absolute advantage" view is simply that an Islamist party offering either of those policies is always more popular than a non-Islamist party offering the same policy. In this view, voters have consistent noninstrumental motives for voting for Islamist parties. This can take two forms. Under a *noninstrumental absolute advantage*, voters prefer Islamist parties offering subsidy cuts to non-Islamist parties offering subsidy increases. An *instrumental absolute advantage*, by contrast, would find that voters prefer non-Islamist parties advocating subsidy increases to Islamist parties offering subsidy cuts, but that across identical policies, Islamist parties are always preferred to non-Islamist parties.

Conditional Advantage

Islam's political advantage, however, may be conditional on parties' economic policy platforms. The second alternative conception of Islam's political advantage holds that when confronted with policies that they oppose, neither Islamist parties nor non-Islamist parties have any advantage. However, when the two party types both propose favorable policies, voters prefer Islamist parties to non-Islamist ones. In the example of fuel subsidies, voters will reject any parties that advocate subsidy cuts but will favor Islamist parties offering subsidy increases over non-Islamist parties offering the same. This means that voters *reward Islamist parties with popular policies* more than they do non-Islamist parties. Accordingly, voters' noninstrumental motives for supporting Islamist parties affect their party preferences, but only when their instrumental motives have been fulfilled.

We emphasize that the simple observation that populist Islamist parties have garnered widespread popular support in many countries is consistent with both of the two preceding interpretations of Islam's political advantage. Populist Islamist parties may be popular because they are Islamist parties offering popular policies and Islamist parties are always more popular,

or because they are Islamist parties offering popular policies and only this kind of Islamist party has an advantage over its non-Islamist competitors. Without comparing different kinds of parties across different kinds of policies, we cannot judge how Islamist ideology affects a party's popular support.

The third alternative conception is the mirror image of the second one. Voters may still have noninstrumental motives for party choices, but instead of rewarding Islamist parties that propose popular economic policies, voters may punish Islamist parties that propose unpopular economic policies less than non-Islamist parties offering the same. This conception of Islam's political advantage suggests that voters *forgive Islamist parties with unpopular policies* more than they do non-Islamist parties. Here, Islam matters when material interests have not been fulfilled.

The idea that Islam's advantage appears only in contexts where Islamist parties' policies are unpopular is ill-suited to explain the primary motivating examples of this chapter—PKS's stress on prodevelopment policy in Indonesia, FIS's popular support in Algeria, or the AKP's popularity in Turkey. But there are reasons to take this view seriously. It may be that Islamist mass organizations in war-torn countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan are more likely than non-Islamist counterparts to secure power despite their ruthless means. Perhaps Iran's Islamist government has survived periods of economic stagnation due to its fealty to Islamist principles. In countries such as Indonesia and Bangladesh, small and relatively unpopular Islamist parties may be more popular than they would otherwise be if they campaigned as nationalist parties. Again, absent comparisons of warlords with benevolent social planners, or of popular economic platforms by Islamist parties with unpopular economic platforms by Islamist parties, these casual observations alone are also consistent with the absolute view of Islam's political advantage.

Islamist Irrelevance

Finally, the null hypothesis that there is actually no inherent advantage to being an Islamist party is critical to our analysis. If true, Islam's perceived

advantage is entirely the result of external contextual factors. How might this occur? If non-Islamist opposition parties are ineffectual, anti-incumbent voters may vote for Islamist parties for reasons having nothing to do with Islam itself. Alternatively, non-Islamist parties may simply be less sensitive, for whatever reason, to citizens' demands, rendering them unwilling or unable to offer the sorts of popular policies that Islamist parties can. In both cases, what appear to be votes for Islamist parties are actually nothing more than votes for preferred policies.

Observing "Advantage"

Given these five conceptual possibilities, we can distinguish among them using only six quantities of interest. We summarize these in table 3.1.

The letter in each cell corresponds to the average level of support across citizens for a party of the type denoted in the columns that offers the economic platform denoted in the rows. In table 3.2 we show how these quantities of interest translate into hypotheses.

Absolute advantage holds that Islamist parties offering any policy type are always more popular than non-Islamist policies offering the same. If this is true, then the average level of support for an Islamist party offering good policies (denoted A in table 3.1) should be significantly larger than the average level of support for non-Islamist parties offering good policies (denoted B). The same should be true for both other platforms: C should be larger than D, and E should be larger than F. If the noninstrumental version of the absolute advantage thesis is correct, then in addition to the above, both C and E should be larger than B, indicating

Table 3.1 Observing Advantage: Necessary Data

		Support for Islamist party	**Non-Islamist party**
Economic platform	**Favorable**	A	B
	Unclear	C	D
	Unfavorable	E	F

Table 3.2 Observing Advantage: Hypotheses

Hypothesis	**Expected findings**	
No Advantage (Null)	$Support_{Islam,Good} = Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	A = B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} = Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Unsure}$	C = D
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} = Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Bad}$	E = F
Absolute Islamist advantage, instrumental	$Support_{Islam,Good} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	A > B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Unsure}$	C > D
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Bad}$	E > F
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} < Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	E < B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} < Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	C < B
Absolute Islamist advantage, noninstrumental	$Support_{Islam,Good} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	A > B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Unsure}$	C > D
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Bad}$	E > F
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	E > B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	C > B
Rewarding Islamist parties	$Support_{Islam,Good} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	A > B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} \geq Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Unsure}$	C ≥ D
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} = Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Bad}$	E = F
Forgiving Islamist parties	$Support_{Islam,Good} = Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	A = B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} \geq Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Unsure}$	C ≥ D
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Bad}$	E > F
Cueing on Islam	$Support_{Islam,Good} = Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Good}$	A = B
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure} > Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Unsure}$	C > D
	$Support_{Islam,Bad} = Support_{Non\text{-}Islam,Bad}$	E = F
Electoral context	$Support_{Islam,Good,President} > Support_{Islam,Good,Representative}$, $Support_{Islam,Good,Governor}$	
	$Support_{Islam,Unsure,President} > Support_{Islam,Unsure,Representative}$, $Support_{Islam,Unsure,Governor}$	
	$Support_{Islam,Bad,President} > Support_{Islam,Bad,Representative}$, $Support_{Islam,Bad,Governor}$	

that any Islamist party is more popular than a non-Islamist party even when the latter offers favorable policies.

Alternatively, if Islam's political advantage means that voters reward Islamist parties for offering good policies, then we should expect A to be larger than B but no difference between E and F. If it means that voters forgive Islamist parties offering bad policies, then we predict no difference between A and B, but that E should be larger than F. Because neither view makes any claim about Islam's role under conditions of uncertainty, we hold simply that C should be greater than or equal to D under both of the conditional hypotheses. If the null hypothesis is true then we should observe that A is equal to B, C is equal to D, and E is equal to F.

If we are correct, though, that voters cue on Islam only under conditions of uncertainty, we should observe that when voters are certain about policy types, there should be no difference between average support for either Islamist or non-Islamist parties: A and B should be equal, as should E and F. But when voters are uncertain about economic policy platforms, Islamist parties should be relatively more popular, so C should be larger than D.

These quantities of interest in table 3.1 make clear the inferential problems that observational studies face. In most Muslim-majority countries, restrictions on political rights prevent elections from approximating true referenda on the political parties contesting in them. The optimal case for studying the role of Islam is a country like Indonesia, a democracy in which several non-Islamist parties compete with several Islamist ones. Islamist parties there struggle to attract the type of electoral support that non-Islamist parties have, suggesting that in the world's largest Muslim democracy, Islam does not dominate all other considerations. But unless we can ensure that we are comparing two parties whose economic platforms are identical, we cannot distinguish the failure of Islam to influence voters from a failure of these parties' economic policies or other considerations.

Now consider other cases. In Turkey, for most of the twentieth century a secular establishment delivered inconsistent economic performance while failing to address the social upheavals that accompanied modernization.

Since 2001, the AKP has attracted popular support by campaigning on probusiness yet socially minded developmentalist principles. Yet if we follow table 3.1, this tells us nothing about the existence or nature of Islam's political advantage. As it is, Islam's importance for the AKP's success remains a topic of debate.

Even more difficult is Iran, where avowedly secular parties have been effectively banned since 1979. While current parties vary in their ideological orientations, all place Islam at their ideological core. Yet their economic policies vary, and candidates employ both Islamic symbols and policy pledges to win votes. Absent parties that fall into the right-hand column of table 3.1, we cannot evaluate the role Islam plays in shaping popular support for Iranian parties. The benefit of our experimental approach is that we can directly observe all of these quantities of interest.

THE METHOD

All conceptions of Islam's political advantage rest on claims about voter preferences. As such, we base our analysis on popular support for different kinds of political parties, which we elicit using our survey data. The Indonesian case is useful because it fulfills three key criteria: (1) Islamist parties have a possibility of victory; (2) parties face no restrictions on their legal ability to campaign as Islamist versus other kinds of parties; and (3) elections are free and fair contests, so that respondents understand elections to be referenda about parties and their platforms. To recall our discussion in chapter 1 about the importance of the Indonesian case, few regimes in the Muslim world meet these basic standards for democratic electoral competition. Among those that do, political freedoms often remain circumscribed. The exception is Indonesia, both a consolidated democracy and the world's most populous Muslim country.

Since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has transformed from a dictatorship into a vibrant multiparty democracy. Political parties in Indonesia range from avowedly pluralist social democratic parties to openly Islamist parties. Free and fair national elections were held

in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. The most prominent Indonesian political parties in mid-2008 (when our survey was fielded) fall into two camps according to their ideological bases (*asas*). Their names and vote shares in the 2004 legislative elections appear in figure 3.1.

The first camp includes parties whose ideological basis is Islam. Together, these Islamist parties together received just over 20% of the votes in the 2004 legislative elections. The Unity and Development Party (PPP) was founded in 1973 as the New Order's official "Islamist" opposition party. PPP attracts some support from Islamists, but "local patron-client relations, more than pro-Islamist state sentiments, appear to have been PPP's main source of support" during the New Order period (Mujani and Liddle 2009: 581). By contrast PKS, the Prosperous Justice Party, is one of the youngest Islamist parties in Indonesia, formed after its predecessor, the Justice Party (PK), failed to meet the minimal electoral threshold in 1999. PKS is a cadre-based party, one that eschews charismatic leadership in favor of grass-roots mobilization, with linkages to similar parties in the Middle East (Eliraz 2007; Mujani and Liddle 2009). Whereas



Figure 3.1 Islamist and Pancasila-Based Parties
Share of pie indicates each party's vote share in Indonesia's 2004 legislative elections.

PK campaigned in favor of imposing Islamic law in 1999, PKS has since downplayed the Islamist language of its campaign messages in favor of economic empowerment and moral leadership. Its relatively strong showing in the 2004 legislative elections has been attributed to the mobilizational capacities of its cadres and to its campaign appeals for "clean and caring" government (Mujani and Liddle 2009: 582). The Moon and Star Party (PBB) and the Reform Star Party (PBR) attract the support of some devout Muslims, but lack the institutional legacy of PPP and the cadre-based system of PKS.

Nearly every other political party retains an official allegiance to Pancasila. Promulgated by Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, Pancasila ("Five Principles") is a religiously syncretic political ideology based on five core values held to be common to all Indonesians. While its interpretation has evolved over the years (Darmaputera 1988), since the 1970s the five principles have commonly been understood to be the acceptance of a single God,[1] humanitarianism, the unity of the Indonesian state, democracy guided by consensus, and social justice (Panitia Lima 1977).

The idea that an Indonesian party's platform is Pancasila or Islam—and that this is a politically salient cleavage today—has historical origins. Under President Sukarno (1945–1967), Pancasila emphasized national unity and progressive reform while rejecting Islamic particularism. Pancasila was reformulated under President Soeharto (1967–1998) as an ideological basis for the New Order regime, rejecting communism and Islamism alike. In 1982, Soeharto decreed that all political parties and organizations must adopt Pancasila as their "sole foundation" (*asas tunggal*). After 1999, this requirement lapsed, leading the PPP along with several new political parties to declare that their official foundations were no longer Pancasila, but Islam. The remaining parties retain allegiance to Pancasila. Among the largest Pancasila-based parties in mid-2008, the Golkar Party is the successor to Soeharto's mass organization of the same name; PDI-P, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, is the successor to PDI (the

1. This principle is interpreted very broadly; in common understanding, it simply rejects atheism.

Indonesian Democracy Party, the New Order's officially "nationalist" opposition party); and PD, or Democratic Party, is the personal political vehicle for former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The remaining two Pancasila-based parties, PKB (National Awakening Party) and PAN (National Mandate Party), are distinctly different in that they are based on mass Muslim organizations but have consciously chosen to become open, multifaith parties with nationalist ambitions. PKB was founded in 1998 by leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Muslim sociocultural organization that claimed fifty million members in 2003 (*Republika* 2003). PAN was founded in the same year by Amien Rais, former head of Muhammadiyah, a modernist counterpart of Nahdlatul Ulama that claimed thirty-five million members in 2003. In Indonesia's first democratic period (prior to 1957), both Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah supported Masjumi, an Islamic party that advocated the adoption of sharia law.[2]

Experimental Method

As part of our survey, we randomly assigned respondents to a series of hypothetical electoral choices. The precise wording is included in table 3.3, both in English and in Indonesian, with italics highlighting the manipulation.

Possible answers included "Yes," "No," and "Don't Know / Refuse to Answer." "Don't Know" accounted for less than 1% of the responses in each experimental group, so we are comfortable discarding these responses from our analysis. We repeated this question two additional times, changing "president" (Presiden) to "the House of Representatives" (DPR) and then to "governor" (Gubernur). As several local governments have enacted sharia ordinances in recent years, we conjecture that respondents may be more willing to support Islamist parties at the regional level than at the

2. NU formed its own political party in 1952. Today, PBB claims to be Masjumi's intellectual heir.

Table 3.3 Experimental Question Wording

If there were a candidate for president from a *Pancasila-based party/Islamic party wishing to implement Islamic law*, and you *believed that/were unsure if* that party's economic policies *would/would not* develop our economy and increase the welfare of the people, would you vote for him or her?

Seandainya ada calon Presiden dari partai politik yang berasas *Pancasila/Islam dan ingin melaksanakan hukum syariah di seluruh negara kita*, dan ibu/bapak berpendapat bahwa partai itu punya program kebijakan ekonomi yang akan membangun ekonomi kita dan meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat, apakah ibu/bapak akan memilihnya?

Seandainya ada calon Presiden dari partai politik yang berasas *Pancasila/Islam dan ingin melaksanakan hukum syariah di seluruh negara kita*, tetapi ibu/bapak tidak tahu apa saja mengenai program kebijakan ekonomi partai politik itu, apakah ibu/bapak akan memilihnya?

Seandainya ada calon Presiden dari partai politik yang berasas *Pancasila/Islam dan ingin melaksanakan hukum syariah di seluruh negara kita*, tetapi ibu/bapak berpendapat bahwa program kebijakan ekonomi partai itu tidak akan membangun ekonomi kita dan tidak akan meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat, apakah ibu/bapak akan memilihnya?

national level. Each respondent accordingly answered three questions, each chosen randomly. We restrict our analysis to those respondents who self-identified as Muslims, although our results do not change if we look at all respondents.

Our approach inevitably forced us to make hard choices about question wording. Our choices reflect deliberate ambiguity for certain concepts, and precision for others. First, we chose a binary distinction between *Pancasila-based* and *Islamist* parties to reflect this fundamental ideological cleavage in Indonesian politics. We avoided the term "non-Islamist" because it might connote opposition to or removal from Islam. All Pancasila-based parties of any national standing count devout Muslims among their most prominent members, and none express hostility to Islam.

Second, we added the qualifier "wishing to implement Islamic law" in order to cue respondents into the distinction between an Islamist party and other parties with large Muslim constituencies. Recall that PAN and PKB are rooted in mass Muslim organizations but base their ideology on Pancasila, in contrast to the four Islamist parties that support some form of Islamic law. To ensure that respondents did not consider Pancasila-based parties as "Islamist" in our survey, we included the modifier "wishing to implement Islamic law" in our question wording. We show below that there is no evidence that this decision has biased our findings.

Third, we operationalized economic conditions using the phrase "would develop our economy and increase the welfare of the people" in order to ensure that respondents considered the policy implications of the party for all members of society. We did this to avoid appealing to respondents' own interests and instead cue them into parties' economic platforms. We believe that targeted appeals to personal welfare are important, but we leave this issue for further study. We do recognize that respondents may have interpreted the response in light of their own material interests regardless of our intentions. If, for example, poor respondents are more likely both to vote for Islamist parties and to interpret this question via their material interests, this might inflate our estimates of support for Islamist parties. Future studies may profit from providing respondents with a clearer definition of the economic policy content of various party platforms.

Fourth, we were deliberately ambiguous about what makes economic policy "good" or "bad." In particular, we do not specify whether there is a trade-off between growth ("develop our economy") and the distribution of the benefits of that growth ("increase the welfare of the people"). We chose to allow respondents to respond following their own belief about whether there is a trade-off between growth and distribution, and to weigh for themselves the relative salience of these two issues in economic policymaking. We note, however, that all Indonesian political parties hold that their economic policies will result in broadly shared economic development.

Fifth, we do not have a natural "control" group among the six treatment groups. Yet while we take seriously the importance of control groups in survey experiments of the type reviewed by Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk (2007), this does not affect the inferences that we draw. All hypotheses are inherently relational: an advantage as compared to some other kind of party. As our goal in the Indonesian context is to ascertain the extent to which Islamist parties have an advantage over Pancasila-based parties, we are careful to compare Islamist parties to Pancasila-based parties rather than to parties of an unknown or unspecified type.

Sixth, we deliberately refrained from specifying actual parties in our questions in order to remove any chance that nonreligious and noneconomic factors such as leadership charisma or historical legacies (see Liddle and Mujani 2007) would influence respondents' choices. Our goal is to approximate a true referendum among ideal types, not to gauge respondents' views of particular parties. Respondents may have linked the prompt to their favorite (or least favorite) Indonesian political party, but randomization helps to mitigate the concern that this might systematically distort our results. We likewise refrained from specifying concrete policy platforms. Rather than impose a single conception of what counts as a good or bad policy, we allowed voters to consider whatever policies they would find appealing or unappealing to guide their responses.

Validity

One danger for this approach is that voters can imagine hypothetical Pancasila-based parties with favorable policies, but they nevertheless associate actual Islamist parties with good economic outcomes to a greater degree than they do actual Pancasila-based parties. While Islam and competence may be conceptually distinct, perhaps in actual politics they are not. If that were true, our hypothetical Pancasila-based parties with favorable economic policies would be purely hypothetical, diminishing the validity of our study. In figure 3.2 we check whether this is true



Figure 3.2 Popular Views of Seven Large Parties
Each column contains the distribution of responses to three questions about the seven largest political parties in Indonesia. Potential responses included "Agree," "Disagree," and "Don't Know/Refuse to Answer." Data come from Muslim respondents only. Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

using respondents' actual views of the seven largest Indonesian political parties.

We chose three variables that should correlate with respondents' views about parties' platforms; these are imperfect indicators, but they are the best available in our data. The figure shows that there are few substantive differences between the *overall average* perceptions of Indonesian Muslims about the seven political parties in question. This reassures us that our hypothetical questions are reasonable; for each party, a large plurality of Indonesian Muslims believe that it represents the interests of both the rich and the poor and is led by capable leaders, but that it is also corrupt.

Although differences across parties in figure 3.2 are substantively small, they are in some cases statistically significant. But significant differences vary by *party*, not by *platform*. That is, the proportion of respondents viewing PPP as representing the interests of all classes in

Indonesian society is greater than the proportion believing that PD does (.661 versus .630, $p = .03$),[3] but the same cannot be said for PKS versus PD (.628 versus .630, $p = .90$) or versus any other Pancasila-based party. Likewise, whereas the proportion of respondents who view PKS as free of corruption is larger than that for all other political parties ($p < .01$ for all comparisons), the similar proportion for PPP is only larger than that for Golkar and PDI-P ($p < .001$ for both) and not other parties. Finally, the proportion of respondents who believe Golkar's leadership to be competent is higher than for PPP and PKS ($p < .01$ for both), but the same is not true for PDI-P.

We therefore find no evidence that Islamist parties as a whole are viewed differently than Pancasila-based parties, either those based on mass Muslim organizations or those with more avowedly pluralist backgrounds. Other party characteristics matter. PKS is perceived as slightly less corrupt than other Indonesian parties not due to its Islamist platform, but probably because of its dedicated focus on eliminating corruption. Golkar's historical association with the New Order regime, the bureaucracy, and the indigenous Indonesian business community probably contributes to views that its leaders are comparatively better suited to rule than other parties. It is therefore unlikely that respondents overwhelmingly associate actual Islamist parties with good economic outcomes, and Pancasila-based parties with the opposite.

The validity of our survey experiment also depends on the extent to which our randomization of questions truly yields six comparable treatment groups. We checked for balance across treatment groups by examining the choice of question (which defines our six treatment groups) across a range of observed responses to other survey questions. We were especially concerned that demographic variables, indicators of religious piety, and views of the economy and politics were each equivalent across treatment groups. We judge this to have been achieved when there is no evidence of a relationship between the responses to such questions

3. *p*-values come from tests of the equality of proportions (1 = agree, 0 = disagree or don't know).

and placement in a particular treatment group—the former the voluntary responses of the respondents, the latter randomly chosen by us. We examined a wide range of statistics to check for balance, and find no evidence of any systematic differences among treatment groups on a range of underlying dimensions that might conceivably affect responses to our experimental questions.[4]

FINDINGS

Figure 3.3 and table 3.4 summarize our main results. Mirroring the hypotheses in table 3.2, each column in figure 3.3 represents "$\text{Support}_{i,j}$," the proportion of Muslim respondents answering yes to a question asking their willingness to vote for a party of type *i* offering policy *j*. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. In table 3.4, "Advantage" is calculated as $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam},j} - \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila},j}$; we test our hypotheses through *t*-tests of the significance of this difference.[5] The results are for Muslim respondents, but we obtain identical findings if we include non-Muslims.

To a striking degree, among Indonesian Muslims, parties' economic platforms dominate their Islamist affiliation in explaining the aggregate political support they receive from our survey respondents. Both party types offering good economic policies are far more popular than parties of either type offering uncertain or unfavorable economic policies. This neatly dismisses the possibility that all Islamist parties are more popular than all non-Islamist parties.

Our other theoretical expectations operate through the comparison of Islamist and Pancasila-based parties that offer the same policies, represented in the *t*-tests arrayed along the second row of table 3.4. We find no evidence that Islamist parties offering good policies are more popular than Pancasila-based parties offering the same, and also no evidence

4. Complete results are available from the authors upon request.

5. Throughout, our inferences are unchanged if we use a binomial test rather than a *t*-test.



Figure 3.3 Experimental Analysis
Each column represents "Support$_{i,j}$," i.e., the proportion of respondents answering "Yes" to questions asking their willingness to vote for a party of type *i* (Islamist or Pancasila-based) offering policy *j* (positive, unclear, or negative).

Table 3.4 Experimental Analysis

	Presidential elections			**Legislative elections**			**Gubernatorial elections**		
Economic policies	*Positive*	*Unclear*	*Negative*	*Positive*	*Unclear*	*Negative*	*Positive*	*Unclear*	*Negative*
Advantage	−4.8	8.7	−0.9	−11.3	9.9	0.1	−8.4	7.8	1.7
T-statistic	−1.876	3.073	−0.405	−4.285	3.641	0.051	−3.356	2.872	0.679
p-value	.061	.002	.685	.000	.000	.960	.001	.004	.497
N_{Islam}	370	365	374	368	373	375	373	367	369
$N_{Pancasila}$	369	384	361	373	362	369	378	379	355

NOTE: "Advantage" is calculated as $Support_{Islam,j} - Support_{Pancasila,j}$ for each policy type *j*. T-statistics come from a test of the equality of the means of $Support_{Islam,j}$ and $Support_{Pancasila,j}$; *p*-values are for two-sided tests. N_{Islam} and $N_{Pancasila}$ are the number of respondents giving valid responses (either "Yes" or "No") to each question. "Don't Know/Refuse to Answer" accounted for less than 1% of the responses in each experimental group.

that Islamist parties offering bad economic policies are more popular than Pancasila-based parties offering the same. These results contradict both of the conditional versions of Islam's political advantage, and they hold across electoral contexts. In fact, we find evidence that Indonesian Muslim respondents are slightly more likely to support *Pancasila-based* parties offering good economic policies. Evidence of this is relatively weak for presidential elections ($p = .061$) but stronger for both legislative and gubernatorial elections ($p < .001$ for both). We discuss possible explanations for this finding below.

For now, we turn our attention to our own understanding of Islam's political advantage, which holds that Muslim voters cue on Islamist platforms under conditions of uncertainty. We find consistent evidence that this is the case. Across electoral domains, respondents were significantly more likely to support an Islamist party than a Pancasila-based party under conditions of economic policy uncertainty (all differences are statistically significant at $p < .005$ in two-tailed tests). The effect is substantively rather small (ranging from 7.78 to 9.85 points), which is due to the fact that fewer than a quarter of respondents are willing to support a party whose economic policies were stipulated to be uncertain. But the absolute level of support for such parties in general is immaterial for our purposes—we expect respondents to be suspicious of parties about whose policies they are uncertain, and base our inferences not on absolute levels of support but on comparisons across types. In all three electoral contexts roughly twice as many respondents are willing to support an Islamist party as a Pancasila-based party under conditions of policy uncertainty.

Our first set of results accordingly demonstrates that Islam's political advantage manifests itself only when a party's economic policy platform is unclear to respondents. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that an Islamist ideology serves as a cue to voters about the future intentions of parties, one that is only salient when economic policy platforms are unclear. In other circumstances—when policies are clearly good or clearly bad, and regardless of electoral context—an Islamist party ideology confers no political advantage.

We can also test whether respondents are more likely to support Islamist parties in electoral contexts other than presidential races using the data in figure 3.3. In no cases are differences statistically different from zero at $p < .1$, so there is no evidence that respondents' willingness to support Islamist parties differs across electoral domains. We might have expected respondents to be more likely to cue on Islam in institutional contexts where politicians have greater control over development policy. There are several possible interpretations of our failure to uncover differences in cueing across electoral contexts. Indonesian voters probably perceive party platforms and individual leadership as more important than formal institutions in general, so our respondents may have simply failed to notice the institutional context in our three survey items. It is also possible that voters do not have detailed understanding of the variation in economic policy responsibility across Indonesian political institutions.

SUBGROUPS AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

A criticism of our approach is that it lumps all Indonesian Muslims together. Might there be "subgroups" of Indonesian Muslims among whom Islamist parties do have more of an advantage? While theoretical claims about Islam's political advantage frequently are not restricted to demographic or economic subgroups, we consider it quite plausible that heterogeneity in Muslim political attitudes might drive our null findings for some of the hypotheses we have tested thus far. A disaggregated analysis will also show which groups are most sympathetic to Islamist political parties under conditions of policy uncertainty.

We chose twelve different variables that might plausibly capture relevant subgroups in which Islam's political advantage might be more likely to exist.[6] The first six variables are demographic. *WOMEN* captures the possibility that there exist gender differences in support for Islamist parties—women may be more likely to support any type of Islamist platform (Blaydes and Linzer 2008). *URBAN* classifies respondents as residing

6. Data on respondents per category is available upon request from the authors.

in an urban area as defined by the Indonesian census. In Indonesia, much as in Turkey and Egypt, Islamist opposition parties are widely believed to be a primarily urban phenomenon. This is explained as a consequence of economic dislocation and feelings of disconnectedness from the modern economy, which are held to be more common among urban residents (who are presumably less connected to traditional social structures than are rural residents) (Kaplan 1992). *NON-JAVANESE* includes all respondents whose primary ethnic identification is not Javanese. As discussed in section "*Aliran*, Ethnicity, and Piety" in chapter 2, there is a common claim that ethnic Javanese are consistently more syncretic or "less orthodox" Muslims than other ethnic groups in Indonesia (Houben 2003: 165). Accordingly, we test whether our findings reflect the fact that Javanese are the largest ethnic group in our sample. *YOUNGER 50%* includes all respondents below our sample median age of thirty-eight years, for older Indonesians may have more internalized the norms of Pancasila than younger Indonesians raised in a time of increasingly conscious Islamization. Finally, *HIGH SCHOOL* corresponds to all respondents with a high school education or lower.

We next turn to economic characteristics that might condition respondents' support for various economic policy platforms. *EMPLOYED* counts only those respondents currently employed. *NO HIGH INCOME* omits from the sample the respondents with household incomes above Rp 1.8 million per month (approximately US$193 in early June 2008). *LOW INCOME* counts only the respondents with household incomes below Rp 800,000 per month (approximately US$86).

Finally, we examine three measures of piety. Muslims who self-identify as *SANTRI* might be more open to Islamist party platforms than those who identify as either *abangan* or *priyayi* (see section "*Aliran*, Ethnicity, and Piety" in chapter 2) *PRO-SHARIA* includes all respondents who either agree or strongly agree with the view that Indonesian law must be made consistent with Islamic law. *PRO-ISLAM IN POLITICS* takes a broader view, capturing all respondents who believe that Islam should play a greater role in Indonesian politics. If Islamist parties have a systematic advantage, it should be among these respondents.

We present the results of the subgroup analysis in figure 3.4.



Figure 3.4 Subgroup Analysis, Presidential Candidates

"Islamic Advantage" is calculated as $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam},j} - \text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila},j}$ for each policy type *j*; 95% confidence intervals are calculated from *t*-tests of the equality of the means of $\text{Support}_{\text{Islam},j}$ and $\text{Support}_{\text{Pancasila},j}$.

We begin our discussion with our central theoretical claim, which is that Islamist parties have a political advantage when economic platforms are unclear. Results from the subgroup analyses in the middle graph show that this finding is remarkably consistent. Across all twelve subgroups, we find that when economic policies are unclear, Islamist parties *always* have a statistically significant political advantage. Results from the bottom graph likewise confirm that an Islamist platform *never* confers an electoral advantage upon parties offering bad economic policies.

Our findings do change, however, in the top graph. Across all Muslims, we found that Pancasila-based parties had a small advantage among parties offering good economic policies. We see in Panel A that this weak advantage disappears in most of the subgroups. Differences are small and far from conventional levels of significance. But most interestingly, even among respondents who agree that Indonesian law must be consistent with Islamic law, we find no evidence that Islamist parties offering good policies gain more support than Pancasila-based parties offering the same. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that Islamist parties offering good economic policies are no more popular than Pancasila-based parties offering the same.

Together, these results give us greater confidence that the patterns we identify among all Indonesian Muslims hold regardless of which group of Indonesian Muslims we use. A weakness of our subgroup analyses is that our sample size inevitably shrinks, reducing our statistical power and making it more likely that we find null results among subgroups than among the general population. But our overall findings still hold.

Regression Analysis

Another way to push our results further is to submit them to multiple regression analysis. Doing so cannot improve on our estimates of the size of Islam's political advantage, but it can improve the efficiency of these estimates.[7]

7. Freedman (2008) argues against using multiple regression to study experimental designs. However, the bias associated with such an approach should be minimal in our application, as we are studying a large sample drawn randomly from a far larger population, not a small sample that is itself the population (see Green 2009).

As controls we include a full set of dummies for gender, ethnicity, age, level of income, employment status, level of education, number of children, marital status, and district. The results appear in table 3.5.

Interpreting the results in table 3.5 takes some care. The first two coefficients, *UNCLEAR* and *BAD*, estimate the effect of having an unclear and negative policy platform for Pancasila-based parties relative to the baseline category (a Pancasila-based party with a good policy platform). The coefficient on *ISLAMIST PARTY* estimates the effect of an Islamist party ideology for a party with a good economic policy platform. Finally, the

Table 3.5 Multiple Regression Analysis

	Model 3.4.1	**Model 3.4.2**	**Model 3.4.3**	**Model 3.4.4**
UNCLEAR	−0.738***	−0.756***	−3.788***	−5.712***
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.217)	(0.407)
BAD	−0.775***	−0.797***	−4.140***	−6.292***
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.235)	(0.562)
ISLAMIST PARTY	−0.048	−0.073*	−0.397	−0.418
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.213)	(0.356)
UNCLEAR ISLAMIST	0.135***	0.194***	0.978***	1.589***
	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.286)	(0.432)
BAD ISLAMIST	0.039	0.071	0.297	0.474
	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.325)	(0.561)
Constant	0.881***	0.833***	2.000***	2.896
	(0.018)	(0.100)	(0.161)	(1.917)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	2,223	1,886	2,223	1,802
Adjusted R^2	.486	.522	.393	.563

NOTE: Dependent variable is support for a Presidential candidate (yes/no). The control variables in Models 3.4.2 and 3.4.4 are described in the text. Models 3.4.2 and 3.4.4 include robust standard errors, clustered by district. Models 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are estimated via ordinary least squares, and Models 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 are logistic regressions.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The adjusted R^2 for Models 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 is a pseudo-R^2.

coefficients *UNCLEAR ISLAMIST* and *BAD ISLAMIST* correspond to the effects of Islamist party ideologies relative to Pancasila-based parties with unclear and negative policy platforms. The results mirror those in figure 3.3, showing that Islamist party ideologies only confer an electoral advantage when economic policy platforms are unclear. The only difference is that in Model 3.4.2, when conditioning on a large number of covariates, the preliminary evidence of an advantage for Pancasila-based parties with good economic platforms now crosses the conventional benchmark of 95% significance.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Piety

We conclude our analysis by exploring the heterogeneity of our experimental results by individual piety. This, in our view, is the strongest possible test of the relationship between piety and vote choice, leveraging the strength of our experimental design but allowing effects to vary across individuals based on their reported level of piety. We do this by repeating the multivariate analysis above, but with an additional interaction term between *PIETY INDEX*, our measure of individual piety described in chapter 2, and each of the treatment variables. If treatment effects vary across individuals, this analysis will uncover them. We present the results in table 3.6.

The interpretation of these results follows directly that of the results from the multivariate analysis in table 3.5. The first five rows simply repeat what we found in the previous multivariate analysis, that Islamist party ideologies only confer an electoral advantage when economic policy platforms are unclear. *PIETY INDEX* and all of its interaction terms are insignificant. From this, we learn that there is no evidence that more pious Muslims are (1) more likely to support any candidate (the coefficient on *PIETY INDEX*), (2) more likely to support an Islamist party candidate (the coefficient on *ISLAMIST PARTY* × *PIETY INDEX*), or (3) more likely to reward or punish parties of either type based on their economic platforms (the remaining coefficients). These results provide little evidence that individual piety moderates any of the effects that we have identified here.

Table 3.6 Multiple Regression Analysis allowing for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	Model 3.5.1	**Model 3.5.2**	**Model 3.5.3**	**Model 3.5.4**
UNCLEAR	−0.746***	−0.762***	−3.862***	−6.007***
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.225)	(0.402)
BAD	−0.778***	−0.808***	−4.162***	−6.696***
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.242)	(0.440)
ISLAMIST PARTY	−0.041	−0.065*	−0.348	−0.360
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.221)	(0.343)
UNCLEAR ISLAMIST	0.138***	0.194***	0.998***	1.670***
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.297)	(0.458)
BAD ISLAMIST	0.033	0.070	0.257	0.581
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.335)	(0.506)
PIETY INDEX	0.001	0.007	0.014	0.117
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.083)	(0.132)
UNCLEAR × *PIETY*	−0.000	−0.010	−0.005	−0.159
INDEX	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.118)	(0.180)
BAD × *PIETY INDEX*	−0.005	−0.012	−0.053	−0.167
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.128)	(0.194)
ISLAMIST PARTY ×	0.002	0.005	0.015	−0.018
PIETY INDEX	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.114)	(0.182)
UNCLEAR ISLAMIST	0.010	0.012	0.054	0.187
× *PIETY INDEX*	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.158)	(0.246)
BAD ISLAMIST ×	−0.003	0.008	−0.020	0.093
PIETY INDEX	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.176)	(0.263)
Constant	0.883***	0.695	2.024***	1.359
	(0.018)	(0.383)	(0.166)	(3.441)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	2,123	1,800	2,123	1,720
Adjusted R^2	.493	.528	.400	.579

NOTE: Dependent variable is support for a Presidential candidate (yes/no). The control variables in Models 3.5.2 and 3.5.4 are described in the text. Models 3.5.2 and 3.5.4 include robust standard errors, clustered by district . Models 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 are estimated via ordinary least squares, and Models 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 are logistic regressions. The adjusted R^2 for Models 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 is a pseudo-R^2.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

However, we are mindful of the difficulties of interpreting complex interactive models such as these. To facilitate interpretation, then, we plot the probability of supporting a candidate of each party and platform type across typical values of *PIETY INDEX*, along with the associated 95% confidence intervals. We present these results in figure 3.5.

These results show that individual piety does play a modest role in conditioning our results. For the left two plots, we see no difference between Pancasila-based and Islamist parties across any level of *PIETY INDEX*, consistent with all findings reported thus far. In the right plot—which summarizes our main findings that Islamist parties have a conditional advantage only when parties' economic platforms are unclear—we see that confidence intervals overlap for those individuals who score lowest on our index of individual piety. We conclude from this result that individual



Figure 3.5 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by *PIETY INDEX*
Each plot compares the predicted probability of voting for an Islamic versus Pancasila-based party, across values of piety; 95% confidence intervals are shaded light gray, and areas where confidence intervals overlap are shaded darker gray. Estimates are derived from Model 3.5.4.

piety does, in fact, moderate the experimental effects that we have identified. Our broad finding is that Muslim voters cue on Islamist platforms under conditions of uncertainty, but this effect only obtains among more pious Muslims.

DISCUSSION

We have shown that an Islamist party platform only provides an electoral advantage to Indonesian political parties when voters are uncertain about parties' economic platforms. But our other findings are interesting as well. Why, given the apparent appeal of Islam as a religion to so many of its adherents, are we unable to find that Islamist platforms produce an electoral advantage in other contexts, even among the most pious respondents in our sample?

Our answer is straightforward: piety does not entail support for political Islam. Indonesian Muslims have many demands on government, of which expanding the role of Islam in society and implementing Islamic law are only two, so it is natural that we find that other concerns dominate Islam in explaining mass support for political parties. To probe this, we asked respondents to choose the three most important governmental priorities from among eighteen different choices. The percentage of respondents mentioning each appears in table 3.7.

We note here that "Implement Islamic law" was a top-three priority for only 2.3% of respondents, while "Protect moral values" was a top-three priority for only 1.7% of respondents. Instead, most respondents rated welfare, employment, stable prices, and national security as their main concerns. Indonesian Muslims look to their political leaders to deliver prosperity, safety, and capable government. In this, they are like voters anywhere else in the world.

An alternative explanation for our null findings is the argument that Indonesian Islam is inherently more moderate than Islam elsewhere in the world (see, e.g., Wanandi 2002). This is more contentiously phrased by Azra (2003: 39) as the "myth of *abangan*," which holds that "Southeast

Table 3.7 What Should the Government's Three Main Priorities Be?

Priority	Percent mentioning
Increase popular welfare	61.7
Provide free primary education	38.8
Decrease unemployment	37.1
Stabilize the prices of basic goods	27.5
Defend the integrity of the Indonesian state	21.5
Eliminate corruption	18.7
Provide free health care for the underprivileged	18.1
Decrease inequality across classes	11.4
Implement laws fairly	11.3
Manage natural resources properly	11.2
Improve the welfare of farmers and fishers	9.8
Develop domestic infrastructure	6.3
Improve government social service provision	6.3
Combat crime	3.4
Implement Islamic law	2.3
Protect moral values	1.7
Protect the environment	0.9
Protect minority groups	0.6

NOTE: Each entry corresponds to the percentage of Muslim respondents listing each option as one that they believe should be among the Indonesian government's three main priorities.

Asian Islam is not real Islam." This might suggest that our cue for "Islamist party" is too strong, so that by including "wishing to implement Islamic law" we have set the bar too high for Islamist parties. Could our finding reflect an inherently moderate population that simply opposes the imposition of Islamic law in Indonesia? Almost certainly not. We find that 83% of respondents would support such a party if they supported its economic policies! Moreover, fully 56% of Muslim respondents (1,248/2,241) either agreed or strongly agreed that Indonesia's laws *must* be consistent with Islamic law. Of course, there may be some respondents who

were discouraged by the mention of Islamic law. But we have no reason to believe that they outweigh the portion of Islamist party supporters who might have believed that PKB and PAN (the two parties based on mass Muslim organizations but which maintain an affiliation with Pancasila) count as "Islamist" parties had we not presented this cue. Moreover, as we report above, even when we restrict our analysis to those respondents *who agree that Indonesian laws must be consistent with Islamic law*, we find no change in our main results. We are therefore confident that neither an inherently moderate population nor the cue "wishing to implement Islamic law" bias us against finding an Islamist advantage.

Our results tell us several things about party ideology and political competition in democratic Indonesia. Islamist party ideology is neither necessary nor sufficient for a party to attract mass popular support. In fact, Islamist parties must establish favorable economic policy credentials to have any hope of attracting the type of mass support necessary to defeat Pancasila-based parties. Both party types appear to have internalized these ideas, as all parties portray themselves as faithful stewards of the Indonesian economy—and their opponents as irresponsible, corrupt, or incompetent. These findings comport with research that has stressed the importance of social service provision in explaining the rise of PKS (e.g., Hamayotsu 2009) but provide the first rigorous evidence against the importance of Islamist party platforms themselves.

Our findings also reinforce that Pancasila-based parties in Indonesia must establish that they are credible economic managers; if they are unable to do so, Islamist parties will enjoy a small advantage over non-Islamist parties. The implication is that to know if Islam affects the electoral fortunes of particular Indonesian Islamist parties, we must take into account what the mass public believes about their policies and those of their competitors. By comparing across parties the proportion of respondents with favorable, unfavorable, or unclear opinions about these parties, we can examine the extent to which parties with Islamist platforms have the possibility of further gaining political strength. We lack data on respondents' views of parties' economic policies, but we do have information on general views about the largest Indonesian parties as of mid-2008.

To probe respondents' views of Indonesian political parties, we return to figure 3.2. Across all parties, substantial numbers of respondents indicate that they are unsure how to evaluate them. A small proportion of respondents is unsure about all parties. Eight percent of all respondents were unsure if any party represents the interests of all classes in Indonesian society, 11% were unsure if any party is led by competent leaders, and 14% were unsure if any party is free from corruption. These are the voters for whom Islamist parties have an inherent advantage, and they tend to be older, rural citizens with relatively low levels of education. A large majority of these respondents acknowledged voting in the 2004 elections, meaning that they can prove critical in close elections between Islamist and Pancasila-based parties.

We expect that these findings will travel to other Muslim-majority countries. In countries that hold free and fair elections, we expect that respondents will be more responsive to economic and social service platforms than to Islamist party ideology, and that Islamist parties will adopt ever more serious and public commitments to capable governance to complement their Islamist platforms. Recent democratic governments in Bangladesh and Pakistan appear to reflect this, as does Hamas in Gaza. Given that we do see relatively high rates of support for an increased role of Islam in Indonesian politics among our respondents, and that our findings do not change when we restrict our analysis to only these respondents who hold such sentiments, we see no principled reason why these findings should not travel to other Muslim countries.

Of course, when regimes restrict Islamist parties from campaigning, inviting them to become symbols of anti-incumbent opposition to secular states, our findings may not hold. In such contexts, the very meaning of Islam as a political ideology may change, becoming a competing source of legitimacy for opposition movements in a way that does not obtain under conditions of free political competition. We of course cannot ascertain whether this is the case using evidence from democratic Indonesia. Still, the developmentalist messages of Islamist parties in Turkey (where elections have been free but party platforms are not) and Malaysia (an authoritarian regime with relatively free elections) are consistent with our argument.

CONCLUSION

Islamist parties the world over have linked pleas for spiritual renewal and Islamist ethics with messages of economic empowerment. Some suggest that Islamist messages play a central role in explaining the rise of such parties, while others argue precisely the opposite. Existing studies have not collected the proper data to adjudicate between these two possibilities, and existing research is conceptually unclear about how Islamist party messages might explain aggregate support for Islamist parties. In this book we remedy both of these problems. In this chapter we have developed a complete set of coherent hypotheses about Islam's political advantage and collected the exact data needed to test them in the Indonesian case, which is perfectly suited for this task as a large consolidated Muslim democracy.

Our methodology takes seriously, but our findings reject, both the reductionist view that Islamist platforms play no role in explaining Islamist party support and the essentialist view that Islamist platforms always play a role in explaining party support. Adopting a nuanced view of how religion interacts with mass public opinion toward political parties, we show that Islamist platforms only influence the aggregate political support that parties receive when voters are uncertain about parties and their policies. Concern with economic policy dominates concern with Islamist platforms among Indonesian Muslims, but within this framework, we can identify situations in which Islamist platforms will play a powerful role.

We see our findings in this chapter as the first step in a broad research program on religion and political economy in the Muslim world and beyond. The problem of separating religious motives from material interests in explaining mass support is common to all confessional parties, not just Islamist ones. For this research to be cumulative, researchers must start with a common set of concepts about the role of religion in mass support for political parties, develop falsifiable hypotheses based on these concepts, and use research designs that provide the necessary data to test them. But we stress that this research must also be sensitive to national political contexts. Understanding the specific political environments in which confessional parties operate is the crucial first step toward developing a general understanding of how religious appeals affect party success.

4

Islam and the Market

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we showed that piety plays a highly circumscribed role in explaining support for Islamist parties. The key issue that we confronted is that many Islamist parties also campaign on populist and reformist platforms, which makes it hard to disentangle religion from reformism as determinants of party support. In this chapter we shift our attention to Islamic banking, in order to examine whether individual piety shapes the way Indonesian Muslims participate in the contemporary market economy.

At first glance, the switch from Islamist party support to Islamic banking may seem jarring. Yet there are useful parallels between the two. Each is an individual choice (to support an Islamist party or not; to choose Islamic financial products or not); each occupies a contested space among Muslim thinkers, in which there is consensus neither on the theological

propriety of using Islamic financial products nor on the imperative to support Islamic law; and the many similarities between the "Islamic" choice and the "non-Islamic" counterpart make it difficult to ascribe motivations to individuals who choose one or the other. Most importantly, each is a salient aspect of modern life among Muslims in contemporary Indonesia, one in which casual observers frequently assume that piety must play an important role in individuals' beliefs and behaviors.

Unlike the case of Islam and democracy, however, the question of whether pious Muslims are more likely to use Islamic financial products does not have a long pedigree. This is puzzling: the global spread of Islamic finance has transformed the financial systems of many Muslim countries, and general interest in the relationship between religious observance and market behavior has produced some of the most prominent interdisciplinary research by sociologists (Weber [1905] 1930), anthropologists (Geertz 1956), and economists (Becker 1976; Iannaccone 1998; McCleary 2011). And yet, despite an abundance of theoretical research on how Islamic finance operates (Aggarwal and Yousef 2000; El-Gamal 2006; Henry and Wilson 2004; Kuran 2004; Visser 2009; Warde 2000) and the growth of studies of Islamic financial institutions in various national contexts (Ariff 1988; Khan and Mirakhor 1990; Moore 1990; Venardos 2006; Wilson 2009), there is relatively little research on Islamic finance from the perspective of ordinary Muslims who might choose to use it.

We suspect that the paucity of research on how religion affects banking choice is the result of an implicit assumption that piety *must* matter. In the minds of many scholars of Islamic finance, the existence of a group of pious Muslims indicates a demand for Islamic banking products—almost mechanically. In addition to the many industry studies that propose that pious Muslims are a large and untapped market segment, the marketing literature on bank choice has identified religious motivations as uniting consumers of Islamic financial products (see Gait and Worthington 2008 for a review). Scholars rarely articulate the logic behind these findings, but implicitly it is one of Islamic orthopraxy: the choice of Islamic financial products is the logical outcome when a pious Muslim has internalized proper Islamic guidelines for behavior in various aspects of everyday life.

An alternative approach—the one that we follow through this book—is to view Islamic finance as a phenomenon embedded within wider processes of development and social change in the Muslim world. This approach pays attention to the particular social contexts in which Islamic finance has grown in the past three decades. It is possible, in this vein, to recast consumers' views of Islamic finance in terms that are amenable to a more economic or sociological analysis, viewing the rise of Islamic banking as an instance of a more general process through which individuals claim or maintain a Muslim identity. Conceived this way, the choice of whether or not to use Islamic financial products is an indication of something deeper than expressed piety, and may in fact reflect the ways in which individuals respond to broader social, economic, and political changes.

Two transformations have occurred in the Muslim world in the past decade—each occurring alongside the rise of Islamic orthopraxy—that suggest different perspectives on consumers' use of Islamic banks than does the literature on bank marketing. The first transformation is the rise of a Muslim middle class (see, e.g., Clark 2004; Nasr 2009; Tanter and Young 1990). Middle- and upper-class Muslims face distinct challenges of identity maintenance. On one hand, they have resources for consumption that set them apart from the poor and working classes. At the same time these individuals face problems of social dislocation that are a product of the very processes of modernization that transformed their class status.[1] A common finding is that such feelings of social dislocation increase individuals' propensity to identify with Islam in their behavior, lifestyle, consumption choices, and political attitudes—many of which are more salient issue areas for members of the middle and upper classes than they are for the poor and working classes. For Khoury (1983: 251), "Islamic revivalism" in politics and social life is a central response to modernization by "classes that in recent years have been drawn into the modernization process but have not been assimilated by it." Because the distinctive

1. There is nothing unique to Islam in this regard. Similar tensions have been noted elsewhere in emerging Asia; see, e.g., Goodman and Robison (1996).

feature of middle- and upper-class Muslims is their ability to consume, we should observe this process of identity maintenance in their consumption patterns. This class-based approach suggests that middle- and upper-class Muslims should be the primary users of Islamic financial products. This is not simply because they are wealthy enough to diversify their investments toward Islamic financial products (assuming such products, being new, are more risky), but rather because they view such practices as preserving a particular Muslim identity in the face of various social changes inherent to modernization.

The second transformation of the Muslim world is the consequence of globalization and the transformation of Muslim identity (Keyman and Koyuncu 2005; Khoo and Hadiz 2010; Mandaville 2001; Meuleman 2000; Roy 2004). Globalization in these accounts has transformed Muslim identity by changing individuals' terms of reference from the national or local community to the global or transnational community. Much like modernization and class formation, globalization can lead to the same kind of social dislocation that increases individual ties to a "deeper" or "enduring" religious identity. But globalization also increases the salience of a Muslim identity by linking it to a broader transnational religious community. Not all Muslims will respond to globalization in this way—it is just as possible that globalization will increase the salience of one's identity as a member of other global or transnational communities too, a question to which we turn in chapter 5—but among those who do, the consequences should be visible in everyday life choices. Such internationalist approaches suggest that Muslims who identify with the global Muslim political community should be more likely to use Islamic financial products because doing so is one way to express one's identification with that community.

These arguments about the origins of social change in the Muslim world do not directly compete with one another, although they differ in how they conceptualize contemporary social change—as driven by Islamization and religious change, by modernization and class formation, or by globalization and identity change. However, when applied to the particular problem of Islamic finance, none of these approaches is based on systematic empirical research.

Strikingly, there is almost no research that directly questions the assumption that more pious Muslims are more likely to use Islamic financial products than are less pious Muslims, as per the conventional conclusions from the marketing literature discussed above. Most such studies of Islamic banking suffer from basic problems of selection bias, for almost without exception these studies focus only on consumers of Islamic banking products (Asyraf and Nurdianawati 2007; Metawa and Almossawi 1998). Other individual-level research focuses only on consumers' awareness of Islamic financial products (e.g., Naser, Jamal, and Al-Khatib 2003) or on a limited number of banks within a country (e.g., Hegazy 1993). Without even a basic grasp of the relationship between piety and the use of Islamic financial products, it is impossible to weigh the influence of piety versus other determinants of individuals' choice of Islamic versus conventional banking products.

Rather than starting with the customers of Islamic banks and determining what characteristics they share, this chapter starts with all potential consumers of Islamic financial products in Indonesia, and investigates the factors that differentiate those who use Islamic financial products from those who do not. Consistent with our emphasis on nonreligious factors as determinants of individual beliefs and behaviors, we find considerable evidence in favor of the class and internationalist approaches to the sources of demand for Islamic financial products: the frequency with which Indonesian Muslims report using Islamic financial products increases as a function both of family income and of respondents' views on the importance of establishing strong political ties with the Middle East. In sharp contrast with the sparse body of existing empirical literature—including the only existing study of consumer attitudes toward Islamic banks in Indonesia (Abduh and Omar 2007)—we find little evidence that Islamic piety is even a partial determinant of the use of Islamic financial products in Indonesia. These findings cannot be explained by differential access to Islamic financial products among different segments of the Indonesian Muslim population, nor can they be explained simply by the ability of wealthier Indonesians to diversify their holdings across different kinds of financial products.

In the next section we provide a brief overview of Islamic finance in order to establish a key point that underlies our argument: from the perspective of most consumers, there is little that distinguishes Islamic products from conventional ones aside from the label applied to them. In the following section, then, we turn our attention back to the Indonesian case, describing the context of Islamic banking in Indonesia as well as our methodology.

AN OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC FINANCE

Warde (2000: 5) defines Islamic finance as, roughly, all financial practices that "are based, in their objectives and operations, on Koranic principles." This is a broad definition, but it captures the essential nature of Islamic economics as an attempt to reconcile religious principles with economic activities. This goes far beyond interest-free banking to include, for example, refusing to do business with companies that operate in morally impermissible sectors such as gambling. That said, in the actual operations of Islamic financial institutions, and for the purposes of this chapter, the essential defining feature of Islamic finance is the explicit prohibition of transactions that involve *riba* (an Arabic term usually translated into English as "interest" but which encompasses several related features of economic exchange).[2]

The prohibition of interest in Islamic economics generates fundamental problems in the operation of Islamic financial institutions. To understand why, consider one basic financial transaction: loan provision. In conventional finance, the lender (hereafter "the bank") provides funds to a borrower (hereafter the "entrepreneur") seeking to use those funds for some productive use; say, to buy a new machine for a factory. The entrepreneur agrees to pay that sum of money back to the bank at some future time plus an additional percentage of the loan's principal—interest—which

2. The Arabic term *riba* does not mean interest. It means "increase." See El-Gamal (2006: 46–59) for a close analysis of the economic content of Islam's prohibition of *riba*.

reflects the time value of money and the profit that the bank expects to make on the transaction. The ability to charge interest is the essence of the bank's motivation for engaging in such a transaction. By contrast, the expectation of future profits from the new machine that exceed the interest charged on the loan is the entrepreneur's motivation for engaging in this transaction.

Islamic scholars have interpreted the ban on interest to reflect an inherent asymmetry in such transactions: the risk in this transaction is believed to fall entirely to the entrepreneur, who must pay back the loan regardless of whether she or he actually obtains profits from the productive use of the loan. Islamic scholars have held that a legitimate contract form must be one that allows risk to be borne by both parties to the contract. The goal of the vast body of contemporary scholarship on Islamic finance is to determine how to accomplish these and other related transactions without charging interest, that is, by sharing risk.

Complete treatments of how Islamic scholars, jurists, and bankers have recreated such transactions without explicitly charging interest appear in El-Gamal (2006), Warde (2000: 132–48), and Venardos (2006: 71–84). Briefly, there are two ways that Islamic financial institutions avoid interest: trade-based transactions and profit-sharing agreements. Trade-based transactions work as a form of deferred sale. Working with the transaction previously described, instead of providing a loan to the entrepreneur, the bank simply buys the machine itself and then sells it to the entrepreneur. The bank bills the entrepreneur for the cost of the machine plus a service charge. This contract form is known as *murabaha*. The entrepreneur and the bank may also negotiate a separate contract in which the entrepreneur may defer portions of the payment into the future; this is known as *bai bithaman ajil*. Related contract forms exist that allow the entrepreneur to lease the machine (*ijara*), often with the option to purchase it at the end of the term of the lease (*takjiri*). What makes these contract forms permissible is that the bank takes legal possession of the machine before selling it to the entrepreneur, which many Islamic scholars interpret as meaning that the bank has exposed itself to risk. In practice, however, the period of legal possession may be extremely short, measuring only in seconds. In

such cases it is clear that the bank's "service charge" functions nearly identically to interest in conventional financial systems.

Profit-sharing agreements, by contrast, resemble venture capital. Under such contracts, the bank provides a loan to the entrepreneur, but retains a right to an agreed-upon percentage of all the future profits that flow from the entrepreneur's investment. Where the bank provides all the financing for the machine, the contract is known as *mudarabah*; where the bank provides only some of the financing, the contract is known as *musharakah*. Scholars interpret this as compatible with Islamic principles because the bank is exposed to the same risk as is the entrepreneur, for the investment may not yield future profits. The profit-sharing clauses in such contracts therefore bear much less resemblance to interest in conventional financial systems than do the trade-based transactions described in the previous paragraph. However, in the same way that venture capital is ill-suited to the day-to-day financing needs of businesses and consumers, profit-sharing contracts such as *mudarabah* and *musharakah* are seldom used for basic business and consumer lending activity (Zubair 2002).[3]

From these two types of contracts Islamic financiers have synthesized a wide range of financial products, from group insurance (*takaful*; see Abdul Rahim et al. 2007) to savings and deposit accounts (*wadiah* and other forms; see Haron 1998) to equity investments of various sorts (see Warde 2000: 138–42). The economist Mahmoud El-Gamal (2006: 176) concludes that "beyond doubt . . . any conventional financial product can be synthesized from premodern contracts." In a world where financial engineering makes the synthesis of Islamic financial products from permissible Islamic contracts straightforward and instantaneous (and thereby costless), the

3. *Mudarabah* profit-sharing contracts are commonly used by Islamic banks offering deposit accounts (Zubair 2002). Here, the depositor is the lender and the bank is the borrower, and the bank agrees to share its profits with its depositors rather than paying interest (although the profits are disbursed regularly and are advertised as a percentage of the deposit, much like interest). Strictly speaking, the bank is not required to pay profits, and in some cases the bank does not guarantee the deposit. Alternative principles through which banks can offer deposit accounts include *qardh ul-hasan* (benevolent loan) and *wadiah* (trust), among others; see Haron (1998).

difference between Islamic and conventional contracts is not one of substance (see also El-Gamal 2008).

The preceding discussion indicates that in a developed financial market, Islamic financial institutions and conventional financial institutions offer products that from the standpoint of the consumer are functionally identical in terms of their ability to fulfill consumers' goals of obtaining financing, deposit-taking, and other functions. Their difference lies exclusively in whether or not the products offer the additional feature of being synthesized using contract forms that are deemed consistent with Islamic principles.

ISLAMIC FINANCE IN INDONESIA

Armed with this understanding of how Islamic and conventional financial products differ and how they are similar, we return now to the Indonesian case. Indonesia is a good context for studying individual preferences for Islamic finance because it is a large, diverse, relatively financially open majority Muslim democracy (Juoro 2008). Its large and diverse conventional financial system has grown in recent years to include a number of domestic and foreign banks that offer what in Indonesia are known as "sharia-compliant" financial products through special "sharia windows" or "sharia offices." Some small-scale banks—known as *Bank Perkreditan Rakyat*, People's Credit Banks, which offer savings accounts and make loans to local businesses (Sunarto 2007: 6–7)—offer sharia-compliant products as well. There are also a number of banks that offer only sharia-compliant products. Following Indonesian conventions, we denote banks that offer exclusively Islamic financial products as sharia banks (*bank umum syariah*), units within conventional banks that offer sharia-compliant products as sharia units (*unit syariah*), and sharia-only branches of conventional banks as sharia offices (*kantor unit syariah*). To avoid terminological confusion, and again following local convention, we denote all financial products that are compliant with Islamic financial principles—regardless of whether they are offered by sharia banks or

conventional banks with sharia units—as sharia banking products. Our focus in this chapter is not on consumers' use of sharia banks versus sharia units within conventional banks, but rather on sharia banking products themselves.[4]

Indonesia is also a good context to explore the consumer demand for sharia banking products due to the marked social changes that have accompanied modernization and globalization in recent decades (Robison 1981; Tanter and Young 1990). Analysts of contemporary Indonesian politics and society have noted the vigorous renewal of a Muslim identity dating from the 1980s (Effendy 2006; Fealy and White 2008; Sukma and Joewono 2007). The confluence of modernization and globalization, on one hand, and Islamic renewal, on the other, suggests that these processes are intertwined in what Fealy (2008) has termed "commodified religion and aspirational piety." It has become nearly impossible to speak about contemporary Indonesian Islam without noting how it has been shaped by the twin forces of modernization and globalization, and how Islam in turn shapes local discourse about Indonesian society, polity, and economy (see, e.g., Rudnyckyj 2009). The Indonesian case therefore presents an opportunity to tease out the role of piety versus other socioeconomic transformations in shaping the demand for Islamic finance.

Some data from Bank Indonesia (2010, 2012) give a general picture of the structure of the Indonesian financial industry (see table 4.1).

While most Indonesian financial institutions remain in the conventional sector, recent years have witnessed an explosive growth in the number of sharia banks and sharia units. Figures indicate that as a percentage of total banks, and as a percentage of total funds in circulation and private bank assets (not reported in table 4.1), sharia banks and sharia units occupy a relatively small portion of the Indonesian banking market. Yet the growth of sharia banking in Indonesia is clear from these figures, and Bank Indonesia has emphasized the importance of creating a robust but well-regulated market for Islamic financial products in order to fulfill what it considers its institutional mission

4. In our survey we asked respondents about their use of jasa-jasa perbankan Islam, which translates more accurately as "Islamic banking/sharia banking services."

Table 4.1 Sharia Banks and Sharia Units, 2005–2012

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Sharia banks								
Total banks	3	3	3	5	6	11	11	11
Total offices	301	346	398	576	711	1,215	1,390	1,488
Sharia units								
Total banks	19	20	26	27	25	23	23	24
Total offices	133	163	170	214	287	262	312	423
Sharia cooperatives								
Total banks			114	131	139	150	155	156
Total offices			185	202	223	286	364	377
General banks[a]								
Total banks	131	130	130	124	121	122	120	120
Total offices	8,236	9,110	9,680	10,868	12,837	13,837	14,797	15,142

note: All figures are for December, except for 2012 (May).

[a] Includes those banks with and without sharia units.

source: Bank Indonesia (2010, 2012).

to meet the demands of Indonesian consumers (while also safeguarding the stability of the Indonesian financial system) (Bank Indonesia 2008).

Measurement

The dependent variable of interest for the analysis in this chapter is the choice of sharia versus conventional banking products. We measure this through a survey item that asked respondents the extent to which they used sharia banking products.[5] The response had four categories: never, sometimes, often, and always. From this we create a four-category ordinal variable, *USE SHARIA PRODUCTS*. We also collapsed the last three

5. We clarified that by sharia banking products we also meant what they might refer to as "Islamic" banking products (see previous footnote).

categories to create a binary variable, *USE SHARIA PRODUCTS (BINARY)*, that is coded 0 for respondents who never use sharia banks, 1 otherwise. An alternative way to measure banking sector preferences is to examine Indonesian Muslims' beliefs about sharia versus conventional banks. One survey item asked respondents whether the Indonesian government must ban conventional interest (*riba*) because it is inconsistent with Islam. This variable (*FORBID RIBA*) has five values—strongly agree, somewhat agree, no opinion, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree.

The joint distribution of responses to *USE SHARIA PRODUCTS* and *FORBID RIBA* among respondents who are both (1) Muslim and (2) reported bank users appears in table 4.2.

First note the bottom row: within our sample, the vast majority of respondents *never* use sharia products. The right-most column, by contrast, shows a roughly symmetrical bimodal distribution of responses, with most respondents either somewhat in favor or somewhat opposed to banning interest. Taken together, the figures in table 4.2 indicate that there is some evidence that individuals who are more likely to favor banning interest are also those who are more likely to use sharia banking products more frequently, but while the relationship is statistically significant, it is not substantively very strong (Kendall's $\tau_b = .0922$, $p < .01$).

Table 4.2 Use of Banks, Sharia-Compliant Banking Products, and Beliefs about Interest

	USE SHARIA PRODUCTS				
	Never	**Sometimes**	**Often**	**Always**	**Total**
FORBID RIBA					
Strongly disagree	6	2	0	2	10
Somewhat agree	293	31	9	4	337
No opinion	106	11	7	1	125
Somewhat agree	285	38	28	13	364
Strongly agree	11	1	3	0	15
Total	701	83	47	20	851

NOTE: Includes only Muslim respondents who report using banking products.

The independent variables of interest are piety, class, and what we gloss here as "international orientation." To measure piety, we use the variable *PIETY INDEX* that we described in chapter 2. To measure class, we rely on respondents' self-reported family income (*INCOME*), measured as a fourteen-point interval scale. The intervals are set at Rp 200,000 bins for the first ten categories. Thereafter it increases by Rp 2,000,000 unit intervals for the next three categories, with the final category comprising household incomes of Rp 5,000,000 and above. Over 90% of respondents fall below the 2,000,000 threshold. There is no evidence that any results below are affected by the nonlinear nature of *INCOME*.

To measure international orientation, we use two measures. The first is the degree to which individuals believe it important that the country of Indonesia have strong ties with Muslim countries (*MUSLIM TIES*).[6] The possible responses here are "very important," "somewhat important," "not very important," and "not important." The second is the degree to which individual respondents report having positive feelings toward (*suka*, or "like") the people of Saudi Arabia (*PRO SAUDI*). The possible responses are "very much like," "somewhat like," "do not like very much," and "do not like at all."

All models include a standard set of demographic controls: age (*AGE*), sex (*FEMALE*), urban or rural (*URBAN*). We also control for unobserved region-specific heterogeneity using district-level fixed effects (see below).

Inferential Strategy

Two key assumptions underlie our empirical analysis. The first is about the availability of sharia banking products: absent data on the presence of sharia bank branches throughout the Indonesian archipelago, it is difficult to interpret nonuse of sharia banking products as reflecting the lack of opportunity to use these products or the lack of interest in using them. We confront this issue two ways. First, we include in all models fixed effects

6. The survey question gives three specific examples: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar.

by *kabupaten*, or district, to capture any location-specific determinants of banking product choice. When we estimate models with a binary dependent variable, this has the effect of discarding all respondents who do not live in a district where at least one respondent did report using sharia banking products. Second, for models without a binary dependent variable, we restrict the analysis to only those respondents who live within a district in which at least one person has used sharia-compliant products.

The second assumption is that as a class, "price" does not distinguish sharia banking products from conventional products. This is important for any argument that links an individual's class—measured via family income—with his or her choice of financial products. If it is the case that sharia banking products are just more expensive (or that they share profits on deposits at effective rates that are lower than the corresponding interest rates) than conventional banking products, then all that we learn from a correlation between income and banking choice is that sensitivity to price is a declining function of income. To rule this out, we draw on two pieces of evidence. The first is the observation that sharia banks and conventional banks in Indonesia compete vigorously on price. The second is the fact that there is no connection between income and the declared sensitivity to price among the respondents in our sample. We treat these in turn.

It is clear that sharia banks in Indonesia compete directly with conventional banks in terms of price. For example, business periodicals regularly report that Indonesia's sharia banks adjust their profit disbursement schedules as a reaction to changes in interest rates among Indonesia's conventional banks (which are determined in turn by Bank Indonesia's statutory lending rate) (see, e.g., "BI Rate Terpangkas, Nisbah Bank Syariah Mengkerut [BI Rate Trimmed, Sharia Banks' Ratios Contract]," *Kontan*, August 10, 2009; "Perbankan Syariah Sesuai Bagi Hasil dengan BI Rate [Sharia Banking Aligns Profit Sharing with BI Rate]," *Republika*, November 21, 2011). Moreover, Indonesia's Islamic banks often report "interest rate equivalents." An example is reproduced in table 4.3, drawn from the website of Bank Muamalat (2010), one of Indonesia's oldest sharia banks.

Here, the "ratio" (*nisbah*) that governs the "portion" (*porsi*) of the deposit disbursed to the customer (*nasabah*) is translated directly into an

Table 4.3 "Ratios" and "Equivalent Rates" for Bank Muamalat, July 2010

Jenis Simpanan (Savings Type)	**Nisbah (Nasabah) (Ratio [customer])**	**Porsi (Nasabah) (Portion [customer])**	***Ekuivalen* rate (Equivalent rate)**
RUPIAH (Rp)			
Deposito 1 bulan (1 month deposit)	50.00	5.01	5.95 %
Deposito 3 bulan (3 month deposit)	51.00	5.11	6.06 %
Deposito 6 bulan (6 month deposit)	53.00	5.31	6.30 %
Deposito 12 bulan (12 month deposit)	54.00	5.41	6.42 %

source: Bank Muamalat (2010).

ekuivalen rate, which, of course, means "equivalent rate." Bank Muamalat and other sharia banks clearly do this in order to help customers compare their products to conventional banking products. Note, moreover, that that advertised ratio varies according to the length of the deposit, much as do interest rates on conventional deposits.

Our survey also provides critical data that allow us to test if it is really true that there is a positive relationship between a respondent's income and the degree to which he or she is sensitive to price when making decisions about bank products—at least in terms of what he or she *claims* about what motivates his or her choice of banking products. The survey asked respondents a series of questions about what determines their choice of banking products, one of which was cost, return, or profit. If income is negatively correlated with the importance placed on cost, return, or profit, then this would suggest that any cost or price concerns that might differentiate sharia banking products from conventional banking products could threaten the inferences that we draw here.

The analysis in table 4.4, however, suggests that this is not a major concern. The table presents the results of three ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models of the relationship between *INCOME* and the

Table 4.4 Household Income Level and the Importance of Cost

	Model 4.4.1	**Model 4.4.2**	**Model 4.4.3**
INCOME	−0.003	−0.009	−0.016
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Constant	2.999***	3.065***	3.098***
	(0.033)	(0.060)	(0.075)
Sample	All respondents	Bank users	Bank users, sharia banks in district
N	2,133	998	618
Adjusted R^2	.246	.233	.188

NOTE: Ordinary least squares regression with district-level fixed effects (suppressed for presentation). Robust standard errors, clustered by district, in parentheses. The dependent variable is the importance of cost or return in determining bank choice.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

importance that respondents placed on cost, return, or profit in making banking choices.[7] The models focus on progressively smaller groups of consumers: Model 4.4.1 includes all consumers, Model 4.4.2 includes only those who report using banks, and Model 4.4.3 includes those who report using banks *and* who live in a district where at least one respondent reported using sharia banking products. As described above, the models incorporate district-level fixed effects, and reported standard errors are robust to arbitrary intradistrict correlation.

In all three models, coefficient estimates are negative, but they are far from significant at conventional levels. The results indicate that household-level income has no systematic effect on respondents' reported sensitivity to cost when choosing banks. It is important to emphasize that these are estimates of reported rather than actual sensitivity to cost, but they are nevertheless reassuring that the findings below about the correlation between income and banking choice do not simply reflect the fact wealthier individuals are more likely to use more expensive products.

7. We operationalize this concept with a simple and broad term: *paling menguntungkan*, which translates as "most profitable."

Table 4.5 Use of Sharia Banking Products

	Model 4.5.1	Model 4.5.2	Model 4.5.3	Model 4.5.4	Model 4.5.5	Model 4.5.6	Model 4.5.7
PIETY INDEX	.042			.030	.034	.016*	.009
	(0.028)			(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.007)
INCOME		.035***		.032**	.034**		.031***
		(0.010)		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.006)
MUSLIM TIES			.241***	.214*	.223*		.067**
			(0.061)	(0.081)	(0.086)		(0.021)
Constant	.419***	.184**	−.441*	−.535	−.570	.128***	−.273**
	(0.009)	(0.065)	(0.211)	(0.294)	(0.330)	(0.000)	(0.090)
Demographic controls?	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	543	622	608	525	516	2,057	1,866
Adjusted R^2	.028	.069	.062	.094	.093	.046	.089

NOTE: Ordinary least squares regression with district-level fixed effects (suppressed for presentation). Robust standard errors, clustered by district, in parentheses. The dependent variable is frequency of use of sharia banking products. The sample includes only respondents who report having used banks in districts where at least one respondent reported using sharia banking products in Models 4.5.1–4.5.5. The sample includes all Muslims in Models 4.5.6 and 4.5.7.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

ANALYSIS

The main results of our analysis of the use of sharia banking products appear in table 4.5. Individually, when controlling for only district-level effects, piety is uncorrelated with the frequency of use of sharia banking products at conventional levels of significance (Model 4.5.1, $t = 1.50$), while both higher incomes and increased interest in ties with Muslim countries are associated with increased frequency of use of sharia banking products (Models 4.5.2 and 4.5.3). These results are unchanged when the three variables jointly enter the model (Model 4.5.4), and also hold when controlling for various demographic controls (Model 4.5.5).

The result that our measure of piety among Muslims is uncorrelated with the use of sharia banking products is, perhaps, surprising. In Model 4.5.6 we enter into the sample all respondents who reported never using any type of bank, as well as those who live in districts where no one reported using sharia banking products, and re-estimate the model. In this much broader sample, we find evidence that piety is associated with *USE SHARIA PRODUCTS*, as expected. But even these results do not hold up against alternative explanations and demographic controls (Model 4.5.7) in that broader sample. The results in Model 4.5.7 instead confirm that the best predictors of the frequency of use of sharia banking products—regardless of how we define the sample—are class and international orientation.

Could these null findings for piety reflect a wholesale rejection of sharia banking products because Indonesia's most pious Muslims believe that sharia products are insufficiently Islamic? Almost certainly not, for two reasons. First, if these pious Muslims object to Indonesia's sharia banking products on religious grounds, then they certainly will also refuse to use conventional banking products. Yet our results rely exclusively on respondents who report using banks—respondents who do not use any banking products at all are excluded from analysis. Accordingly, any pious Muslims who object to sharia banking products are not in the analysis sample. Put otherwise, our inferences rely only on those pious Muslims who believe that sharia banking products are sufficiently Islamic to be permissible, on the assumption that if they did not, they would not use conventional banking products either.

Table 4.6 Use of Banks by Decile of *PIETY INDEX*

PIETY INDEX Decile	Count	Percentage using banking products
1	212	26%
2	214	34%
3	222	43%
4	203	44%
5	214	41%
6	212	44%
7	213	43%
8	212	46%
9	220	46%
10	208	46%

NOTE: Sample includes all Muslims.

Second, the data do not reveal any difference in the willingness of the most pious Muslims to use banks. In table 4.6 we divide *PIETY INDEX* into deciles, and for each decile calculate the fraction of respondents who report using banks.

The results show that the most pious Indonesian Muslims are just as likely to report using banking products as their less pious counterparts. This evidence is inconsistent with the idea that the most pious Muslims are selectively opting out of the financial markets and also happen to believe that sharia-compliant banking products are insufficiently Islamic.

In table 4.7 we re-examine the relationship between international orientations and the use of sharia banking products using the alternative definition of international orientations, *PRO SAUDI*. The results for the alternative measure are not consistent with those from *MUSLIM TIES*: it is uncorrelated with the frequency of use of sharia banks either alone or in conjunction with other variables (Models 4.7.1–4.7.3). Including it alongside *MUSLIM TIES* weakens the relationship between that variable and the frequency of use of sharia banks, but does not render it insignificant at conventional levels (Model 4.7.4).

Table 4.7 Use of Sharia Banking Products, Alternate Definition of International Orientation

	Model 4.7.1	Model 4.7.2	Model 4.7.3	Model 4.7.4
PRO SAUDI	.085	.093	.103	.105
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.062)
PIETY INDEX		.028	.035	.033
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
INCOME		.032**	.031*	.032*
		(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
MUSLIM TIES				.190*
				(0.088)
Constant	.155	−.055	−.070	−.756*
	(0.174)	(0.190)	(0.267)	(0.349)
Demographic controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	584	506	497	490
Adjusted R^2	.042	.077	.078	.105

NOTE: Ordinary least squares regression with district-level fixed effects (suppressed for presentation). Robust standard errors, clustered by district, in parentheses. The dependent variable is frequency of use of sharia banking products. The sample includes only respondents who report having used banks in districts where at least one respondent reported using sharia banking products.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

The results thus far constitute powerful evidence in favor of class and international orientation as being the central factors explaining the use of sharia banking products among Indonesian Muslims, and against the view that piety comprises a meaningful explanation for the use of sharia banking products. One key estimation issue, however, is the fact that the distribution of responses to the dependent variable *USE SHARIA PRODUCTS* is skewed toward zero, or nonuse. We confront this issue in two ways. First, we change the dependent variable to its binary definition (*USE SHARIA PRODUCTS (BINARY)*) and estimate conditional logistic regressions (Chamberlain 1984) that account for district-specific unobserved

heterogeneity (Models 4.8.1–4.8.5). Note that by making the comparison between those who use sharia banking products sometimes and never, this operationalization also alleviates the potential confounding issue that some individuals wish to use sharia banking products all the time, but due to the unavailability of certain *kinds of products* (say, insurance) in their locality, they can only use sharia banking products sometimes.

Second, we return to the four-valued dependent variable and estimate an ordered probit regression to account for the nonlinearity in the dependent variable. Given the importance of accounting for unobserved district-specific heterogeneity, this introduces complications, for fixed effects ordered probit models are inconsistent. We therefore proceed with two different specifications. Model 4.8.6 ignores the potential for unobserved heterogeneity by dropping district-level fixed effects, while Model 4.8.7 reinserts them and ignores the potential inconsistency of the parameter estimates. The results appear in table 4.8.

All of the substantive conclusions from earlier models are unchanged, although their interpretations do change. In Models 4.8.1–4.8.5, coefficient estimates correspond *to the change in the log odds of using sharia banks at all*. As before, higher values for *INCOME* and *MUSLIM TIES* are always associated with increases in the log odds of using sharia banks, while piety never is. The results in Models 4.8.6 and 4.8.7 yield similar conclusions. To facilitate interpretation of these results, we plot the predicted cumulative probability[8] of the first three responses across the range of values for *INCOME* and *MUSLIM TIES* in figure 4.1 and figure 4.2, holding other variables at their means. These results are from Model 4.8.6.

The area below the bottom curve (labeled "Never") is the probability of never using sharia banking products for various values of the independent variable of interest (with other variables held at their means). The two areas between the three curves ("Sometimes" and "Often") correspond to the probabilities of these two responses, and the area above the third

8. These predicted probabilities are derived from simulated parameter estimates ($\tilde{b}$), obtained from 5,000 draws from the multivariate normal distribution whose means are the parameter estimates ($\hat{b}$) and whose variance is the estimated variance-covariance matrix: $\tilde{b} \sim N(\hat{b}, Var(\hat{b}))$. See King et al. (2000).

Table 4.8 Use of Sharia Banking Products, Alternate Specifications

	Model 4.8.1	**Model 4.8.2**	**Model 4.8.3**	**Model 4.8.4**	**Model 4.8.5**	**Model 4.8.6**	**Model 4.8.7**
PIETY INDEX	.072			.044	.080	.039	.063
	(0.071)			(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.037)	(0.046)
INCOME		.093**		.079*	.086*	.056***	.066**
		(0.030)		(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.023)
MUSLIM TIES			.709***	.489*	.502*	.349**	.428**
			(0.200)	(0.237)	(0.246)	(0.112)	(0.164)
Demographic controls?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
District fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Dependent variable	Binary	Binary	Binary	Binary	Binary	Ordered	Ordered
N	528	601	580	499	490	516	516
Pseudo-R^2	.003	.024	.027	.034	.042	.032	.132

NOTE: Models 4.8.1–4.8.5 are conditional logistic regressions. Models 4.8.6 and 4.8.7 are ordered probit models. Robust standard errors, clustered by district, are in parentheses. The sample includes only respondents who report having used banks in districts where at least one respondent reported using sharia banking products.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.



Figure 4.1 Income and the Use of Islamic Finance
This figure shows the probability of using sharia banking products across values of *INCOME.*



Figure 4.2 Muslim Ties and the Use of Islamic Finance
This figure shows the probability of using sharia banking products across values of *MUSLIM TIES.*

curve ("Always") is the probability of always using sharia banking products. Together, the two figures show that the probability of never using sharia banking products declines as a function of both increasing values of *INCOME* and *MUSLIM TIES*, while the probability of being in each of the remaining three groups increases.

Do class and international orientation also shape individual beliefs about whether interest must be banned due to its theological impermissibility? It need not be the case that one's own use of sharia banking products corresponds to a belief that interest should be banned for others. The data in table 4.2 indicate that among those twenty respondents who always use sharia banking products, only thirteen (65%) agree (either strongly or to some degree) that interest should be banned. Interestingly, it is also the case that of the 701 respondents who never use sharia banking products, fully 42% of them agree that interest should be banned. To explore whether piety, class, and international orientation have the same relationships to beliefs about banning interest as they do to the use of sharia banking products, in Panel A of table 4.9 we estimate three models that replicate the previous models, but with *FORBID RIBA* as the dependent variable.

The results in Panel A indicate that a respondent's international orientation is related to his or her individual beliefs about banning interest, but that class—as measured by family income—no longer has a significant relationship with beliefs about banning interest. In Model 4.9.A3 we also discover that more pious Muslims are more likely to favor banning interest. However, while this may be interpreted as limited evidence that piety may shape beliefs about banning interest even if it does not shape actual use of sharia banking products, these results are from a fixed effects ordered probit model, and therefore should be interpreted with care because of the aforementioned problems with fixed effects in ordered probit regressions.

In Panel B of table 4.9 we check to see if *FORBID RIBA* itself explains individuals' use of sharia banking products when controlling for alternative explanations. Model 4.9.B1, which includes only district-level fixed effects, indicates that it does. But when the measures of piety, class, international orientation, and other demographic controls are included (Models 4.9.B2–4.9.B5), this relationship is no longer statistically significant.

Table 4.9 Forbidding Interest and Sharia Banking Products

Panel A: Dependent variable = *FORBID RIBA*

	Model 4.9.A1	**Model 4.9.A2**	**Model 4.9.A3**
PIETY INDEX	.061	.043	.093*
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.046)
INCOME	.013	.020	.025
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)
MUSLIM TIES	.262**	.274*	.342**
	(0.099)	(0.107)	(0.129)
District fixed effects?	Yes	No	Yes
N	508	508	508
Adjusted R^2	0.125		
Pseudo-R^2		.015	.138

Panel B: Dependent Variable = *USE SHARIA PRODUCTS*

	Model 4.9.B1	**Model 4.9.B2**	**Model 4.9.B3**	**Model 4.9.B4**	**Model 4.9.B5**
FORBID RIBA	.091*	.063	.135	.105	.104
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.127)	(0.060)	(0.088)
PIETY INDEX		.033	.085	.039	.062
		(0.026)	(0.077)	(0.041)	(0.049)
INCOME		.036**	.095*	.058***	.072**
		(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.017)	(0.025)
MUSLIM TIES		.228*	.535*	.370**	.448**
		(0.087)	(0.242)	(0.114)	(0.168)
District fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
N	541	500	471	500	500
Adjusted R^2	.046	.118			
Pseudo-R^2			.057	.041	.148

NOTE: Models 4.9.A1, 4.9.B1, and 4.9.B2 are ordinary least squares regressions. Models 4.9.A2, 4.9.A3, 4.9.B4, and 4.9.B5 are ordered probit regressions. Model 4.9.B3 is conditional logistic regression. Robust standard errors, clustered by district, are in parentheses. The sample includes only respondents who report having used banks in districts where at least one respondent reported using sharia banking products. All models except for 4.9.B1 include demographic controls.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

DISCUSSION

The rise of Islamic finance is part of a larger phenomenon of a global Muslim renewal that has occurred over recent decades. Scholars are today beginning to take seriously the important changes in national financial systems that have been brought about through the rise of Islamic finance. Theoretical studies of Islamic finance have demonstrated the ways in which contract forms deemed by Muslim scholars to be theologically permissible can be applied to modern financial practices. Likewise, studies of Islamic financial systems have charted the historical origins of modern Islamic finance, described how Islamic finance works in practice, and identified the ways in which various national systems differ from one another. Almost entirely omitted from this literature is the focused study of what determines individual demand for Islamic financial products. This chapter begins to fill this gap in the literature.

Similar to our conclusions about the importance of reformist and populist party platforms in understanding Muslims' support for Islamist parties, considering the use of Islamic financial products as a claim about identity rather than merely a consequence of one's piety or religiosity encourages analysts to look beyond religion to other factors that may influence individuals' strategies for identity maintenance. At least in Indonesia—where conventional and Islamic financial systems coexist, where expressed piety is on the rise, and where Muslims face the social changes inherent in modernization and globalization—piety is far less important as a factor in shaping individuals' use of Islamic financial products than commonly believed. Instead, modernization and globalization play decisive roles in shaping individual use of Islamic financial products. The picture that these empirical results paint is static, focusing on a snapshot of contemporary Indonesia rather than on the processes through which class formation and global identity formation promote the use of Islamic financial products. But the cross-sectional variation identified here among Indonesians with regard to their individual use of Islamic financial products is informative, and is consistent with the view that modernization and globalization

rather than religious change itself are the factors driving the rise of Islamic finance.

Our findings give new context to research on development, social change, and identity in the Muslim world by exploring an important but understudied component of Muslims' daily lives. Far from being irrelevant or inconsequential due the fact that it so closely parallels conventional finance, Islamic finance is a uniquely powerful symbol of identity politics in the Muslim world *precisely because* it is so nearly indistinguishable from conventional finance. The choice of Islamic financial products—at least in plural banking systems such as those found in Indonesia—is therefore a window into the ways in which social and economic changes are filtered through religion to yield concrete changes in the lives of millions of Muslims.

These findings are also a window into a set of questions that the literature on Islamic finance has only begun to ask, and are an interesting parallel to existing research on the origins of Islamic economics and Islamic finance, which Timur Kuran (2004) has argued lie in a set of social, political, and economic changes that began in the 1930s in the Indian subcontinent and received critical support as a consequence of the oil boom of the 1970s. Much as the origins of Islamic financial institutions—the supply of Islamic finance—begin with modernization and globalization, these findings suggest that the use of Islamic financial institutions—the demand for Islamic finance—can be tied to analogous processes at work today.

One cautionary note is in order for scholars of Islamic finance in other national contexts. Indonesians' approach to Islamic finance may not be representative of all Muslims due to differences in Islamic jurisprudence across Sunni Muslim communities. Indonesian Muslims overwhelmingly follow the Syafii school of Islamic jurisprudence (see chapter 2, section "*Aliran*, Ethnicity, and Piety"), which is predominant in Southeast Asia, East Africa, and parts of Egypt and the southern Arabian Peninsula (see Abdal-Haqq 2002: 67–74 for information on the various schools of Sunni jurisprudence). The jurisprudential traditions differ in the extent to which they accept various contract forms. Venardos (2006: 89), for example, argues that the Hanafi school—predominant in Turkey and Pakistan,

among other countries—is far less permissive on financial transactions than the Syafii school. What may be considered a theologically impermissible financial arrangement by a pious Pakistani Muslim may be considered wholly Islamic by a pious Indonesian Muslim. If so, this necessitates care in generalizing about piety and banking choice to countries where other schools of Islamic jurisprudence place restrictions on the types of financial products that may be labeled Islamic.

This cautionary note notwithstanding, the implications of this research for the literature on bank choice are both methodological and theoretical. Methodologically, these findings demonstrate the dangers of selection bias—starting with all consumers and then determining what characteristics they share makes it impossible to differentiate between users and nonusers. This makes it difficult to discover the factors that are common to just Islamic bank users in particular rather than those factors that are common to all Muslims, the latter being much less interesting to bankers and marketing scholars than the former. Theoretically, these findings also suggest that there are unappreciated socioeconomic factors that shape individual bank choice. Fuller appreciation of these "nonbank" drivers of bank choice sheds insights into how modernization and social change affect market behavior among Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere.

5

Islam and the World

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we showed that the orientation of Indonesian Muslims toward the Muslim world is a powerful predictor of their use of Islamic financial products. We interpreted this result as indicating that Muslims with a cosmopolitan, globalized Muslim identity are more likely to act in ways that are consistent with the maintenance of that identity. That conclusion rests on an implicit assumption that the relevant global community with whom Indonesian Muslims identify is the Muslim world. Yet we are well aware that throughout Indonesian history, relations with other global communities—for example, with the Western world, or with China—have been just as important as relations with the Muslim world.

In this chapter we set our sights on Indonesia's place in the world, and ask how Islamic revivalism shapes Indonesians' preferences for engagement with other kinds of communities. Indonesia is a particularly useful

case in this regard because it is difficult to classify in the "civilizational" framework that scholars from Huntington (1996) to Katzenstein (2009) have used to understand how communities of states relate to one another. Moreover, public opinion analyses of these issues remain scarce. Recent contributions have deepened our understanding of the complex relationship between popular attitudes and global politics *in* the West (see, e.g., Berinsky 2009; Milner and Tingley 2013; Sobel 2001), but careful empirical work on public opinion *toward* the West remains relatively scarce (see Jamal 2012 for one notable exception). Empirical research on how people outside the West relate with *others* outside the West is almost nonexistent.

When we ask how Indonesians relate to multiple different kinds of global communities, we uncover the complex interrelationships between religious identity and the ways that Muslims conceive of their country's place in the global political community. That is, rather than studying pro-Muslim or anti-Western attitudes in isolation, we reframe them as two distinct components or dimensions of a wider phenomenon that we term "global engagement." Global engagement denotes the salience among citizens of one state of foreign relations with other states in the global political system. Anti-Americanism—or more broadly, opposition to "the West"[1]—is one facet of global engagement, but Muslim publics engage with many types of countries besides the United States or the Muslim world in general, including countries that share with them common historical backgrounds, religious and cultural traditions, and geostrategic concerns. Some individuals may be engaged with many different kinds of countries, or disengaged with them, or engaged more with some kinds of countries than others.

This relatively benign conceptual move has surprisingly stark implications for what it means to observe that an individual Muslim or a

1. For reasons we make clear below, we study engagement with the West in general (rather than with the United States in particular) as a more encompassing way to measure engagement with the United States and countries that Indonesians view as similar to the United States.

collection of Muslims favors more engagement with the Muslim world than engagement with the West. That observation alone is consistent with a particularistic variety of global engagement in which Muslims favor only the Muslim world, but it is also consistent with an antihegemonic (but nevertheless cosmopolitan) variety of global engagement in which Muslims favor relations with the Muslim world as well as with other non-Western communities. Analyses of Muslim revivalism in the post-Cold War world often fear that religious revivalism is by definition an indication of Muslim particularism (see most notably Huntington 1996). But without an approach that can capture both the *multidimensionality* and the *nonexclusivity* of global engagement it is impossible to determine the consequences that religion, identity, or any other individual or contextual factor has for global engagement.

In what follows we develop a new statistical procedure that allows us to study multidimensional, nonexclusive choices such as global engagement, and then apply it to our survey data on preferences for global engagement with the West, the Muslim world, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. We find that Islam in Indonesia has cosmopolitan rather than particularistic effects on foreign policy attitudes among Indonesian Muslims. More pious Muslims indeed are more likely to believe that Indonesia should have close foreign relations with the Muslim world. But they are also more likely to favor close foreign relations with East Asia and Southeast Asia, and piety is wholly unrelated to public opinion about Indonesia's foreign relations with the West. To put this finding about individual piety in context, we compare it to the relationship between Javanese ethnicity and preferences for global engagement among Indonesian Muslims, and find a countervailing relationship. Javanese Muslims are less likely to value relations with the Muslim world, but no more or less likely to value relations with the West, Southeast Asia, or East Asia, as compared to non-Javanese Muslims.

These findings have implications beyond the Indonesian case, for they show how to make sense of anti-Americanism and civilizational conflict in contemporary global politics. Despite the long interest among scholars of contemporary Muslim societies in the relationship between Islamic

revivalism, foreign policy, and global engagement (see Dawisha 1983; Shaffer 2006), few studies have systematically examined Muslims' attitudes about global engagement except in the context of the growing literature on anti-Americanism in the Muslim world and beyond (see, recently, Chiozza 2009; Jamal 2012). To understand what anti-Western attitudes mean, they must be studied alongside views of other global communities. If Islamic revivalism meant that ordinary Muslims do indeed prefer less engagement with the West and more engagement with the Muslim world, then especially in established democracies such as Indonesia and democratizing countries such as Egypt, Bangladesh, and Tunisia, religious revitalization may have important implications for the foreign relations of Muslim majority countries that are consistent with "clash of civilizations" view of Islam and global politics (Huntington 1996). But our evidence is inconsistent with the Huntingtonian view. Instead, it supports an alternative perspective of Islamic renewal as marked by modernity and cosmopolitanism rather than fundamentalism or particularism (Kamali 2006).

We begin this chapter with a conceptual overview of global engagement that draws on the recent literature on political identity to illustrate the various ways in which individuals may engage with different global political communities, including the West but by no means exclusive to it. In the following sections, we show how to apply these insights to the Indonesian case.

CONCEPTUALIZING GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

Global engagement refers to the salience among citizens of one state of foreign relations with other states in the global political system. It denotes individual views of foreign policy at the national level, and as such can be approached using the standard toolkit for understanding foreign policy attitudes as consequence of various individual-level factors such as political awareness, education, and demographic characteristics. Most research on foreign policy attitudes has asked whether they are "coherent" or "correct" (Holsti 1996; Shapiro and Page 1988). In contrast, we use foreign

policy attitudes as a window into the relationship between Muslims' social and religious identities, on one hand, and global engagement, on the other. The object of investigation is not the truth or correctness of foreign policy attitudes, but rather how religious and ethnic identities shape opinions about various global communities across Muslims.

Global engagement, for the purposes of this chapter, is understood as the degree to which individuals engage with other global political communities, or the *salience* of foreign relations. An alternative approach is to consider the reasons that individuals hold these beliefs, or the *valence* of foreign relations. We touched on the notion of valence in chapter 3, but here it plays a different role. The first step in research on global engagement is to determine whether, for example, Javanese Muslims are less engaged with the Muslim world than non-Javanese Muslims given their particular position in Indonesia's ethnopolitical landscape. This is a question of the salience of foreign relations. Armed with the finding (discussed below) that Javanese Muslims attribute less importance to relations with the Muslim world than non-Javanese Muslims, it is possible to study whether this is because *Javanese Muslims* attribute less importance to relations with Muslim countries because they believe that *non-Indonesian Muslims* look down upon Javanese Muslims, or if this result emerges because *non-Javanese Indonesian Muslims* believe that Javanese Indonesians look down on *them*. Such an approach would explore the valence of foreign engagement, explaining the "content" of those views and why individuals hold the views that they hold. Both the salience and valence of foreign relations for ordinary Indonesians are important facets of Muslims' global engagement, but in our view, salience is conceptually prior to valence. Our chapter focuses on the salience of Indonesia's foreign relations across multiple global communities because we believe that this is a necessary first step, and expect that future work can build on ours in order to probe the meanings that Muslims attach to Indonesia's foreign relations.

Global engagement reflects the strength with which individuals identify with different kinds of global communities. Studying global engagement, like studying other forms of political identity, therefore requires close attention to the multidimensionality and nonexclusivity of individual

opinions. Global engagement is a *multidimensional* concept because individuals may engage with many different global communities.[2] Reviewing the conceptual bases of ethnicity, for example, Chandra (2006) observes that a woman born of West Indian parents in Trinidad who moves to the United States is simultaneously black, West Indian, and African American. She is also potentially a Democrat, a Catholic, a woman, an American, and several others. Recognition that identity is multidimensional has generated a wealth of new research on how various contextual factors can shape the relative salience of different dimensions of identity (see, e.g., Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).

Global engagement is similarly multidimensional. Muslims may place high value on relations with other Muslim countries, but this single religious dimension does not fully capture the complexity of global engagement. Another dimension is toward the hegemon: Muslims may place high value on engagement with the West, or with the United States in particular. Still another dimension is regional: Muslims may value relations with their regional counterparts (Syrians with Jordanians and Turks, Pakistanis with Indians and Afghans, Guineans with Sierra Leoneans and Ivoirians, Indonesians with Malaysians and Filipinos). In sum, global engagement among Muslims is not exclusive to relations with the Muslim world, or even with the Muslim world versus the West, but rather must be understood in relation to many distinct global communities.

Global engagement is also *nonexclusive*. Just as individuals' identities need not compete with one another, neither must the various global communities with which an individual engages. Following Chandra's

2. Social psychologists have also explored the multidimensionality of identity in a different way, understanding multidimensionality to mean that the nature of identification itself has multiple dimensions. Examples include "salience, centrality, regard, and ideology" (Sellers et al. 1998), and "self-categorization, evaluation, importance, attachment and sense of interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioral involvement, and content and meaning" (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004: 80). That understanding of multidimensionality is distinct from (but in principle compatible with) our own understanding of multidimensionality.

example, one might ask if a West Indian woman feels more attached to her West Indian or her African American identity—thereby forcing these two identity dimensions to be mutually exclusive—but for many questions the relative importance of one identity versus another is less interesting than the absolute importance of both. Some social contexts may increase the salience of her identity as both a West Indian and an African American, even if the salience of one increases more than the other.

The importance of recognizing the potentially nonexclusive nature of global engagement becomes clear when interpreting what it means when Muslims report strong support for engagement with the Muslim world. This might indicate that these individuals hold Islamist views, prioritizing common religion as the basis for global engagement. But it also might indicate that these individuals are cosmopolitans, meaning that they value foreign relations with all kinds of countries. It could also indicate anti-Westernism, valuing foreign relations with all non-Western countries (Muslim countries, but also regional or ideological partners among non-Muslim countries). Herein lies our key conceptual innovation. Adjudicating among these various interpretations requires an understanding of global engagement in which strong engagement with the Muslim world can coexist with strong engagement with the West, or with the region, or with other communities. As dimensions of global engagement are only potentially nonexclusive, not certainly so, we must treat nonexclusivity as a testable hypothesis rather than an assumption.

In sum, global engagement describes the priorities that citizens of one state place on foreign relations with other states in the global political system. In studies of Muslim foreign opinion, views about Muslim countries' relations with the United States have dominated, but since global engagement is an inherently multidimensional concept, such an approach overlooks important information about relations with other countries that is critical for interpreting opinions about the United States. The next section brings us back to the Indonesian case, where we can explore these issues in further depth.

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: THE INDONESIAN CASE

Indonesia is a particularly useful context through which to explore Islam and global engagement because although it is the world's most populous Muslim country, its geographical location and political history have meant that its relations with non-Muslim countries have always been at least as important as its relations with the Muslim world. Historically and culturally linked to the Indian subcontinent, colonized by the Dutch, occupied by Japan, wary of China's regional influence, formerly a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a firm Western ally for the latter half of the Cold War, currently a member of the G-20, and with the potential to become Southeast Asia's regional leader in the coming decade, Indonesia has a history of regional and global political relations that are at least as rich and politically meaningful as its relations with the Muslim world.

These multiple, sometimes overlapping regional and civilizational ties have made Indonesia a difficult case for scholars wishing to locate the country in one region or civilization. Huntington (1996) recognized that Indonesia was located in Asia and that it was "far from the Muslim center" (177), yet still termed it "a rising Muslim power" (219). For the purposes of our larger argument in this book, however, the difficulty of classifying Indonesia is useful: Indonesia provides a context in which to probe the multiple overlapping global identities that Muslims have, because it is possible to distinguish engagement with the Muslim world based on common religious ties from engagement with other communities based on regional ties (East Asia) and cultural/historical ties (Southeast Asia). Moreover, religious and ethnic heterogeneity among Indonesia's diverse population makes it possible to compare Muslims of different religious outlooks and ethnic backgrounds. Particularly among Indonesia's ethnic Javanese plurality, ethnic identity may be as salient as religious identity.

Yet despite the multiple global communities with which Indonesians engage, we recognize, as we have throughout this book, that Islam plays an increasingly prominent role in contemporary Indonesian politics (Effendy 2006; Fealy and White 2008). And as a consequence, scholars

have speculated about the consequences of religious revitalization for how Indonesians engage with the world (see, e.g., van Bruinessen 2012), and for Indonesian foreign policy (Perwita 2007; Sukma 2003). This makes a study of foreign policy attitudes in Indonesia particularly relevant to debates about religious identity and global engagement.

Four Country Groups

In contemporary Indonesian foreign policy, four international political groupings dominate: the Muslim world, the West, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. These represent Indonesia's foreign relations with states defined by their common religious heritage, systemic position, regional position, and geostrategic position.[3] The first describes foreign relations with other Muslim countries. While it might seem self-evident today that Indonesians would value their country's relations with other Muslim countries, this was likely not always a particularly salient global identity for all Indonesians, in particular those living on Java or Bali or in eastern Indonesia. That said, Islam is a global religion whose adherents conceive of themselves as part of a global religious community, or ummah. All Muslims who are capable of doing so are required to travel across national borders to accompany Muslims from around the world on the hajj. Islamic revivalism should therefore correspond to heightened salience of Indonesia's place in the global Muslim community. By the same token, the very nature of Islam as a global religion means that a more conspicuous awareness of Islam in an individual's daily life may heighten his or her awareness of all global communities, not just Muslim ones. If this is true, then while pious Muslims

3. At different periods in history, there would be additional communities of states that are no longer particularly salient for Indonesians, such as an Austronesian community defined by a common linguistic heritage (ranging from Madagascar to Hawaii), an Indic community defined by Hindu-Buddhist heritage (including the countries ruled as British India along with parts of mainland Southeast Asia), a community defined by common Dutch colonial rule (including Suriname, Sri Lanka, and South Africa), a Non-Aligned Movement community (including India, Burma, and Kenya), and others.

will find relations with the Muslim world to be more salient, this might be paralleled by similar increases in the salience of relations with other types of countries.

The second identity dimension describes relations with the United States and other Western powers. Between 1965 and the end of the Cold War, Indonesia was a close ally of the West, and profited greatly from Western trade and aid (particularly that coming from the United States and Australia). Today, Indonesia still remains an important trading partner for the United States and Australia, and governments of both countries consider Indonesia a key counterterrorism partner. The reflourishing of Indonesian Islam might threaten these ties. Indonesia's New Order regime was keen to maintain close ties with the West, and although in later years the New Order did become more tolerant of Islam in public life (Liddle 1996), the regime was on the whole unsympathetic to Islam as a basis for politics at home or foreign policy activism abroad (Crouch 1981; Hadiz 2011). Islamic revivalism might produce a reaction against the West as a consequence of its rejection of the previous regime's generally pro-Western and anti-Islamic orientations.

The third identity of note is a Southeast Asian regional identity. The concept of Southeast Asia as a region is a relatively modern construction (McVey 1995), but it is nevertheless widely understood among Indonesians. Historically, precolonial kingdoms with political centers on Java and Sumatra maintained spheres of influence across the South China and Sulu Seas, including territory that is today part of Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines. For historical reasons, then, Indonesians share with other Southeast Asians a range of cultural practices and historical political experiences. Finally, from a contemporary political standpoint, Indonesia is by far the most populous member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and many Indonesian officials believe that ASEAN provides an important regional forum through which Indonesia may realize its foreign policy interests (Benny and Abdullah 2011; Haftel 2010). This means that Indonesians may value relations with other Southeast Asian countries as well.

Finally, Indonesia is part of a greater Asian region. Japanese and Chinese influence on modern Indonesia has been substantial, and both have strived to achieve dominance over the wider Asian region, so regional geostrategic concerns comprise a fourth relevant dimension for Indonesians' global engagement. The Japanese occupied Indonesia during the Second World War and set in motion Indonesia's independence movement. Since the mid-1960s, Japan has been one of Indonesia's closest trade and investment partners. During the Cold War Chinese-Indonesian bilateral relations were frigid, a consequence of Chinese concerns about Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority and its tacit support of Indonesia's communist movement in the early 1960s. Today Sino-Indonesian relations have improved (Sukma 2009), but Chinese military and economic power, as well as China's growing appetite for natural resources, are looming concerns for Indonesian foreign policy. Foreign relations with East Asia therefore are an important reference point for Indonesians.

Domestic Political Identity and Foreign Policy Attitudes

From this description of the four global political communities with whom Indonesians may engage, it is possible to identify several possible hypotheses about the relationships between domestic identity and foreign policy attitudes among Indonesian Muslims. Of central importance to contemporary debates about Islamic revivalism and foreign policy identity is religiosity or piety. As noted above, greater identification with Islam, or adherence to Islamic religious practices, might correspond to a higher salience of an Islamist foreign policy identity. But such transformations might also increase the salience of other global identities as well by reinforcing the notion that a respondent is a member of many global communities. Religiosity could therefore have either a cosmopolitan influence or an Islamist influence on global engagement, or some mixture of the two: for instance, religiosity among Muslims might decrease the salience of relations with the West at the same time that it increases salience of relations with the Muslim world, or it might leave the former unaffected.

Ethnicity or other forms of identity may also shape global engagement. Indonesia is one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries, but as we discussed in section "Conceptualizing Global Engagement" previously, the cleavage between Javanese and non-Javanese ethnic groups is particularly salient. The political salience of this distinction has three origins: the precolonial kingdoms in the Indonesian archipelago (many of the largest of which were Javanese), the treatment of the island of Java under Dutch colonial rule (as the political center of the Dutch East Indies), and the fact that Javanese are today the most numerous of Indonesia's many ethnic groups. For contemporary Indonesians, Javanese-ness often signifies a particular kind of indigenous political identity that, when conceiving of the wider Indonesian state, is less beholden to viewing Indonesia through the lens of a broader foreign community (in this case, the Muslim world) than is the case with other ethnic groups.[4] The *aliran* cleavage that we described in chapter 2, section "*Aliran*, Ethnicity, and Piety," might function in analogous ways.

In the context of Indonesians' global engagement, the political effects of ethnicity (Javanese-ness, or alternatively, *aliran*) may manifest themselves in a number of ways. Ethnic Javanese or self-identified *abangan* may be less cosmopolitan than non-Javanese across all global identities, and prioritize foreign relations with all types of countries less than non-Javanese. Alternatively, if ethnic identities are seen as competing with Islam, then Javanese or self-identified *abangan* will be less likely to prioritize engagement with the Muslim world in particular. Finally, a broad view of Javanese/*abangan* identity might find affinities with similar indigenous nationalisms in Southeast Asia. If so, ethnic Javanese or self-identified

4. Other ethnic identities may connote the opposite. In various ways and for various reasons, Acehnese, Bantenese, and Makassarese ethnic groups are viewed as less beholden to Indonesia's Javanese-centric nationalism and more willing to self-identify as members of the global ummah. Research by Sachs (2009) illustrates the ways in which non-Javanese Indonesians interpret nationalist symbols differently than Islamic symbols. This suggests that self-identification with a global Muslim community may function as a reaction by non-Javanese Indonesians to what they view as the Javanese-centrism of the contemporary Indonesian polity. Despite our survey's large sample size, we do not have sufficient statistical power to test the effects of these ethnic categories on global engagement in the same way as we can the Javanese ethnic category.

abangan would place greater value on Indonesia's relations with other Southeast Asian countries.

STUDYING ENGAGEMENT

To investigate how these possible identity dimensions affect the salience of global engagement with these global political communities, we asked respondents their opinions about Indonesia's foreign relations with the four groups of countries identified above. The question wording appears in table 5.1.

Any survey question wording inevitably requires making hard choices about conceptualization and measurement. The benefits of this particular question wording are several. We are able to focus narrowly on the political component of global engagement as refracted through Indonesia's foreign relations, which is distinct from any sort of cultural or personal affinity that individuals may have with various types of peoples (although this is certainly interesting as well). Likewise, while a question asking individuals, "What kind of country is Indonesia like?" might be a more targeted window into global engagement in the abstract sense, such a question proves difficult to communicate meaningfully to survey respondents. Foreign policy attitudes, by contrast, are more concrete. Finally, this wording of the abstract importance of engagement with other countries focuses respondents on the salience of relations with other country groups. As we noted above, valence—what exactly respondents believe about each particular country grouping, or the values that they associate with each—is an important issue as well, but one that we reserve for future research. In the following analysis the dependent variables are the four ordinal responses to these questions: *MUSLIM TIES, WEST TIES, SEA TIES*, and *EA TIES*.

As we discussed previously, our motivating concern is the possibility that among Indonesian Muslims, relations with many different kinds of countries may each be salient, or none of them, or some of them. Figure 5.1 illustrates six hypothetical combinations of responses

Table 5.1 Global Engagement Items

How important are Indonesia's foreign relations with countries from *the Muslim World/the West/Southeast Asia/East Asia*?

Responses: *Not Important*
Somewhat Important
Important
Very Important
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer (discarded from the subsequent analysis)



Figure 5.1 Six Varieties of Global Engagement
This figure presents six hypothetical sets of responses to the four question items described in table 5.1, on the importance of Indonesia's foreign relations with each of four groups of countries.

to the questions in table 5.1, each of which describes a variant of global engagement. We have given each variety a shorthand name—Islamist, pro-Western, anti-Western, and so forth—as a way to summarize what we believe each group of choices might reflect.

An Islamist variant of foreign policy attitudes is characterized not just by the belief that relations with the Muslim world are important, but also by the belief that relations with the rest of the world are unimportant. A Western variant features a similar belief, but about the West instead of the Muslim world. It would be possible to distinguish between these two by placing Islam and the West in binary opposition as two ends of a single dimension, but it is not possible to capture the alternative configurations of identity in figure 5.1 in that way. Following the discussion above, consider the distinction between "anti-Western" and "Islamist" variants of global engagement: both predict strong identification with the Muslim world and weak identification with the West, but the former also predicts strong identification with other non-Western countries. Consider also the distinction between Islamist and cosmopolitan variants: both make identical predictions about engagement with the Muslim world, but very different predictions about engagement with other country groups. Many other combinations are possible to imagine. To analyze the factors that shape global engagement, in turn, we develop below a statistical framework that preserves the multidimensionality and nonexclusivity of the various dimensions of these foreign policy attitudes.

A Statistical Model

In this section we describe a statistical model of multidimensional, nonexclusive, ordered choices, which we will use to study global engagement. The discussion here is technical. We have endeavored to keep the mathematical language to a minimum, but some amount of notation is necessary for readers who wish to understand how we are implementing our statistical model, how to tie it to our conceptual discussion above, and how to interpret the results. Readers interested in the complete exposition of the technical details may see the technical appendix at the end of this chapter. Readers who are uninterested in the details of how we model global engagement may skip this section entirely, but should interpret the results in the sections below with care.

Our model is an extension of the ordered probit model to encompass multiple simultaneous choices. This "multivariate ordered probit" (Greene and Hensher 2010: 299–301) model provides a natural statistical framework in which multidimensionality and mutual exclusivity are testable hypotheses. To see this, recall that the data on global engagement take the form of four dependent variables, each with four possible values. Take, for example, opinions about global engagement with the Muslim world. The response from individual i, which we denote $y_{Muslim,i}$, is either "Not Important," "Somewhat Important," "Important," or "Very Important." We make the innocuous assumptions that these four potential responses fall along an ordinal scale, and in turn, that they are the realization of an unobserved continuous variable $y^{*}_{Muslim,i}$. That unobserved dependent variable is a function of independent variables $\mathbf{X}_{Muslim}$ plus an error term ε_{Muslim}. The same is true for responses to each of the three other responses $y_{West,i}$, $y_{S.E.Asia,i}$, and $y_{E.Asia,i}$.

Our statistical approach, then, amounts to estimating the following set of four equations:

$$\begin{aligned} y^{*}_{Muslim} &= \mathbf{X}'_{Muslim}\beta_{Muslim} + \varepsilon_{Muslim} \\ y^{*}_{West} &= \mathbf{X}'_{West}\beta_{West} + \varepsilon_{West} \\ y^{*}_{S.E.Asia} &= \mathbf{X}'_{S.E.Asia}\beta_{S.E.Asia} + \varepsilon_{S.E.Asia} \\ y^{*}_{E.Asia} &= \mathbf{X}'_{E.Asia}\beta_{E.Asia} + \varepsilon_{E.Asia} \end{aligned}$$

Our innovation is to model the covariances of the error terms ε. We will denote the covariance between any two error terms j and k as $\hat{\rho}_{j,k}$, and Σ as the matrix of all covariances. Our method allows us to estimate the parameters β as well as the individual covariances ρ.

Substantively, this model produces two statistics of interest. First, the parameter estimates $\hat{\beta}$ test whether each set of independent variables are correlated with responses across each dimension. These results will allow us to test, for example, whether Javanese Muslims are more or less likely to favor strong foreign relations with the Muslim world, the West, and so on. This is a test of the multidimensionality of a particular variable's relationship with global engagement. In the case of ethnicity, if $\hat{\beta}_{Muslim} > 0$ but

$\hat{\beta}_{West}$, $\hat{\beta}_{S.E.Asia}$, and $\hat{\beta}_{E.Asia} = 0$, then the relationship between ethnicity and global engagement is in fact unidimensional.

The second statistic of interest is the estimated error covariance, which tests the mutual exclusivity of global engagement. For example, if $\hat{\rho}_{Muslim,West} > 0$, then respondents who favor strong relations with the West also favor strong relations with the Muslim world (net of systematic determinants of each). Conversely, if $\hat{\rho}_{Muslim,West} < 0$, then the two dimensions are indeed mutually exclusive. In this way, our statistical methods allow us to investigate empirically the degree to which differences across individuals are consistent with a conception of global engagement as having multiple, overlapping, nonexclusive dimensions.

Independent Variables: Piety, Ethnicity, and Controls

As independent variables, we include measures of piety, ethnicity, political awareness, political efficacy, and education. The main variable of interest for scholars of the foreign policy consequences of Islamic revivalism is piety. If Islamic revivalism leads Muslims to shift their priorities for global engagement toward the Muslim world and away from the West, then at the individual level, Muslims who report greater piety should be more likely to value Muslim ties and less likely to support ties with the West. However, Islamic revivalism may have various other, more complex effects on global engagement, as described previously. We use our *PIETY INDEX*, as before, to capture this key potential determinant of foreign policy attitudes.

In the Indonesian context, ethnicity may also shape global engagement, as discussed above. A dummy variable (*JAVANESE*) identifies all respondents who choose Javanese as their primary ethnic identity. To capture the *abangan-santri* cleavage, we define two dummy variables, *ABANGAN* and *SANTRI*, that capture all respondents who self-identified as one of these two.[5] If Javanese or self-identified *abangan* engage with global

5. Recall from chapter 2 that 1% of respondents self-identified as *priyayi*. The omitted category therefore includes both those who identified as *priyayi* and those who declined to identify as one of the three.

communities differently than other Indonesians, then they should be less likely to value Muslim ties than are other Indonesian Muslims, and perhaps also more likely to value ties with other country groups, particularly Southeast Asians.

As controls, we include variables that capture education, political awareness, personal views of different groups of foreigners, and a set of demographic controls. All are possible explanations for global engagement, and each is also possibly correlated with expressed piety or ethnic identification, meaning that their omission might artificially strengthen the estimate relationships among piety, ethnicity, and global engagement. The first control variable, *EDUCATION*, captures individuals' highest levels of education. If education exposes individuals to new ideas and gives them information about the world that they would otherwise not have, then higher levels of education should correspond to greater interest in foreign relations with all types of countries, indicating that it has a cosmopolitan influence on foreign policy attitudes.

We also measure political efficacy and political interest through two variables (*POLITICAL INTEREST* and *POLITICAL EFFICACY*). These measure the extent to which individuals report having an interest in politics, and the extent to which individuals report that they have the ability to affect government policies and decisions, each on a four-point scale. By controlling for these two factors, we ensure that our measure of the importance of ties with various kinds of countries does not simply reflect individuals' baseline orientation to political activity or politics more generally. However, these two variables may also be viewed as post-treatment confounders: if piety affects political interest or political efficacy, then controlling for them may mask the relationship between piety and global engagement. Fortunately, none of our results depend on whether or not we include these two variables in the analyses below.[6]

6. Results for analyses that exclude *POLITICAL INTEREST* and *POLITICAL EFFICACY* are available from the authors upon request.

For similar reasons, we also control for individuals' baseline orientations toward various kinds of people, each one of which is representative of a particular class of countries under consideration: Saudis to represent the Muslim world, Americans for the West, Malaysians for Southeast Asia, and Chinese for East Asia.[7] These four variables (*LIKE SAUDIS, LIKE AMERICANS, LIKE MALAYSIANS*, and *LIKE CHINESE*) are included separately as controls in each model of global engagement. The distinction between countries and peoples (or nations) is critical, and by controlling for baseline orientations toward various kinds of peoples we ensure that these results reflect global engagement rather than other forms of global identity politics or affinity for various types of people.

Finally, in all models we include income, age and age squared, and dummies for urban/rural, gender, and marital status as demographic controls. Furthermore, we account for regional heterogeneity in two different ways. In the first model, we allow errors to be clustered by province, the highest subnational political unit in Indonesia. In the second model, we account for unobserved regional heterogeneity directly by including province-level fixed effects as well.

RESULTS

Before turning to the statistical results, consider first the joint distribution of the dependent variables as a basic test of the dimensionality and nonexclusivity of global engagement across the four country groups. Table 5.2 contains Goodman and Kruskal's γ, a measure of the ordinal association between each pair of dependent variables.

Positive values indicate that for a particular pair of dependent variables, individuals who consider relations with one group of countries important are likely to rate relations with another group of countries highly; the

7. The Indonesian-language versions are clear that "Malaysians" (*orang Malaysia*) does not mean "ethnic Malays" (*orang Melayu*) and that "Chinese" (*orang RRC*) does not mean ethnic Chinese Indonesians (variously, *orang Cina* or *orang Tionghoa*).

Table 5.2 Correlated Views across Country Groups

	Muslim world	**The West**	**Southeast Asia**	**East Asia**
Muslim world	1			
The West	0.27*	1		
Southeast Asia	0.75*	0.59*	1	
East Asia	0.57*	0.74*	0.82*	1

NOTE: This table displays measures of association (Goodman and Kruskal's γ) for each pair of responses to "How important are Indonesia's foreign relations with countries from [REGION]?"

* $p < .05$.

closer to 1, the stronger is this association. Negative values would indicate that high rankings for one country group correspond to lower rankings for another. The results in table 5.2 indicate that on the whole, Indonesians' opinions on global engagement are *not* mutually exclusive—individuals who favor engagement with the Muslim world also tend to favor engagement with the West, with Southeast Asia, and East Asia. While the estimates of the association between each pair of dependent variables vary in size, each estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at $p < .05$.

We can probe this overall result more closely by examining plots of frequencies of each of the six pairs of dependent variables, which appear as figure 5.2.

The plots help to explain the varying magnitudes of association in table 5.2. For example, when it comes to the Muslim world and Southeast Asia (the top-right plot), most respondents who state that relations with the Muslim world are "important" also respond the same way for "Southeast Asia." There are relatively few individuals who view relations with one but not the other as "important" or "very important." Compare this to the plot corresponding to the West and the Muslim world (the top-left plot). Here, although a plurality of respondents continues to hold that relations with the West and the Muslim world are important, there is an asymmetry: we also discover more substantial numbers of respondents who hold that relations with the West are "unimportant" or only "somewhat important" even though they consider relations with the Muslim



Figure 5.2 The Importance of Different Country Groups
This figure shows the frequency of each response to "How important are Indonesia's foreign relations with countries from [REGION]?" for each of the six pairs of two regions. The size of each circle reflects the relative frequency of that pair of responses, so larger circles correspond to more common pairs of responses.

world to be "very important." A similar pattern emerges for the Muslim world and East Asia (middle-left plot), in which the asymmetry favors the former, and for Southeast Asia and the West, in which the asymmetry favors the latter.

To summarize what we have learned so far, our data strongly support the notion that Indonesians' opinions on global engagement are *not*

mutually exclusive. The more important a respondent rates one group of countries, the more likely she or he is to rate any other group of countries as important. This confirms to us that arguments about the *relative* importance of ties between Indonesia and various other country groupings will obscure the basic finding that most Indonesians consider multiple country groups to be important, which stands in sharp contrast to any general perspective that civilizations are "in competition." But there are subtleties in the data too, in particular the asymmetry between the importance of the Muslim world and Southeast Asia relative to the West: some Indonesians do view the Muslim world and Southeast Asia as important but not the West, whereas very few believe the reverse. This suggests that further analysis will allow us to characterize the relationship between individual beliefs and identities and patterns of global engagement.

Results

We follow the statistical methodology described in section "A Statistical Model" to estimate the relationship between piety, identity, other political attitudes, and demographic characteristics and patterns of global engagement. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present results from the multinomial ordered probit regressions, both without province fixed effects (table 5.3) and with province fixed effects (table 5.4).

The results in these two tables provide the additional insights into the complex relationships among Islam, ethnicity, and global engagement in contemporary Indonesia, although much richer inferences can be drawn from further analyses, as we show below.

Begin first with the estimated error covariance matrix $\hat{\Sigma}$. Each estimated component is highly statistically significant, which indicates there are efficiency gains from jointly estimating these four equations in each model. However, the more interesting substantive conclusion is that each component is also positive. Transforming each term back into a correlation coefficient, these values range from .352 ($\hat{\rho}_{Muslim,West}$) to .753 ($\hat{\rho}_{S.E.Asia,E.Asia}$). This is strong evidence that net of their systematic

Table 5.3 Multinomial Ordered Probit Results

	MUSLIM TIES	*WEST TIES*	*SEA TIES*	*EA TIES*
PIETY INDEX	.058*	.005	.049***	.035*
	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
SANTRI	−.029	−.088	−.050	−.154*
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.073)
ABANGAN	.182	.066	.108	.078
	(0.116)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.075)
JAVANESE	−.120	.143	−.074	.047
	(0.096)	(0.077)	(0.048)	(0.057)
EDUCATION LEVEL	.058***	.061***	.074***	.067***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.018)
POLITICAL INTEREST	.049	.008	.084	.039
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.035)
POLITICAL EFFICACY	.096**	.020	.063	.039
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.029)
LIKE SAUDIS	.229***			
	(0.040)			
LIKE AMERICANS		.366***		
		(0.032)		
LIKE MALAYSIANS			.251***	
			(0.049)	
LIKE CHINESE				.269***
				(0.034)
CUT 1	−1.113***	0.504	−0.268	−0.197
	(0.329)	(0.383)	(0.262)	(0.191)
CUT 2	−0.676*	1.183**	0.193	0.347
	(0.311)	(0.404)	(0.265)	(0.196)
CUT 3	1.177***	2.590***	1.882***	1.937***
	(0.333)	(0.420)	(0.270)	(0.215)
SIGMA	1			
	.368***	1		
	(0.043)			
	.837***	.617***	1	
	(0.030)	(0.064)		
	.580***	.842***	.957***	1
	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.072)	

NOTE: $N = 1739$. Standard errors (clustered by province) in parentheses. Estimates for the elements of $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$ are for atanh(ρ); diagonals are fixed at 1.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 5.4 Results with Province Fixed Effects

	MUSLIM TIES	*WEST TIES*	*SEA TIES*	*EA TIES*
PIETY INDEX	.050*	−.006	.044**	.030*
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
SANTRI	−.067	−.109	−.096	−.131
	(0.054)	(0.075)	(0.058)	(0.083)
ABANGAN	.043	−.014	−.022	−.020
	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.095)
JAVANESE	−.278**	.143	−.156	.083
	(0.098)	(0.149)	(0.115)	(0.141)
EDUCATION LEVEL	.061***	.063***	.082***	.074***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.017)
POLITICAL INTEREST	.033	.017	.069	.021
	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.034)
POLITICAL EFFICACY	.093*	.024	.049	.030
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)
LIKE SAUDIS	.222***			
	(0.042)			
LIKE AMERICANS		.368***		
		(0.032)		
LIKE MALAYSIANS			.246***	
			(0.047)	
LIKE CHINESE				.270***
				(0.032)
CUT 1	−1.020***	0.363	0.134	−0.117
	(0.299)	(0.383)	(0.248)	(0.196)
CUT 2	−0.581*	1.054**	0.603*	0.442*
	(0.279)	(0.408)	(0.244)	(0.201)
CUT 3	1.329***	2.491***	2.349***	2.066***
	(0.296)	(0.429)	(0.248)	(0.213)
SIGMA	1			
	.371***	1		
	(0.040)			
	.813***	.648***	1	
	(0.027)	(0.058)		
	.566***	.868***	.955***	1
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.077)	

NOTE: $N = 1739$. Standard errors (clustered by province) in parentheses. Province fixed effects suppressed for presentation. Estimates for the elements of $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$ are for atanh(ρ); diagonals are fixed at 1.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

determinants, Indonesians' opinions on global engagement are *not* mutually exclusive—individuals who favor engagement with the Muslim world also tend to favor engagement with the West, with Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Moreover, the correlation between errors in the equations for the Muslim world and the West is far smaller than that, for instance, between the Muslim world and Southeast Asia. This illustrates the complexity of the interrelationships among foreign policy attitudes toward different country groups, but in no case is it accurate to conclude that engagement with one group of countries entails disengagement with another group of countries.

Turn next to the estimated coefficients on *PIETY INDEX, JAVANESE*, and the controls. As expected, respondents' opinions about Saudis, Americans, Malaysians, and Chinese are closely related to their beliefs about the importance of Indonesia's foreign relations with the country groups that they represent. As hypothesized, *PIETY INDEX* is associated with higher scores on *MUSLIM TIES*. But *PIETY INDEX* is also associated with higher scores on *SEA TIES* and *EA TIES* as well, and is unrelated in either Model 1 or Model 2 with scores for *WEST TIES*. Wald tests cannot reject the equivalence of the coefficients on *MUSLIM TIES, SEA TIES*, and *EA TIES* ($p = .65$ for *MUSLIM TIES* versus *SEA TIES;* $p = .12$ for *MUSLIM TIES* versus *EA TIES*). They do reject the equivalence of *WEST TIES* with the other three ($p = .01$ for *MUSLIM TIES;* $p < .01$ for *SEA TIES;* $p = .02$ for *EA TIES*).

These results indicate that more pious Muslim respondents considered Indonesia's foreign relations with Muslim countries, Southeast Asian countries, and East Asian countries to be more important than less pious respondents. This is strong evidence in favor of the multidimensionality of the relationship between piety and global engagement: more pious Muslims placed greater emphasis on Indonesia's relations with all three types of countries. But critically, this did not come at the expense of Indonesia's relations with the West, which were viewed at equivalent levels of importance regardless of the individual's reported level of piety.

Graphical Results

Figure 5.3 illustrates this conclusion graphically by plotting marginal probabilities (with associated 95% confidence intervals) of various responses across typical values of *PIETY INDEX*.[8] This is an important exercise because the estimated coefficients associated with *PIETY INDEX* do not reveal how likely various responses are across dimensions.[9] Each panel in figure 5.3 displays the predicted probability that a respondent believes that Indonesian relations with each group of countries falls in each of the four categories, across various values of *PIETY INDEX*, with all other variables held at their means (or, for dummy variables, their modes). Estimates are calculated from the results of Model 1 in table 5.3. The benefit of a graphical approach is that it also facilitates comparison of absolute probabilities of various responses across the different dimensions.

For Muslim countries, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, the probability that a respondent thinks that Indonesia's relations with these countries are "very important" increases as *PIETY INDEX* increases. The probability that a respondent thinks that Indonesia's relations with these countries are at any of the other levels of importance decreases—with most of the decrease coming from those respondents believing that relations with these countries are "important." Figure 5.3 also indicates that while a Muslim who scores at the lowest plotted level of *PIETY INDEX* is equally likely to view relations with the Muslim world as "important" or "very important," that same respondent is far more likely to view relations with all other countries as "important" than "very important." The conclusion is that while higher levels of *PIETY INDEX* are associated with more engagement with the Muslim world, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, this positive association begins from different baseline values across groups of countries.

To probe this further, figure 5.4 plots the first differences in predicted probabilities of each response for two pairs of countries (the Muslim

8. The range of plotted values (−3 to 3) of *PIETY INDEX* includes the variable's 5th through 95th percentiles.

9. These probabilities are complex nonlinear functions of the coefficients and the cutpoints, which vary across models.



Figure 5.3 Piety and Global Engagement
Each panel displays the predicted probability (along with its 95% confidence interval) that a respondent believes that Indonesian relations with country type *j* fall in each of the four categories, across various values of *PIETY*, with all other variables held at their means (or, for dummy variables, their modes): for values *m* of "Not Important," "Somewhat Important," "Important," and "Very Important" and *j* of "Muslim World," "West," "Southeast Asia," and "East Asia."

world versus the West, and the Muslim world versus Southeast Asia), again across various typical values of *PIETY INDEX* and using results from Model 1 in table 5.3.

Figure 5.4 shows, first, that regardless of the value of *PIETY INDEX*, Indonesian Muslims are more likely to view Muslim relations as "very important" than relations with the West and with Southeast Asia. Across most values of *PIETY INDEX*, the opposite is true in the case of relations that are "important," "somewhat important," or "not important." Second, figure 5.4 shows that these differences increase as *PIETY INDEX* increases in the case of the Muslim world versus the West, but not so in the case of the Muslim world versus Southeast Asia.

Turning to other variables of interest, the results in tables 5.3 and 5.4 point to some interesting conclusions. As expected, *EDUCATION*



Figure 5.4 Comparing Predicted Probabilities across Countries
Each panel displays the difference in the predicted probabilities (along with 95% confidence interval around this difference) that a respondent believes that Indonesian relations with country *j* and country *k* fall in each of the four categories, across various values of *PIETY*, with all other variables held at their means (or, for dummy variables, their modes): for values *m* of "Not Important," "Somewhat Important," "Important," and "Very Important" and *k* = *the West* and *Southeast Asia*.

is positively and significantly related to foreign policy attitudes on each of the four dimensions, indicating that education has (as expected) a cosmopolitan effect on global engagement. In table 5.4, *JAVANESE* is negatively correlated with *MUSLIM TIES*, although this estimate has the same sign but is not statistically significant at conventional levels in table 5.3. To facilitate interpretation, in figure 5.5 we compare the predicted probabilities of various responses for Javanese versus non-Javanese respondents, holding other variables at their means or modes (this is the same procedure that generated figure 5.3). To be clear, these plots were generated using the results in table 5.3, *not* table 5.4, even though the parameter estimate on *JAVANESE* is not statistically significant in the former.



Figure 5.5 Ethnicity and Global Engagement
Each panel compares the predicted probability (and its 95% confidence interval) that a respondent believes that Indonesian relations with country type *j* fall in each of the four categories for Javanese versus non-Javanese respondents, with all other variables held at their means (or, for dummy variables, their modes): for values *m* of "Not Important," "Somewhat Important," "Important," and "Very Important" and *j* of "Muslim World," "West," "Southeast Asia," and "East Asia."

Figure 5.5 indicates that Javanese and non-Javanese Indonesians are by and large equivalent in their responses to questions about the importance of Indonesia's foreign relations with the West, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. But non-Javanese are slightly more likely to consider relations with the Muslim world to be "very important" than "important," whereas there is no such pattern among Javanese.[10] We emphasize that this difference in figure 5.5 is small. However, this finding is consistent with contemporary understandings of ethnicity

10. Because we have held *SANTRI* and *ABANGAN* at their modes, these predicted probabilities reflect respondents who have self-identified as neither. However, our findings about ethnicity do not change if we repeat the analysis for *santri* or *abangan* respondents.

in Indonesia as moderating Muslims' political engagement with the Muslim world. It does not support the idea, however, that Javanese Muslims favor closer engagement with Southeast Asia or other country groupings.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has probed the relationship between Islam, ethnicity, and global engagement. Our results are relevant for three literatures on public opinion, Islam and public opinion, and identity that remain relatively isolated from one another and which also travel far beyond the Indonesian case. Scholars of contemporary Muslim politics frequently speculate about the consequences of religious revivalism for Muslims' views of their place in contemporary global politics, but there is little empirical research on the foundations of public opinion that can shed light on these issues. Existing research on global public opinion has not yet properly explored either the variations among Muslims (in terms of piety or other characteristics) or the various ways in which Muslims might orient themselves to the world. And theorists of political identity recognize that identity is a complex and multidimensional construct, yet empirical research has not developed the methodological tools fully to explore political identities in a way that preserves the multidimensionality of identity without imposing arbitrary restrictions on how various dimensions are related to one another.

The methods and findings in this chapter speak directly to these issues. Most Indonesian Muslims, regardless of how pious they are, favor engagement with the Muslim world. But while piety only heightens this favorable disposition toward the Muslim world, it also heightens Muslims' engagement with other non-Western countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim. And although piety does not similarly heighten Indonesian Muslims' views on engagement with the West, neither does it weaken them. Piety's effects on Indonesian public opinion are cosmopolitan, not particularistic. This suggests that religious revivalism in

the Muslim world may shift Muslims' global orientation toward all non-Western countries, but this will nevertheless not come at the expense of engagement with the West.

But Muslims differ along other characteristics besides their piety. Education, for instance, has a truly cosmopolitan effect on perceptions about global engagement. More interestingly, ethnicity attenuates some Muslims' attitudes toward engagement with the Muslim world. Indonesia, like many other Muslim countries, is an ethnically plural society in which ethnic cleavages have long been suspected of having implications for how ordinary people conceive of their place in the world. Results in this chapter are consistent with expectations with regard to ethnic Javanese Muslims, and point to the important moderating effects that nonreligious identities may have on Muslims' global engagement.

These conclusions also lead back to the theoretical perspectives on civilizations and cosmopolitanism in world politics that motivated our analysis of the Indonesian case. Indonesian Muslims do not engage with the global political community in terms of a simple opposition between the Muslim world and the West. Moreover, Islamic revivalism—insofar as it can be captured by comparing individuals' religious beliefs and behaviors at one point in time—need not draw Indonesia toward the Muslim world and away from the rest of the world. The surprising implication is that religion proves to be just as cosmopolitan a force in Indonesia as are modernization, globalization, and other transformations that Indonesians have experienced in recent decades.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Let the subscripts i denote individuals, j denote dimensions (Muslim world, the West, Southeast Asia, East Asia), and m denote the choices (Not Important, Somewhat Important, Important, Very Important). The observed collection of responses is therefore a collection of four discrete choices representing unobserved continuous proclivities toward each of

the four groups of countries (y_{ji}^{*}). For each individual, then, we observe $\mathbf{y}_i$, a 4×1 vector derived from $\mathbf{y}_i^{*} = (y_{1i}^{*}, y_{2i}^{*}, y_{3i}^{*}, y_{4i}^{*})'$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} y_j &= 1 \quad \text{if} \quad -\infty < y_j^{*} \le \mu_{j,1} \\ y_j &= 2 \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_{j,1} < y_j^{*} \le \mu_{j,2} \\ y_j &= 3 \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_{j,2} < y_j^{*} \le \mu_{j,3} \\ y_j &= 4 \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_{j,3} < y_j^{*} \le +\infty \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

for all *j*. Let $\bar{m}_{ji}$ denote the choice by individual *i* of response *m* along dimension *j*. The joint probability of any set of observed choices for any individual *i*, $\Pr(y_{1i} = \bar{m}_{1i}, y_{2i} = \bar{m}_{2i}, \ldots, y_{ji} = \bar{m}_{ji})$ is therefore

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr\left(y_{1i} = \bar{m}_{1i}, y_{2i} = \bar{m}_{2i}, y_{3i} = \bar{m}_{3i}, y_{4i} = \bar{m}_{4i}\right) \\ &\quad = \Pr(\mu_{1,m-1} < y_1^{*} \le \mu_{1,m}, \mu_{2,m-1} < y_2^{*} \le \mu_{2,m}, \\ &\qquad \mu_{3,m-1} < y_3^{*} \le \mu_{3,m}, \mu_{4,m-1} < y_4^{*} \le \mu_{4,m}) \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

To study the relationship between Islamic revivalism, ethnicity, and global engagement, we model each dimension as a function of a set of known exogenous covariates $\mathbf{X}_j$ plus an error term (dropping subscripts *i*):

$$\begin{aligned} y_{Muslim}^{*} &= \mathbf{X}_{Muslim}' \beta_{Muslim} + \varepsilon_{Muslim} \\ y_{West}^{*} &= \mathbf{X}_{West}' \beta_{West} + \varepsilon_{West} \\ y_{S.E.Asia}^{*} &= \mathbf{X}_{S.E.Asia}' \beta_{S.E.Asia} + \varepsilon_{S.E.Asia} \\ y_{E.Asia}^{*} &= \mathbf{X}_{E.Asia}' \beta_{E.Asia} + \varepsilon_{E.Asia} \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

The parameter estimates $\hat{\beta}_j$ test whether the elements in $\mathbf{X}_j$ (which are not identical across dimensions) are correlated with responses across each dimension. These results indicate, for example, whether Javanese Muslims are more or less likely to favor strong foreign relations with the Muslim world, the West, and so on. This is a test of the multidimensionality of a particular demographic variable's relationship with global engagement. In the case of ethnicity, if $\hat{\beta}_{Muslim} > 0$ but $\hat{\beta}_{West}$, $\hat{\beta}_{S.E.Asia}$, and $\hat{\beta}_{E.Asia} = 0$,

then the relationship between ethnicity and global engagement is in fact unidimensional.

To examine whether these dimensions are mutually nonexclusive, assume that the errors in each element of (3) have zero conditional means— $E(\varepsilon_j|\mathbf{X}_j)=0$ for all j—but that the errors are related across equations. Specifically, it is possible to decompose the error term for each equation into two parts: the error associated with each dimension, denoted ξ, and the set of errors that are shared between pairs of dimensions, denoted ν. A full decomposition of the error terms is therefore

$$\begin{aligned}\varepsilon_1 &= \nu_{1,2}+\nu_{1,3}+\nu_{1,4}+\xi_1\\ \varepsilon_2 &= \nu_{1,2}+\nu_{2,3}+\nu_{2,4}+\xi_2\\ \varepsilon_3 &= \nu_{1,3}+\nu_{2,3}+\nu_{3,4}+\xi_3\\ \varepsilon_4 &= \nu_{1,4}+\nu_{2,4}+\nu_{3,4}+\xi_4\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

If we assume that all ν and ξ are normally distributed, then the vector of equation errors $\varepsilon=\left(\varepsilon_1,\varepsilon_2,\varepsilon_3,\varepsilon_4\right)'$ is distributed multivariate normal, but with correlated elements. Let $\rho_{j,k}$ denote the correlation between two elements of the error matrix ε_j and ε_k, and let $\mathbf{\Sigma}$ denote the correlation matrix for the elements of ε. The errors are distributed multivariate normal with a zero mean vector, $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}\sim N(\mathbf{0},\mathbf{\Sigma})$, where

$$\mathbf{\Sigma}=\begin{bmatrix}1 & & & \\ \rho_{1,2} & 1 & & \\ \rho_{1,3} & \rho_{2,3} & 1 & \\ \rho_{1,4} & \rho_{2,4} & \rho_{3,4} & 1\end{bmatrix} \tag{5}$$

Note that if any $\nu_{j,k}=0$, then $\rho_{j,k}=0$. In this case, the two dimensions j and k are unrelated. By allowing $\rho_{j,k}\neq 0$ for at least some j, the model shows whether, for example, respondents who favor strong relations with the West also favor strong relations with the Muslim world (net of systematic determinants of each). The elements of $\hat{\mathbf{\Sigma}}$ are therefore tests of the mutual exclusivity of global engagement, allowing dimensions to be mutually exclusive (in which case $\hat{\rho}_{j,k}<0$) or complementary (in which case $\hat{\rho}_{j,k}>0$).

From this, the log likelihood function to be maximized is in (6).

$$\ln L = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{m_1=1}^{1} \ldots \sum_{m_4=1}^{4} I\left(m_{1i} = \bar{m}_1, \ldots, m_{4i} = \bar{m}_J\right) \ln \Pr(y_{1i} = \bar{m}_1, \ldots, y_{4i} = \bar{m}_4) \quad (6)$$

We employ the cmp package (Roodman 2011), implemented in Stata 12, to estimate this multivariate ordered probit model.

6

Conclusion

OUR FINDINGS AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

This book has used the Indonesian case to probe a series of foundational questions about piety and politics in Muslim democracies. Our analysis rests on the basic assumption that the actions and choices of mass publics constitute the core of democratic politics, which means that understanding mass public opinion is essential for making sense of how religious revitalization matters for the trajectory of Muslim democracies. Moreover, the answers to many questions about how piety matters for Muslim political life depend on the beliefs, actions, and preferences of ordinary Muslims. Does support for Islamist political parties depend on their other policy platforms? Do pious Muslims prefer Islamic financial products? Is religious revivalism associated with cosmopolitan worldviews, or with a distinct favoritism for the Middle East at the expense of the West and other regions or civilizations? Using an unusually rich source of survey data

from Indonesia, we have shown not only how to *answer* these questions, but also how to *ask* them appropriately in the first place.

In chapter 1, we described the collection of results in this book as a "null finding." By this we mean that individual-level piety among Indonesian Muslims does not explain any of the phenomena that we set out to explain: social identity by *aliran*, support for Islamic law or political Islam, support for Islamist parties, the use of Islamic financial services, or greater engagement with the Muslim world relative to other world regions. Upon careful analysis, what sometimes appear as correlations between piety and beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors turn out to be fully explainable by nonreligious factors. Establishing these points required sophisticated, sometimes technical discussions of how to construct indices, how to distinguish correlation from causation, and how to model complex choices using statistics. Nevertheless, we have kept sight of the broader substantive conclusions that rest on these statistical and conceptual arguments, and clarified the substantive importance of the assumptions that we make in our analysis. The guiding principle is that these methods help us to answer substantive questions.

The methodological tools that we have introduced in this book are general tools that help us to better understand a host of general problems in the social sciences that extend beyond these applications in Indonesia. Our analysis of what individual piety means conceptually and how to measure it empirically, from chapter 2, should help other scholars seeking to measure piety among survey respondents to better ground their measures in a substantive theory of piety, rather than employing survey items that happen to be available but are not so grounded in theory. The challenge of distinguishing religion from reformism to explain partisan support for Islamist parties, which we took up in chapter 3, is obviously relevant to understanding events in the Arab Middle East following the Arab Spring. Our experimental framework travels readily—with appropriate modifications to fit different national contexts—to help tackle this question, as demonstrated recently by Jamal, Masoud, and Nugent (2014). So, too, can it be used to explore valence issues other than religion in Muslim-majority countries, such as ethnicity or "values." Likewise,

any set of identities that can be characterized as multidimensional and/or nonexclusive can be analyzed using the tools in chapter 5. There is surprisingly little research that explicitly models identity in ways that respect multidimensionality and nonexclusivity, despite what we believe to be wide—if implicit—acceptance that this is likely to be true (Abdelal et al. 2009; Chandra 2006).

The takeaway message from this book is much more, however, than just the lack of an association between piety and politics, or the set of conceptual, statistical, or inferential techniques that other scholars may apply to related problems in their own research. It is that piety among Muslims must be understood alongside the complex, multifaceted transformations that are concurrently underway in Muslim societies. At various points throughout this book, we have identified globalization, modernization, and democratization as forms of social, economic, and political change that shape the lives of Indonesian Muslims. These concomitant processes mediate any simple relationship between religious belief, on one hand, and political preferences and economic behaviors, on the other. Our more general conclusion is therefore a constructive one about the study of Islam, to place Islamic revitalization in its appropriate social and political context. Although the methods and the data that we use to construct our argument are novel, we are certainly not the first to have reached this conclusion: Khoury (1983) made an analogous argument more than three decades ago in the Middle East, and more recent formulations from Indonesia include Rudnyckyj (2009) and Hadiz (2014). We hold that our insights drawn from Indonesia are likely to apply to Islamic revivalism in the rest of the Muslim world.

Of course, it is always difficult to generalize about findings of particular behavioral and attitudinal patterns from single country studies, and our quantitative case study of Indonesia is no exception. From the broader perspective of Islamic studies, though, the Indonesian case is usually a particularly difficult one to sell. Some scholars motivate the study of Islam in Indonesia by appealing to the uniqueness of the Indonesian case—as a window into the variation that exists across the Muslim world, a corrective to a popular and academic focus on the Arab Middle East as representative

of the Muslim world, or to use the liminality of Indonesia as a window into the making and remaking of Islam (see, e.g., Bowen 1993: 4–11; Geertz 1968: 9–13; Hefner 2000: 6–10). An alternative is to remind readers that Indonesia is, after all, the world's most populous Muslim country, so it is worthy of study in its own right even if it is not representative of the Middle Eastern cases. We certainly agree that these are valuable perspectives. But we adopt a different approach in this book to motivate the intense study of Indonesian Islam. We have argued that Indonesia is the *best* place to study Muslim democracy in action—it is, indeed, the only country in which we can observe how Islamist ideologies interact with non-Islamist ones in the electoral sphere today. But even further, we have shown in chapter 1 that Indonesia is not an "outlier" Muslim country across a wide range of metrics that we can use to compare countries. In making this case, we seek to reclaim a central position for Indonesia in the study of Islam, not because Indonesia is unusual, not because it is peripheral, not because it is big, *but because it is typical*.

There is one final conclusion to draw from our findings as well, about piety itself. If individual piety does not predict things like support for Islamic law, partisan preferences, or market behavior, then should we conclude that piety is unimportant? Nothing in this book should be construed as leading to that conclusion. Instead, we hope to refocus the study of piety among Indonesian Muslims on the beliefs and behaviors that constitute it, and the social, demographic, or ideational factors that shape it. Rather than considering individual piety as an explanatory or independent variable, our hope is to recast it either as a dependent variable to be explained, or more generally, as a phenomenon to be understood in its individual and social context. Naturally, such understandings of piety cannot be found in mass public opinion, and impersonal surveys can reveal only hints. Rather, ethnographic research of the type found in Rudnyckyj (2010) is essential for understanding meaning and content, alongside careful analysis of the social context of Islamic revivalism of the type found in Fealy and White (2008). The implication from our survey-based analysis of Indonesian Islam is that there is a lot that we still do not know about piety.

REVISITING OUR LIMITATIONS

As we look ahead to ways in which scholars of Islam, democracy, public opinion, and Indonesia can build on our arguments, it is helpful to recapitulate some of the limitations of this book that we identified in chapter 1.

Perhaps the most significant limitation of our book is that it looks only at a single snapshot of Indonesia, from 2008. We are unable to compare piety in 1955 to piety in 1998 to piety today. This means that our analysis of Islamic revivalism is constrained to be an analysis of variation in piety among a cross section of Indonesians, rather than a dynamic analysis of how piety has changed over time and the events or historical processes that may shape that change. We do not doubt that such a dynamic analysis of piety and public opinion and how each has changed over time is essential for developing a more comprehensive understanding of Indonesian Islam, and we hope that our approach will inspire future public opinion research that enables scholars to make comparisons across time. Nevertheless, if we are sensitive in the conclusions that we draw, we do still learn a good deal about piety and public opinion from a single cross section. Recall, for example, our findings in chapter 4 that more pious Muslims are no more likely to use Islamic financial products. This finding does not preclude piety from shaping personal economic choices in previous decades, or in the future, but it does tell us that any theory of the relationship between piety and economic behavior must account for their decoupling in the contemporary Indonesian context.

There may also have been changes in Indonesian public opinion and Islam between 2008 and today. A look at today's Indonesian headlines—at the time of writing (February 2017)—would see continued attention to Islam and Indonesian public life in venues such as the *New York Times* ("As Shariah Experiment Becomes a Model, Indonesia's Secular Face Slips," January 12, 2017), *Asia Times* ("A Rising Tide of Islamic Intolerance," January 25, 2017), and *Voice of America* ("Majority of Religion School Teachers in Indonesia Support Sharia Law," December 27, 2016). Indonesian media cover Islam, politics, and economics regularly and enthusiastically ("Jakarta Considered Worthy of Becoming Center

of Islamic Economics," *Kompas*, January 25, 2017; "The All-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals Urges the Ummah to Vote," *Republika*, February 9, 2017). In late 2016, a large demonstration in Jakarta called "Aksi Bela Islam III" (Defending Islam Action III) saw hundreds of thousands of Muslims assemble to demand the conviction of Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (a.k.a. Ahok), a Sino-Indonesian Christian accused of having insulted Islam. The subsequent gubernatorial campaign saw an aggressive push by hardline Islamists who found some support from Anies Baswedan, previously considered a moderate Muslim voice. In the end, Anies defeated the popular Ahok, and Ahok was subsequently convicted and jailed on the blasphemy charges. These developments have led some observers of Indonesian politics to question whether a more hardline Islamist conservatism is indeed on the rise in Indonesia today (see Bean 2017; Hikam 2016).

This focus on headline events might suggest that Indonesian Islam has changed in the years since 2008 in ways that might affect the conclusions we draw from our survey. But in fact, we fielded our survey in the wake of an earlier period of heightened awareness of Islam in Indonesian politics, following the passage of the Anti-Pornography and Pornographic Acts Bill of 2008 and increasing public and scholarly awareness of hardline groups like the Islamic Defenders Front who today continue to play similar roles in Indonesian public life. Scholars of Indonesian politics have studied new forces of Islam in Indonesian politics since at least the early 1990s (Hefner 1993; Liddle 1996), and Islamism has been a force in Indonesian politics since independence. We cannot know if current events in Indonesia represent something new or the continuation of a decade-plus of Islamist mobilization in democratic Indonesia. We do not think, however, that headline events provide any reason to conclude Indonesian public opinion has changed appreciably on Islam since 2008.

A second limitation of our book is its exclusive focus on Indonesia. We have made a strong case in favor of an intensive study of the Indonesian case, but plainly, a general contribution to understanding Islam requires comparative work. Several questions are of particular importance. First, to what extent does the pattern of piety that we have uncovered among

Indonesian Muslims apply more generally? We find that piety among Muslims varies along a single dimension, and is unrelated to beliefs about sharia and political Islam. Does the same pattern hold in other Muslim majority countries? Second, at a more conceptual level, are there other indicators of piety that would be more appropriate in other countries? Recall our description of the "breadth" of our measure of piety in section "Breadth" that rituals such as *tahlilan* (ritual prayers for the deceased) and communal practices such as *pengajian* (communal Qur'anic study sessions) may be viewed as not strictly part of a definition of piety. They also do not have meaning beyond the Indonesian context. A comparative perspective must be similarly rooted in national—or even local—understandings of religious belief, worship, and practice in order to conceptualize piety in ways that are appropriate to the context in which Muslims live.

Finally, our argument relies heavily on surveys as a window into public opinion. Some may view public opinion research as hopelessly devoid of context, but as the accompanying discussion in the preceding chapters has stressed, we always have rooted our discussion in a qualitative, historically grounded, and contextually sensitive understanding of the Indonesian case to ensure that the questions we ask and our interpretations of our findings make sense. This is exactly the "unit context" that privileges "the features of a case [that] give it meaning" (Pepinsky 2014a: 447). Our analysis of Indonesia would not have been possible otherwise.

Still, public opinion is but a small portion of Indonesian politics, and no analysis of Islam and politics can be confined to survey responses. We find it most useful to view our findings as a baseline that captures contemporary public sentiment about Islam in Indonesia, and to use this baseline to evaluate questions such as elite radicalization, movement power, inequality, party strategy, and so forth (for a contemporary overview of these and other perspectives on Indonesian politics, see Ford and Pepinsky 2014).

For an example of how this is possible, consider analyses of "secular democracy" in Indonesia (Barton 2010; Mujani and Liddle 2009). One way in which Islam and secular democracy may coexist in contemporary Indonesia is if Indonesian Muslims are not particularly religious, or if Indonesian Islam is "not real Islam" (Azra 2003: 39). Our findings suggest

an alternative interpretation. Indonesian Muslims are, in fact, religious—they simply do not vote exclusively on scriptural grounds. This implies, in turn, that understanding the relative success of particular Islamist parties in contemporary Indonesia requires attention to the mobilizational and programmatic strategies that parties pursue (Hamayotsu 2011a, 2011b), or to religion as a category of identity, rather than to voters' narrow preferences for these parties' religious platforms. Likewise, the rise of sharia regulations, and the broader "conservative turn" (van Bruinessen 2013) in Islamist political discourse, may not be the product of an Islamist shift in Indonesians' mass preferences. Instead, a focus on local elite competition (Buehler 2013) and global trends in Islamic discourse (van Bruinessen 2011) is more revealing. Our analysis in this book complements these other analyses by showing the limits of Islamic piety as an explanation for trends in contemporary Indonesian politics.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

Although we have written this book primarily for an academic audience and focused almost exclusively in the preceding chapters on the academic debates to which our findings contribute, we do believe that our findings have implications for policymakers in Indonesia and elsewhere. Some of them are fairly prosaic. For example, those who market Islamic financial products to Muslims should focus more on providing an identifiably Islamic yet wholly modern product that attracts middle- and upper-class Muslims.[1] Likewise, we have shown that Islamist parties can only win votes by appealing to Islam when they find themselves in the curious situation where voters are ignorant about their policy platforms as well as those of their non-Islamist opponents. And in this case, convincing voters

1. An inspection of the websites of sharia banks and sharia units shows that their marketing departments have already embraced this message. See, e.g., the website of Bank Muamalat at http://www.bankmuamalat.co.id/, last accessed on March 11, 2015, which features information about prize giveaways and the ease of banking with the bank, alongside information about how Islamic finance works.

of their party's developmentalist and reformist credentials is more valuable than an Islamist message anyway. As we hinted in the introduction, some of Indonesia's Islamist parties have indeed reacted to these specific findings. When we first presented them in Jakarta in 2009, for example, an attendee from the leadership of PKS expressed interest in our results, and assured us that his party intended to move away from a focus on Islam and toward good governance and developmentalism.

Perhaps more importantly, our findings should also inform policymakers interested in Islam, religious revitalization, democracy, and relations between the West and the Muslim world. Consider our findings about piety and global engagement. In addition to Indonesia being a key security partner for the United States, Indonesian democracy is an important part of its foreign relations with the United States and other Western states (Emmerson 2006; Murphy 2009, 2010). If we had found in chapter 5 that religious revitalization led Indonesians to engage less with the West and more with the Muslim world, this might confirm the fears expressed in some recent overviews of US-Indonesian relations that democracy has empowered an anti-American religious constituency that will make Indonesia a less compliant partner for Western foreign policy in the Muslim world (see e.g. Murphy 2010). Scholars of Arab foreign policy have long voiced parallel concerns about what the Arab Spring means for US relations with Egypt, Tunisia, and other Middle Eastern countries where Muslim religious expression is also more conspicuously present in recent decades. The evidence here should be heartening on this account, for we find no evidence that more pious Muslims in Indonesia are more anti-Western than their less pious peers.

Policymakers should also take note of our other findings about global engagement, specifically that piety among Indonesian Muslims is associated with greater engagement with East and Southeast Asia. This finding reflects an understudied shift in the ways in which Indonesians relate to other parts of Asia. For most of Indonesia's independent history, great power politics and ideology dominated relations between Indonesia and other states in the region. China-Indonesia relations prior to 1965 reflected an incipient "Beijing-Hanoi-Jakarta axis," one opposed both to

Western or US influence in the region and wary of a Soviet-dominated communist bloc in Asia. After 1965, Indonesia's relations with China and the non-aligned Southeast Asian states soured, to be replaced with trade and investment relations with Japan and South Korea, and regional alignments with noncommunist Southeast Asia through the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is only with the rise of China as a commercial power in the post–Cold War era, and the growth of ASEAN to encompass all of Southeast Asia except for Timor-Leste, that Indonesian foreign policy has moved past Cold War politics.

Viewed in this context, the relationship between piety and engagement with East and Southeast Asia is particularly intriguing. It further reinforces our view that religious revivalism in Indonesia is a multifaceted process with cosmopolitan effects, and policymakers should not ignore how Indonesian Muslims conceive of themselves as members not just of the Muslim world but also of the global South. Given the animosity between Islamist and communist elements in Indonesia that came to a head during the killings of 1965–1966 (see, e.g., Wertheim 1966), and the widely-perceived continued specter of communism in Indonesia even today, the finding that pious Muslims favor deeper engagement with East Asia also suggests that at least in the eyes of the Indonesian mass public, the People's Republic of China is no longer a source of threat on communist ideological grounds. (Some politicians and military officers, of course, continue to claim that communism represents a significant "latent threat" in Indonesia.)

Our findings also have implications for how to understand Indonesian democracy. The basic facts in the Indonesian case are simple and clear. Since democratization in 1999, Islamist parties in Indonesia have not prevailed in democratic elections. At the same time, Islamists have met with some success in furthering what might be considered an Islamist political agenda. What this means, however, is the subject of a growing, and indeed sharpening, debate.

Existing perspectives on political Islam and democracy in Indonesia—both among academics and among members of the policy community—follow one of two general approaches. The first focuses on the characteristics of Indonesian Islam itself. As we discussed in chapters 1 and 2, these

arguments hold that Indonesian Muslims are inherently moderate, or syncretic, or pluralist, or heterogeneous, or some other quality that makes Indonesian Islam uniquely compatible with democracy. In the Guided Democracy era, Benda (1965) suggested that whenever political Islam emerges as a force in Indonesian politics, it encounters a reaction from the country's nationalists, whose political aspirations channel Indonesia's Javanese, aristocratic, and pre-Islamic cultural substrata. Following a different line of reasoning, Ramage (1995) argued during the New Order that the wide acceptance of Indonesia's national ideology of Pancasila has shaped the ways in which Indonesian Muslim political leaders articulate democratic ideals. Whatever the explanation for the uniqueness of Indonesian Islam, for this line of reasoning, the key question is, "Does the nature of Islam in Indonesia mitigate the tensions between political Islam and democracy?" An implication, then, is that if Indonesian Islam were to become—or if it were discovered to be—less moderate, less syncretic, less pluralist, or less heterogeneous than previously thought, this would have negative consequences for the compatibility of political Islam and democracy in Indonesia. This leads to worries about the adoption of a more conspicuously religious identity by many Indonesian Muslims over the past forty years, and to debates as to whether this process threatens the non-Islamic foundations of Indonesian democracy.

A second general approach shifts focus from the particular characteristics of Islam as practiced in Indonesia and their consequences for political behavior to the essential characteristics of Islam as a religion. Arguments made from this second approach challenge (either implicitly or explicitly) the supposition that political Islam and democracy are somehow incompatible. Rather, these analyses seek to demonstrate that pious Muslims can be committed members of a democratic polity, and reject the conclusion of some scholars of Islam (and some Islamists themselves) that Islam requires its believers to reject democracy as inherently un-Islamic. Writing just prior to the end of the New Order, for example, Barton (1997) studied the thought of several "Islamic liberals" in Indonesia, arguing that they were developing a new "progressive" form of Islamic political thought that would subsequently become a basis for

Indonesian democracy.[2] For these scholars, the evidence required to study the relationship between democracy and political Islam in Indonesia comes from ethical claims drawn from religious texts and those who interpret them, not from mass beliefs or preferences. That is, the existence of antidemocratic Islamic parties, for example, has no bearing on the "true" relationship between political Islam and democracy in Indonesia, or anywhere else for that matter. For this line of research, the key question is, "Are there tensions between Islam as a religion and democracy as a form of government in Indonesia?" This is an Indonesian version of a global question, which Tibi (2008: 44) articulates simply as, "How democratic is Islamism?" That said, the existence of conspicuously pious Muslim democrats, who are common in contemporary Indonesia, is often used to demonstrate that political Islam and democracy are indeed compatible. At the same time, as Menchik (2016) has argued, Indonesia's Muslim democrats may not favor the variant of liberal democracy found in the United States.

Our findings in this book can be read alongside both of these perspectives on Islam and Indonesian democracy. We find evidence that Indonesian Muslims are indeed pious, and that traditional *aliran* cleavages no longer map neatly onto variation in individual piety. These findings may worry those who have argued that Indonesia's form of Islam is inherently moderate and syncretic, and thus democratic, because we have demonstrated that Indonesian Islam might be a bit less syncretic than previously thought. However, we do not find evidence, either in our analysis of beliefs about democracy in chapter 2 or in our analysis of party support in chapter 3, that piety *matters* for party ideology. While there is still a lot that we do not know about individual piety among Indonesian Muslims, we do now know that it is not a major force in Indonesian party politics.

To the extent that observers of Indonesia should worry about Islam as a threat to Indonesian democracy, it is not because of the beliefs of Indonesian Muslims. Rather, it is because of the choices of Indonesia's political elites, or the strategies that Indonesia's parties—Islamist *and*

2. Indonesian Muslim intellectuals such as Ulil Abshar-Abdalla and the late Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid have played a prominent role in this line of research.

others—pursue to secure power. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Indonesia's Islamists have made a choice to accept democratic elections as the procedure through which citizens allocate political authority. That is, they have accepted as legitimate that democracy is a procedure by which, in the words of Przeworski (1991: 10), "parties lose elections. There are parties: divisions of interest, values and opinions. There is competition, organized by rules. And there are periodic winners and losers." Islamists in Indonesia have organized political parties, they have lost elections, and they continue to participate in them. Any threat to Indonesian democracy coming from Indonesia's Islamists now comes from within the often corrupt, sometimes ugly, process of democratic politics itself, in which the Islamists are only one of many actors.

APPENDIX

Constructing Our Survey

The bulk of the survey data that we employ in this book comes from a single, large, nationally representative survey that we conducted in 2008. Here, we describe how we implemented this survey and give a basic overview of the demographic characteristics of the respondents. These give us confidence that these results are broadly representative of the entire Indonesian population.

We constructed our sample frame via a multistage random sampling technique. We began with the national census to stratify our sample by the percentage of the national population living in each of Indonesia's thirty-three provinces and the percentage classified as urban or rural in each province. This gives the stratification weight for each province *i* as w_i, with $\Sigma_1^{33} w_i = 1$. The number of respondents drawn from each province is accordingly $w_i \cdot n$, where n is the sample size (2,548). Within each province, we also take from the census an exhaustive list of all inhabited places (*desa*/*kelurahan*), which serve as the primary sampling unit. (*Desa* corresponds to village, while *kelurahan* is roughly equivalent to an urban ward.) We impose that ten respondents will be drawn from each *desa*/*kelurahan*, so we choose at random $\frac{w_i \cdot n}{10}$ *desa/kelurahan* from each province, stratified by the percentage of that province's population that is classified as urban or rural.

In each selected village and ward we obtained a list of neighborhoods (*rukun tetangga*), which we further sampled randomly, choosing five *rukun tetangga* from each *desa/kelurahan*. Survey teams then obtained

Table A.1 Total Respondents, by Province and Urban-Rural Split

Province	Rural	Urban	Total
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	40	10	50
Sumatera Utara	80	60	140
Sumatera Barat	40	10	50
Riau	40	20	60
Jambi	20	10	30
Sumatera Selatan	50	30	80
Bengkulu	10	9	19
Lampung	70	20	90
Bangka-Belitung	10	0	10
Kepulauan Riau	0	10	10
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta	0	90	90
Jawa Barat	220	219	439
Jawa Tengah	240	150	390
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta	20	20	40
Jawa Timur	250	170	420
Banten	50	50	100
Bali	20	20	40
Nusa Tenggara Barat	30	20	50
Nusa Tenggara Timur	40	10	50
Kalimantan Barat	40	10	50
Kalimantan Tengah	10	10	20
Kalimantan Selatan	30	10	40
Kalimantan Timur	10	20	30
Sulawesi Utara	30	0	30
Sulawesi Tengah	20	10	30
Sulawesi Selatan	60	30	90
Sulawesi Tenggara	20	0	20
Gorontalo	10	0	10
Sulawesi Barat	10	0	10
Maluku	10	10	20
Maluku Utara	10	0	10
Papua	10	10	20
Papua Barat	10	0	10
Total	1,510	1,038	2,548

NOTE: This table provides comparative data on respondents to our 2008 survey.

Table A.2 Summary Statistics

Ethnicity	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Education**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Javanese	1,022	40.22	No schooling	157	6.17
Sundanese	425	16.73	Some primary	429	16.87
Malay	131	5.16	Completed primary	758	29.81
Madurese	101	3.97	Some middle school	101	3.97
Bugis	71	2.79	Completed middle school	391	15.38
Betawi	67	2.64	Some secondary	76	2.99
Batak	34	1.34	Completed secondary	472	18.56
Minang	67	2.64	Some tertiary	17	0.67
Balinese	41	1.61	Diploma graduate	49	1.93
Bantenese	13	0.51	University graduate	93	3.66
Other	569	22.39			
Income	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Religion**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
< 200	494	19.71	Muslim	2,241	88.33
200–399	398	15.88	Protestant	146	5.75
400–599	440	17.56	Catholic	76	3
600–799	238	9.5	Hindu	45	1.77
800–999	241	9.62	Buddhist	14	0.55
1,000–1,999	229	9.14	Other	15	0.59
1,200–1,399	46	1.84			
1,400–1,599	80	3.19	**Age**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
1600–1799	30	1.2	< 20	89	3.61
1,800–1,999	61	2.43	20–29	488	19.82
2,000–2,999	142	5.67	30–39	725	29.45
3,000–3,999	49	1.96	40–49	526	21.36
4,000–4,999	21	0.84	50–59	370	15.03
>5000	37	1.48	60–69	174	7.07
			> 70	90	3.66

NOTE: This table provides comparative data on respondents to our 2008 survey. Income refers to monthly household income in thousands of Indonesian rupiah.

from the neighborhood heads in each chosen neighborhood the complete list of household heads (KK, *kepala keluarga*) and members of each household. From these, we chose two households at random, and approached both to enumerate all household members over seventeen years of age. Alternating by gender, with one man and one woman from each neighborhood, respondents were chosen randomly from the lists of members in each household using a Kish grid. Our response rate was 89.3%. The total number of respondents per province, broken down by the number in urban and rural sampling units, appears in table A.1.

Below, we describe some of the basic features of our survey sample. Table A.2 shows the distribution of respondents according to ethnicity, religion, education, income, and age.

The most important conclusion to take away from table A.2 is that the survey is broadly representative of Indonesia. Like Indonesia as a whole, 88% of our survey respondents are Muslim, 40% are Javanese, and the top ten most numerous ethnic groups account for less than 80% of our respondents. The vast majority of our respondents have at least some formal education, although only about 25% have completed secondary schooling. Income inequality is readily apparent, with fully one in five respondents having a household income of less than Rp 200,000 per month (approximately US$20 in 2008).

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